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ABSTRACT
FAST GLASS: MODERNITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE CINEMATIC LENS
by
Allain Daigle
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Tami Williams
This dissertation tells a cultural history of how lenses became cinema lenses. While
lenses are essential for film production, we know very little about the early history of cinema
lenses. Rather than just focusing on which lenses were used on certain movies, I historicize how
lens production became an industry. Between the 1880s and the 1920s, lens production shifted
from an artisanal craft to a commercial industry. By looking at how companies created lenses for
film production and projection, I expand early film history to account for the creative work of
opticians, engineers, advertisers, and distributors. In more specifically focusing on how lenses
became “cinema lenses,” I historicize how ideas central to film studies – perspective, objectivity,
subjectivity, and realism – were considered in relationship to lenses. I examine four influential
optical companies in Germany (Zeiss), France (E. Krauss), the United States (Bausch & Lomb),
and England (Taylor-Hobson). By examining international optics alongside film history, we can
see that lenses were not just the product of remarkable inventors or ever-improving designs.
Ultimately, I argue that lenses were shaped by a wide range of social, cultural, and industrial
debates about the role that technologies of vision played in 19th and 20th century life.
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Introduction | Lens Culture
For the successful photographing of
motion pictures in studios and in all kinds
of weather, a lens of considerable speed
is needed.
Motion Picture News (1916)
“Fast glass” describes lenses ideally suited to photographing subjects that are either
quickly moving or in low conditions of natural light. The phrase, poetically collapsing the space
of the lens’ view with the speed of the camera shutter, is an informal term used by photographers
and cinematographers to describe lenses with wide apertures. Fast glass is also emblematic of a
belief that photography and cinema encouraged at the turn of the 20th century: that technology
could arrest and illuminate a world beyond direct human perception.
Lenses supplemented and enhanced human perception during a period of intense and
rapid technological change in Europe and the Americas. Cities were undergoing rapid industrial
expansion; manufacturing technologies were reshaping visions of labor and leisure time;
railroads accelerated the circulation of people and products alike. 1 Science, art, literature, and
philosophy sought to represent dramatic changes in perceptions of time and space that occurred
as a consequence of an increasingly rapid technological world. This constellation of changes
constituted cultural modernity: a term Anson Rabinbach uses to describe the intimate connection
that developed between rapid industrialization and representations of time and space. In contrast
For broader discussions of the relationship between technology and modern culture, see Rabinbach, The Human
Motor; Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1990); Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwartz, eds., Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995); Brian Jacobson, Studios Before the System: Architecture, Technology, and the
Emergence of Cinematic Space (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); and Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence
of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). For a
more detailed discussion of modernity and transit, see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: Trains and
Travel in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Urizen Books, 1979); Kristen Whissel, Picturing American Modernity:
Traffic, Technology, and the Silent Cinema (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); and Ott, “Iron Horses:
Leland Stanford, Eadweard Muybridge, and the Industrialised Eye.”

1
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to technological modernity, which foregrounds technology as the central criteria of
modernization, cultural modernity emphasizes that any technological development should be
recognized in the context of its self-construction by society. Amidst these changes in social
experience were scientists, artists, and entrepreneurs who sought to capture moving images of a
changing world through a camera lens.
Perhaps more than any other representational form, cinema held a privileged relationship
to modernity. As Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwartz contend in Cinema and the Invention of
Modern Life, cinema became the “fullest expression and combination of modernity’s attributes”
due to the fact that “modern culture was ‘cinematic’ before the fact.” 2 A changing relationship
between vision and experience characterized modern culture’s cinematic nature. Workers saw
their time materialize as commodities. 3 Passengers took pleasure from the railroad’s collapse of
time and space. 4 Citizens increasingly looked at the world as consumers in urban shopping
centers and brought these practices to the world more broadly. 5 Cinema did not just represent the
modern world: the modern world was increasingly experienced as cinematic.
Although less closely examined by early film historians in comparison to manufacturing,
transit, or urbanization, the industrialization of precision lenses emerged in and through the same
changes that gave rise to the emergence of cinema and modern life. As theorist Mary Ann Doane
argues, photographic images, especially motion pictures, best expressed and visualized the
abstract knowledge authorizing the interlocking social projects of science, government, and

Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwartz, “Introduction” in Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life, eds. Leo Charney
and Vanessa Schwartz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 1.
3
Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, The Archive (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002), 7
4
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
5
Anne Friedberg, Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
2

2

industry. The public fascination with daguerrotypes, stereoscopes, photography, and cinema was
a fascination with the “encoding of lens imagery in a permanent, retrievable form.” 6 If modernity
was cinematic, this was due in no small part to the industrialization of lens production and the
adoption of optical technologies by a wide array of modern institutions. Between the 1880s and
the 1920s, lens production widely shifted from an artisanal practice to an industrial system. Lens
production was predominantly located in newly industrial cities like Jena, Rochester, and
Leicester. International systems of modern traffic brought together resources like clay, fuel,
refined silica, and professional knowledge. 7 The mass production of lens-based instruments –
ranging from to microscopes to binoculars to photographic cameras to cinema cameras –
manufactured perception as an object for mass-consumption.
In optics, lens history is frequently written as the product of remarkable inventors or as an
ever-improving series of physical designs. Rudolf Kingslake’s foundational work, A History of
the Photographic Lens (1989) is an exemplary work of optical history that provides a
wonderfully complex, but primarily technical, history of lens design. As he writes early on in his
book:
Any attempt to develop a strictly chronological approach to the history of the
photographic objective is invariably confused by a hopeless mass of crosscurrents. It
would be easier if each type of lens had been invented, developed, perfected, and then
abandoned in a limited period of time…Unfortunately for the historian, but fortunately
for the working photographer, the lenses available at any one time cover a wide range of
constructional types.” 8
Kingslake’s history traces the history of photographic lenses through different types of lens
designs. In contrast to most optical histories, Kingslake’s work is nuanced and accounts for the
multiple and overlapping trajectories of lens production. But, the latter third of Kingslake’s book

A.D. Coleman, “Lentil Soup,” Et Cetera (Spring 1985): 20.
For more on modern traffic, see Kristen Whissel, Picturing American Modernity.
8
Rudolph Kingslake, A History of the Photographic Lens (Boston: Academic Press, 1989), 7.
6
7
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exemplifies a pervasive tendency that infects histories of science and technology more broadly:
the history of optics written as a pantheon of fifty-nine white men, with nearly all hailing from
Europe or from European descent. 9 Kingslake himself acknowledges that even this list was the
result of a difficult search, with hundreds missing. To challenge this history is not to invalidate
the work or contributions of these opticians, but to ask: what else affected the development of
lenses over time? The multiple forms of visual culture that emerged from the use of lenses were
not solely the product of new technologies, remarkable inventors, or commercial promotors.
This project argues that the industrialization of precision lenses in the late 19th and early
20th century – explored here as both a material and a cultural practice – was as much a cultural
event as it was a series of technological developments. For most of the 19th century, individual
opticians created lenses on the basis of refined craftwork and intuition. Beginning in the 1880s,
when Zeiss began to manufacture new kinds of distortionless lenses on the basis of scientifically
designed glass, optics began to closely align with practices that sought to apply “new scientific
modes of perception to social questions” that could bring a utopian spirit of scientific neutrality
to 19th century culture. 10 The idea that lenses could improve society was not a techno-determinist
misunderstanding so much as it was a product of the way that technology was becoming
interwoven in the social fabric of industrial modernity. 11 As Brian Winston suggests,
technologies are “embedded in the social sphere and are themselves and ideological expression
of the culture.” 12 As David Noble similarly suggests, technology is deeply within culture, and

This biographical section of the book makes up over a third of the volume’s length. Rudolf Kingslake, 192-314.
Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990 (1992)), 86.
11
Readers of David Noble’s America By Design, Olivier Zunz’ Why the American Century?, and David Hounshell’s
From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932 will find striking parallels between the industries of
chemicals, electricity, higher education, and optics.
12
Brian Winston, Technologies of Seeing: Photography, Cinematography, and Television (London: BFI, 2009), 39.
9

10
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constitutes “fundamental social development in itself: the preparation, mobilization, and
habituation of people for new types of productive activity, the reorientation of the pattern of
social investment, the restructuring of social institutions, and, potentially, the redefinition of
social relationships.” 13 Lenses did not descend upon modern life fully formed for the use of
photographers and cinematographers. As technologies, lenses were shaped by a series of social,
cultural, and industrial activities that shaped the conditions under which a lens came to function
as a reliable and practical technology of vision.
This project examines the cultural history of the motion picture lens from the 1880s to the
late 1920s. To do so, I trace the history of early cinema through four influential optical
companies in Germany (Zeiss), France (E. Krauss), the United States (Bausch & Lomb), and
England (Taylor-Hobson). In Chapter 1, I use Zeiss to examine how industrial lens production
was part of a broader 19th century cultural movement that believed in the social and economic
benefits of scientifically measuring vision. By implementing scientific practices in the
predominantly artisanal practice of lens construction, Zeiss influenced a global shift towards the
industrial production of precision lenses. In Chapter 2, I use E. Krauss to examine the emergence
of cinema alongside fin-de-siècle Parisian instrument culture. In analyzing how instrument
makers branded and sold lenses in relationship to cinematic practice, I illustrate that lenses came
to circulate in ways that departed from and often exceeded the initial ideals of lens designers and
distributors. In Chapter 3, I use Bausch & Lomb to trace the effects of World War I on the
national and international production of lenses between 1914 and 1918. By examining the
wartime development of Bausch and Lomb, I argue that national anxieties about the provenance
of optical glass played a key role in expanding international optical industries in ways that were
David Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979), xxii.
13

5

unintentionally beneficial to the industrialization of film production. Finally, in Chapter 4, I
examine how and why Taylor-Hobson lenses became so closely linked to cinematic practice in
the 1920s. By examining the horizontal and vertical integrations of the studio system, I
demonstrate how lenses became most clearly defined as “cinema lenses” on the basis of studiospecific practices of film production.
Ultimately, I argue that lenses became cinema lenses on the basis of a broad range of
criteria that often had nothing to do with film form, but everything to do with cinema. As a note
on my methodology: this project does not trace which lenses were used on which films, and
neither does it trace a history of lenses solely through the lens designs that were used for
cinematography. In this effort, I run the risk of alienating both the cinephile and the technophile.
But, in looking for evidence of cinema culture at the intersection of new things and old habits, I
hope to deconstruct the inscription of optics as an industry defined by objectivity and rationalism
and illustrate the power that lenses had in shaping the relationship between modernity,
technology, and cinema.

The Myth of a Total Cinema
One might be tempted to see lenses as important to the history of cinema because lenses
satisfy the necessary technical prerequisites for the capture of clear motion pictures. However, as
André Bazin writes in “The Myth of Total Cinema,” the idea of cinema long predated its
supposed technical invention. The photographic cinema “could just as well have grafted itself
onto a phenakistoscope foreseen as long ago as the sixteenth century.” 14 What cinema does

André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema,” What is Cinema, Vol. I., trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1967), 19.

14
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emerge from is a particular convergence of “various obsessions, that is to say, out of a myth, the
myth of total cinema.” 15 The guiding myth of cinema, according to Bazin, was an “integral
realism, a recreation of the world in its own image, an image unburdened by the freedom of
interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time” that found manifestation in the late 19th
century. 16 Cinema expressed the desire to adequately represent and express the experienced
reality of a rapidly changing modernity.
Film studies has historically used the myth of total cinema to combat a reduction of
cinema down to its technical components. As evidenced by the foundational works of Tom
Gunning, Edward Dimendberg, Mary Ann Doane, and Anne Friedberg, linking cinema’s
emergence to changes in subjective experience is a useful strategy for countering the
technological determinism that characterize techno-centric histories of the cinema. Indeed, as
Charles Musser writes, early film studies’ disciplinary turn to archival evidence following the
highly influential 1978 Brighton FIAF conference was a methodology that avoided the
nationalist-inspired searches for the ‘origin’ of cinema and technological ‘firsts’ that dominated
early film history. 17 A disciplinary emphasis on social configurations rejects the ideology of
institutional imaginations and prioritizes the role of culture in social change. As Jean-Louis
Comolli suggests in “Machines of the Visible,” the cinema does not follow directly from
technological or scientific progress, but rather, the “offsettings, adjustments, arrangements
carried out by a social configuration in order to represent itself, that is, at once to grasp itself,
identify itself and itself produce itself in its representation.” 18 In representing its history as a

Ibid. 22.
Ibid. 21.
17
Charles Musser, “Nationalism and the Beginnings of Cinema: The Lumière Cinématographe in the US, 18961897,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 19, no.2 (1999): 149.
18
Jean-Louis Comolli, "Machines of the Visible," in The Cinematic Apparatus, eds. Teresa De Lauretis and Stephen
Heath (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980), 120.
15
16
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social configuration, the study of early film has richly produced the cinema as more than the sum
of its technological parts.
This suspicion of technology can be traced to the historical divorce between film studies
and the sciences, a division rooted in the development of film studies as an academic discipline
in the 1940s and 1950s. As Dudley Andrew suggests in “The Core and the Flow of Film
Studies,” cinephilia has historically been the driving force of film studies. Many of cinema’s
earliest theorists, such as Ricciotto Canudo, Rudolph Arnheim and Hugo Munsterberg, sought to
legitimize film as art, often in relationship to literature. However, in the 1940s and 1950s, the
discipline of film studies was taken over by French structuralism. Filmologie, which described
an impartial and scientifically objective study of the relationship between cinema and the social
sphere, took on increased academic prominence. 19 Coined by Gilbert Cohen-Séat, who published
Essai sur les principes d'une philosophie du cinema in 1946, filmologie became a justification
for the integration of cinema into other academic disciplines whose enrollments were, in turn,
vitalized by their offerings in film studies. Bazin’s 1946 claim that the cinema owes “virtually
nothing to the scientific spirit” was likely in dialogue with these efforts to institutionalize a more
structured and systematic approach to the study of film. 20 Filmologie and its related efforts to
legitimize film studies as a technical science were often antithetical to the cultural interests in

Sarah Cooper, “Film Theory in France,” French Studies 66.3 (1 July 2012): 376-382.
https://doi.org/10.1093/fs/kns078
20
Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema,” 164. It is worth noting that the hermeneutics of suspicion revolving around
the role of science in film studies is alive and well. At the 2018 Society for Cinema and Media Studies conference, a
paper on Bazin rallied against the idea of film studies without film. The speaker claimed that this direction of study
would be like going to a restaurant and finding that “the only thing left to eat were the menus.” While I appreciate
the speaker’s zeal, they demonstrate a willful ignorance and refusal to recognize cinema’s participation in larger
conditions of production. To follow the speaker’s analogy, there are significant moral and ethical stakes in food
production, and I would argue that it does make a significant difference whether we know if our food is locally
sourced, sustainably produced, culturally appropriative, or part of an indirect effort to gentrify a neighborhood.
19
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representation and narrative that characterized cinephilia and, in turn, the invention of cinema by
the spectator. 21
Optical science and the science of cinematography are primarily (and often necessarily)
preoccupied with questions of physics and mathematics that allow little space for cultural
considerations. Science, nonetheless, has a cultural history that intersects and parallels many of
the established genealogies of early cinematic culture. As Anson Rabinbach suggests, scientific
ideas often elude cultural historians in accounts of social change because they rarely emerge
directly, or rather, visibly, from class conflict. 22 Recent early film scholarship has begun to
interrogate this historical gap, most notably Virgilio Tosi’s Cinema Before Cinema: The Origins
of Scientific Cinematography (2005), Inga Pollman’s dissertation Cinematic Vitalism: Theories
of Life and the Moving Image (2011) Oliver Gaycken’s Devices of Curiosity: Early Cinema and
Popular Science (2015) and Scott Curtis’ The Shape of Spectatorship: Art, Science, and Early
Cinema in Germany (2015). However, these intersections are a relatively recent development in
early film scholarship. As the relationship between film and cinema becomes increasingly
unsettled at the turn of the 21st century, our current historical moment begs expanded
considerations of the ways that film and media technologies might be thought of as part of “a
larger experimental arrangement” that does not cleanly match our existing disciplinary
boundaries. 23

21
Exemplified by Christian Metz’s semiological approach to film language, Jean-Louis Baudry’s apparatus theory,
and Raymond Bellour’s narrative formalism, the high film theory of the 1960s and 1970s dovetailed filmologie’s
approach to cinema and carried forward its myopic attention to cinema’s structure. Following the rise and fall of
structuralism in the 1970s, film studies retained a skeptical relationship to structural approaches to cinema but
pursued these critical aims through the disciplinary approaches of feminism and cultural studies. We can also see
similar skepticism of structural approaches to film in the critical responses to the work of David Bordwell.
22
Rabinbach, The Human Motor, 15.
23
Scott Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship: Art, Science, and Early Cinema in Germany, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015), 3.

9

The various obsessions with realism that make up Bazin’s myth of total cinema were at
the heart of parallel 19th century debates about vision, representation, and objectivity in optical
science. The convention of some of the most influential ideas of realism and perception did, in
fact, emerge from classist distinctions that formed around the use of lens-based instruments to
demonstrate knowledge in the sciences. The division between the hard sciences and the
humanities has created both ontological and epistemological divisions between nature and
culture that, in turn, delegitimize the hybrid forms of knowledge. Lenses are a difficult object in
this respect – existing scholarship tends to analyze lenses along these disciplinary divisions.
While historical knowledge about motion picture lenses ironically remains a blind spot
for film studies, when engaged with directly, the existing scholarship in film studies has often
used lenses to think through broader ideological questions of the cinema. Bordwell, Staiger, and
Thompson’s The Classical Hollywood Cinema offers a significant historical overview of lenses
in cinema, although their accounts of lenses are primarily restricted to the role of lenses in
relationship to cinematography. Comolli’s “Machines of the Visible,” in critiquing Jean Mitry’s
determinist claims of lenses, argues that lenses are part of a broader negotiation of what
constitutes realism in mass culture. In addition to using philosophers as “Lens” interludes
between her chapters, Anne Friedberg’s The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft builds
one of its central points around lens practice, arguing that the cinema emerged as a combination
of “optical trickery with the projective illusions of the camera obscura – the projection of light in
a darkened room.” 24 The tendency to immediately link lenses with form, realism, and
spectatorship speaks to a common cultural foundation that lenses tap into: a convergence of

24

Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), 86.
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obsessions and anxieties about representation, the representable, and our capacity to apprehend
these images with and through technology.
The lens, as Comolli suggests, often stands in for the whole of the cinema. They are
simultaneously highly visible (often standing in for the whole of the cinematic dispositif) and
highly invisible (immediately subordinated to the camera, the celluloid film, or the screen). As
technological modernity decentered the role of the human eye in perception, the lens functioned
as “a guarantor of the identity of the visible with the normality of vision.” 25 This is to say: lenses
helped affirm the centrality of human perspective in the midst of the many visual technologies
offering potentially more objective claims to reality than the human eye. The metonymy of lens
and eye does reduce the cinema to one of its technological parts, but perhaps more interestingly,
the substitution suggests that lenses have borne a significant amount of imagination about
cinema’s relationship to modernity, technology, and perception.
Intuitively it might seem that this history ought to be traced through still photography and
extend to the work of early photographer-opticians like Niépce and Daguerre. As Jonathan Crary
argues in Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century, though, the
invention of photography and the cinema are often mistakenly imagined as part of a continuous
unfolding of “a Renaissance-based mode of vision in which photography, and eventually cinema,
are simply later instances of an ongoing deployment of perspectival space and perception.” 26 To
correct the notion that cinema did not emerge as the technological evolution of the photographic
camera, we must also recognize that its emergence was not limited to a history of aesthetic
photographic or screen practices. For example, foundational developments in the design,

Comolli, "Machines of the Visible,” 124.
Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1992), 3-4.

25
26
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production, and conception of photographic lenses were most strongly influenced by debates not
in photography, but in the industrial structures that emerged around microscopy. These overlaps
also occurred on the side of material supply. For example, W.K.L. Dickson experimented
extensively with microscope lenses when designing the Kinetograph for Edison in 1892. 27
Seemingly stable divisions between motion pictures and other fields of practice were less clear at
the turn of the 19th century. This project intends to track how, and more importantly why, these
distinctions formed the way they did.
Following these historical overlaps between cinema and the sciences, we ought not to
think about cinema as fundamentally divided from sciences – nor, for that matter, should we
think about science as being fundamentally divided from cinema. As Curtis suggests, “There is
an intimate and complex relationship between any technology and the agenda that makes use of
it. The technology is not merely applied to the problem; the problem presents itself in part
because of the technology.” 28 In order to understand a history of cinematic lenses, it is necessary
to understand the culture of optics in which lenses became imagined as useful and valuable in the
first place.

Lens Culture
Lenses are technologies, but lenses are also objects. As objects, lenses offer lessons in
understanding how culture has organized itself around the material of glass. Humans invest
beliefs in lenses, but lenses are also cultural because “that culture could only have emerged in the
first place through the interactions between embodied humans and a creative material world.” 29

Paul C. Spehr, The Man Who Made Movies: W.K.L. Dickson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 237.
Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship, 2.
29
Timothy LeCain. The Matter of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 236.
27
28
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Lenses exist at the surface of a complex set of material processes – they are crushed down into
silica from the quarries of Fontainebleu, melted by constant and intense heat in specially
designed clay pots, examined by testers for defects, ignored in the shop windows of Parisian
instrument retailers, worn down from excessive handling and use, laid away in attics, bought
online and shipped across the world to be remounted on digital cameras. As Lewis Mumford
claims, “Without the use of glass for spectacles, mirrors, microscopes, telescopes, windows and
containers, the modern world as realized by physics and chemistry could scarcely have been
conceived.” 30 Glass, as both a material and a way of organizing space, arranged people, places,
and their relation to each other.
Modern culture was a lens culture. Broadly conceived, lens culture is the idea that optical
principles both characterize and constitute a lived relation with the world as a visual relation to
the world. In “Lentil Soup,” photographer AD Coleman defines lens culture as “an interlocking
set of instruments and paradigms which permits the endless reframing of man as perceiver, the
world as perceived, and the lens image as both vehicle and repository for that transaction.” 31 In a
society that based a significant amount of its informational exchanges on visual knowledge,
lenses became important because they enabled viewers to perceive the act of perception. Lenses
permit us “to see the imaging process itself – to contemplate that process, abstract ideas from it,
and metacommunicate about it.” 32 Lens-based practices like photography and cinema enabled
people to apprehend images of the technological world and, in turn, imagine it. Or, as Jean-Louis
Comolli writes, culture manufactures itself from representations which are at once the “means,
matter and condition of sociality.” 33
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The lens culture of the mid to late 19th century was not invented by a certain lens, but
rather, came about through the complex integration of mass-produced lenses with a wide variety
of social, cultural, and political representational practices. Through their widespread use, lenses
sustained a broader belief in the capacity of technology to bridge a perceived gap between
human bodies and the field of the visible. Although not immediately accepted as the best object
for viewing reality, when combined with film, lenses became an essential tool for representing
reality when they became invisible. For photography and cinema to emerge as a “new”
technology in the 19th century, modern culture had to replace the existing world of signs,
activities, and social fabrics and replace them with “a ‘new world’ of objects, classification,
laws, technologies, and meanings.” 34 Simultaneously a capitalist and ecological enterprise,
lenses reinforced the belief that vision could link together humans, things, nature, and culture
together through technology. 35
Over time, the practice of using lenses to see the world has become ordinary to the point
of invisibility. Microscopy, photography, and cinema introduced “optical principles and concepts
into the givens of our culture.” 36 Lenses shape, filter, and inform the information that we see in
and through them – yet, as Coleman writes, “even the most blatant distortions tend to be taken
for granted as a result of the enduring cultural confidence in the essential trustworthiness and
impartiality of what is in fact a technology resonant with cultural bias and highly susceptible to
manipulation.” 37 As Winston suggests, technologies of seeing often have little to do with helping
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us understand their own historical and social realities: “On the contrary, their basic illusionism
disguises their artifice, their cultural formation and their ideological import.” 38
We frequently recognize cinema’s materiality only in states of decay or inconvenience:
scratched celluloid film, sticky theater floors, a multiplex with limited parking, the cracked
screen of an iPad. But, more often than not, the material culture of cinema goes unnoticed: a
smooth transition between multiple reels of film, correctly focused projectors, the energy
required to power a home television screen. Simply because cinematic materials go unnoticed
does not mean that they do not shape film culture. On the contrary: as celluloid film is displaced
by digital formats for both recording and projecting motion pictures, the lens reveals itself as one
of cinema’s most persistently material objects. To be sure, film without celluloid, theatrical
exhibition, and changing reception practices all signal a shift in what we understand cinema to
be. While celluloid has been central to the definition of film studies, the unmooring of cinema
from film stock at the close of the 20th century calls for new questions, and new histories, of
cinema without film.
This project uses optical history to more squarely plant film history in a tradition of sight
and seeing that is less dependent on the centrality of celluloid film. In addition to film history, I
use a wide range of archival resources – ranging from early optical treatises to scientific
publications to Hollywood trade press to lens catalogues 8– to read the history of the lens from
within its production contexts. This is not to say that these archival sources tell a more
fundamental truth about the history of lenses. If anything, these corporate and scientific
publications demand just as much of a cautious and critical eye to narrative structure and
aesthetic representation as film and literature. Nonetheless, these sources do offer useful insights
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about lenses in ways that classical film history has neglected. In attending to the history of the
motion picture lens, I hope to provide some tactical avenues to rethink the stakes of the “end” of
cinema. Part of this involves deconstructing the logics of techno-fetishism and rational thought
that are endemic to optical history, which obscure the ways in which lenses are connected as
much to imagination as they are imaging.
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Chapter 1 | Modern Glass: Zeiss and the Industrialization of Vision
Nothing in the history of science, not
even the airplane, or the radio, is a
greater monument to human
invention than the anastigmat.
Karl Brown (1922)
In 1922, American Cinematographer published a five-part series of articles titled
“Modern Lenses.” American Cinematographer, which began publication in 1920, was a
newsletter published by The American Society of Cinematographers about the practice and craft
of cinematography. By the 1920s, the role of the camera operator was becoming the role of the
cinematographer. The change in job title reflected an ongoing struggle to elevate the labor and
value of operating motion picture cameras. Written by Karl Brown, a cinematographer who
collaborated with D.W. Griffith, “Modern Lenses” surveyed both the historical development of
lenses and notable kinds of contemporary lenses such as soft-focus and super speed lenses. Part
historical overview, part technical reflection, and part advertising, “Modern Lenses” was
emblematic of American Cinematographer’s ongoing efforts to give cinematographers a history
and more professional legitimacy. In linking lenses to broader histories of scientific innovation,
industrial production, and contemporary aesthetics, Brown’s series defines lenses as more than
tools. Rather, lenses are imagined as emblems of modern vision.
The lens most closely associated with modernization at the turn of the 20th century was
the anastigmat, a standard type of lens used in both photography and cinematography. Brown,
dedicating the third installment in his series to anastigmats, dramatically emphasizes the
historical significance of this lens, claiming that “Nothing in the history of science, not even the
airplane, or the radio, is a greater monument to human invention than the anastigmat.” 39
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Anastigmat was originally the brand name for a lens released by the German optical company
Zeiss in 1890. These kinds of lenses were exceptionally valuable to photographers and
cinematographers because they simultaneously corrected two significant kinds of lens distortion:
chromatic aberration (where different colors of light reached a recording medium, like celluloid
film or a collodion plate, at different points) and spherical aberration (where image focus was
clear in the image center but increasingly softer at the edges of the film). Prior to anastigmats,
most lenses could correct for chromatic aberration or spherical aberration ̶ but not both.
Anastigmat became such a generic term for corrected lenses that, in 1900, the Zeiss anastigmats
became advertised by the “Protar” brand name to distinguish them from the multitude of lenses
that were being advertised as anastigmatic. 40 By the turn of the 20th century, a lack of distortion
in photographic lenses had shifted from a special feature to a basic expectation.
The historical significance of the anastigmat is more than a question of brand loyalty or
product placement. As optical historian Rudolf Kingslake provocatively declares in his 1934
article “The Development of the Photographic Objective,” lens history “divides itself naturally
into two parts, the ‘old’ period from 1812 to 1886, and then the “anastigmat” period from 1886
to the present day.” 41 The Zeiss Anastigmat was released in 1890; 1886 marked the year that the
Zeiss Glastechnisches Laboratorium Schott und Genossen (Schott and Associates Glass
Technology Laboratory) began distributing barium crown glass. The industrial production of
barium crown glass enabled lens designers to create distortionless lenses, like the Anastigmat,
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Figure 1 Zeiss Anastigmat. Carl Zeiss Optical Works Jena: Photographic
Objectives and Photo-Optical Auxiliary Appliances. 1894. 15.

that many designers had previously thought to physically impossible. In creating these new kinds
of optical glass, Zeiss chemist Otto Schott was hailed by the Deutsche Glastechnische
Gesellschaft (The German Glass Society) as “the creator of modern scientific glass
technology.” 42 In turning optical glass into a technical material that could be systemically
designed and reliably used to produce precision optical systems, Schott “allowed optics to
become a technology.” 43 Technically measured glass was imagined as a key material not only for
optics, but for “virtually all technology, i.e., in the end, for modern life in general.” 44 The
modernization of glass was a practice of subjecting glass to increased measurement, elevating it
from a material to a technology, but it was also a practice of making it possible to think of vision
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and technology as interchangeable. Anastigmats were emblematic of growing associations
between modernization, technology, and perception in the science of optical glass production.
But what was modern about this vision? And how exactly did optics’ imagination of modern
vision come to coincide with the cinema?
This chapter argues that the modernization of precision optics, exemplified by the
anastigmat, was as much as a cultural development as it was a technological development. The
scientific production of lenses was part of a broader cultural movement in Germany that saw
social and economic benefits resulting from the scientific measurement of vision. In order to
understand why scientifically designed lenses became so valuable, this chapter will lay out a
longer tradition of anxieties about the reliability of vision and visual technologies that were
addressed – albeit unevenly – by the scientific design of optical glass and precision lenses. Using
Zeiss as a case study, I argue that that modern glass emerged at the confluence of three
significant cultural developments: the professional acceptance of theoretical science by optical
designers, the standardization of previously artisanal practices of lens production, and the
convergence of these scientific practices with photographic lens production. By implementing
scientific practices in the predominantly artisanal practice of lens construction, Zeiss influenced
a global shift towards an industrial production model of precision lenses. While the
modernization of glass has been historically equated with practices of remarkable industrial
innovation, as Miriam Bratu Hansen writes, “We should not underrate the extent to which
modernism was also a popular, or more precisely, a mass movement.” 45 Together, these cultural
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influences aligned modern vision with a historically specific practice of mass manufacturing
lenses according to scientific measurements.

Modern Vision
Modern culture was frequently cinematic before the fact of cinema. 46 As Leo Charney
and Vanessa Schwartz contend in Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life, the cinema as it
came to be understood at the turn of the century emerged from “a historically specific culture of
the cinematic which emerged from ̶ yet also ran parallel to ̶ other transformations associated
with modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” 47 Modernity – the insistence
upon the present and its future as a resistance to the past – characterized a broad range of social,
economic, cultural, and subjective transformations to Western life in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. 48 The majority of scholarship on early cinema’s relationship to modernity places
cinema in relationship to a series of ongoing transformations in 19th century modern society such
as the rise of consumer culture, the annihilation of space and time by the railroad, and the
urbanization of cities. As theorist Mary Ann Doane argues, photographic images, especially
motion pictures, best expressed and visualized the abstract knowledge authorizing the
interlocking social projects of science, government, and industry. Motion pictures were not
invented so much as they participated in an ongoing cultural imperative to represent and
apprehend a profoundly disembodied sense of reality.
The increased experience of abstraction in daily life was one of the defining
characteristics of modernity. As Crary argues, photography and cinema are best understood as “a
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crucial component of a new cultural economy of value and exchange” rather than as increasingly
advanced form of visual representation. 49 Paper money, iron and glass architecture, clocks,
railroad travel, urbanization, and photography all participated in the broad disintegration of “a
stable and local presence” in the 19th century. 50 Industrial capitalism’s search for expanding
markets, and its creation of institutions that could support those markets, enacted abstraction as a
daily experience ̶ an experience, in Karl Marx’ words, characterized by the sense that “All that
is solid melts into air.” 51
As labor time became central to the functioning of industrial capitalism, conceptions of
time and its representability became crucially supported by processes of abstraction and
rationalization. 52 For Crary, photography and cinema were adjuncts to a larger social project to
refigure how “an observer was figured in a wide range of social practices and domains of
knowledge.” 53 Many of the dominant forms of producing realistic effects in 19th century mass
visual culture, such as the stereoscope, were based on “a radical abstraction and reconstruction of
optical experience.” 54 A handheld set of slightly distorted lenses that enabled spectators to see
far off scenarios in three dimensions, the stereoscope was immensely popular and made it
possible for spectators to make pleasure out of an experience of abstract viewing. These
seemingly disparate modern practices were, as Mary Ann Doane contends, “effects of a
historical pressure to rethink time in relation to its representability.” 55 In the context of an
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industrial economy that relied deeply on abstraction, the value of perception expanded from the
capacity to see to the capacity to stabilize multiple abstract representations as real presence. In
turn, human perception – the unaided eye – was increasingly experienced as inadequate to the
apprehension of a rapidly moving and abstract experience of modern time.
Developments in 19th century sciences increasingly demonstrated that visual perception
provided an incomplete vision of lived reality. In particular, statistics and thermodynamics
unsettled previously firm beliefs in the relationship between human perception and reality.
Statistics, as a way of accounting for and managing random variation, challenged the belief that
individual perception alone was adequate to apprehending the natural world. 56 Similarly,
Hermann von Helmholtz’ theories of thermodynamics gave rise to a deep crisis of faith in future
of human progress. Thermodynamics established a scientific justification for the equality of
humanity and nature by stating that energy could not be created or destroyed, only changed.
Helmholtz was not the first to discover the theory of the conservation of force, but he conceived
of its mathematical principles in a structure that “encompassed and surpassed the individual
findings and ideas of his codiscoverers.” 57 The law of energy stated that energy, unmanaged,
flowed naturally into disorder – simultaneously suggesting that human beings were equally
subject to the inevitable flow of energy into chaos.
In the wake of Helmholtz’s theories, the application of the scientific method to society
took on a moral imperative. Helmholtz himself was an influential agent in linking science to
society. Following his 1847 address on the universal law of the conservation of energy,
Helmholtz’s writings and popular lectures on thermodynamics linked together planets, forces of
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nature, machines, and human labor power as examples of the principle of, and the social need
for, the conservation of energy. 58 Helmholtz was an influential agent of what Anson Rabinbach
terms “social modernity:” the practice of applying “new scientific modes of perception to social
questions and bringing to bear a spirit of utopian and scientific “neutrality” that was opposed to
the forces that rent 19th century society along lines of class and ideology.” 59 A series of social
projects studying industrial accidents, fatigue, and human motion through photographic images
demonstrated the far-reaching impact of scientific understanding on social philosophy. Using the
human body as the site of measurement, theories of energy conservation proposed by
thermodynamics were translated into the politics and social policies that grow up around labor
power and fatigue, as exemplified by the politics of Karl Marx and the efficiency studies of F.W.
Taylor. Thermodynamics suggested that, much like the natural world, social energy might be
measured, conserved, and perhaps even optimized. 60
The increased study of energy challenged broader beliefs in the relationship between
perception and reality. As Crary contends, “a massive reorganization of knowledge and social
practices,” particularly in the sciences, unsettled the stability of the relationship between sight
and knowledge. The direct correlation between sight and experience exemplified by the
Renaissance perspective was “severed from the scientific base that had once authorized it” by
developments in 19th century optical science. 61 Investigations of color, motion, sight, and light
contributed to the idea that models of perspectival representation “no longer had the legitimation
of a science of optics.” 62 Scientists such as d’Arcy, Roget, Brewster, Faraday, Plateau, Stampfer
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and Babbage carefully observed how “the eye could be tricked into creating visual
superimpositions, or even illusions of motion, by viewing rapidly changing images.” 63 Vision
increasingly came under scrutiny and lost its stability as a privileged form of knowledge and
knowing. As Martin Jay writes in Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in TwentiethCentury Thought, the initial euphoria of visual experimentation gave way to a profound
suspicion of vision. 64 The “frenzy of the visible” characterizing mid-nineteenth century
experiments shifted to a “violent decentering” of vision that manifested in various arts
movements like Impressionism, Cubism, Futurism, Vorticism, and Naturalism. 65
As vision became increasingly suspect, the sciences made a concerted effort to reassert
the possibility of a dependable observer through the establishment of professional conventions
and agreed upon measurements. An idea that became (but was not always) central to practices of
observation in the sciences was objectivity. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison historicize in
Objectivity, objectivity was a historically specific idea that emerged in the late 19th century as a
belief in habits, techniques, and practices which were accepted as credible due to training and
daily repetition. Contrary to how the term is often used, objectivity didn’t emerge as a belief in
universal, essential forms of knowledge. Objectivity was not an effort to reinstitute an essential
truth of vision. Rather, instead of considering how objective knowledge was different from
subjective knowledge, scientists and philosophers “confronted the problem of observations that
varied among and within individuals. The problem was not solely of humans and nature. It was
also of humans against humans. It was not only about what was true, but about who was right
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[orig. emphasis].” 66 Culminating in the 1860s and 1870s, scientific culture began to privilege
practices of objective investigation and representation that safeguarded scientists against “a new
kind of obstacle to knowledge: themselves.” 67 Scientific practice increasingly took on a moral
dimension of self-discipline that cultivated a “scientific self grounded in a will to willnessless.” 68
What characterized the acceptance of objective visual evidence was “self-surveillance, a form of
self control at once moral and natural-philosophical.” 69 The possibility of objective
representation was “a moral, as much as a technical, quest” for a scientific culture seeking to
legitimate the now-suspect observer with a set of more dependable and objective practices. 70
What characterized the modern vision of industrial modernity was the institutional desire
to visualize, measure, and stabilize the abstractions necessary to the functioning of a capitalist
economy. The desire for “optical neutrality” enacted in the arts and the sciences alike created the
conditions under which subjects could consume vast new amounts of visual imagery and
information. 71 Visual studies like astronomy, microscopy, and photography, implemented across
a variety of social projects, institutionalized of a way of seeing, feeling, and experiencing that
held the promise of progressive social change. If modernity was the insistence of the now, then
optical neutrality emphasized that lenses could be used to stabilize experiences of modernization
that increasingly took place beyond unaided biological sight.
Optical instruments of measuring and perception took on new significance and value in a
period when belief in both the popular and the scientific observer was increasingly subject to
question. Rather than offering a clear way to see the world, lens-based instruments initially
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introduced further questions about the possibility of objective knowledge. The French use of the
term objectif for lens in French is not coincidental to these broader concerns with perception and
knowledge. However, its usage requires some historical unpacking. Due to the curved shape of
the glass, the words for lens in English, French, and German derived from the Latin name of the
lentil plant, lens culinaris. However, in mid-17th century France, the word objectif also began to
be used to describe the optical glass of telescopes and microscopes. According to the
Französisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch (The French Etymological Dictionary), one of the
earliest uses of objectif to describe a lens or set of lenses in instruments turned towards an object
to be examined occurred in the 1666 issue of Le journal des sçavans, the first academic journal
to appear in Europe along with Philosophical Transactions in 1665. 72 It’s important to recognize
that, in the 17th century, objectivity meant the opposite of how the term came to be used in the
19th century. Objectivity referred to things “as they are presented to consciousness” whereas
subjectivity referred to “things in themselves.” 73 Using objectif rather than lentille to describe the
lenses of telescopes and microscopes emphasized that the instruments mediated, rather than
revealed, observations about the natural world.
Objectif began to be used to describe lenses at the same time that philosophical
instruments like telescopes, microscopes, and magic lanterns began to be used in scientific
practice. When philosophical toys initially made their way into acceptable scientific practice in
the 17th century, they began to “do more than provide premises for, or confirm the conclusion of,
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a “demonstration” – they became the demonstration itself.” 74 The use of instruments to show
phenomena fundamentally altered what, precisely, was being demonstrated. It was not clear that
the demonstration of an instrument was definitively the same as the demonstration of knowledge.
A divide opened up between instruments that were used for research and instruments that were
used for demonstration. 75 Lenses were recognized as presenting a view of the world – which was
not necessarily the same as subjectivity of the world in and of itself. Much like how the term
objectivity shifted to connote unbiased reality, as scientific practices changed how they thought
of the relationship between knowledge and mediated perception, objectifs also shifted in this
discourse.
The use of the term ‘scientific’ to describe investigative technologies, rather than
exhibition technologies, was suggestive of a broader division that was emerging between
theoretical and technical knowledge. The expression “scientific instrument” only became
common in the late nineteenth century. 76 During the second half of the nineteenth century,
advertisements for instruments increasingly appeared on the first and last pages of scientific
journals, scientific books, and treatises. 77 While the origin of the term “scientific instrument” is
unclear, as Warner writes in “What is A Scientific Instrument, When Did It Become One, and
Why?,” the term first became important at the 1851 Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of
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glass building built specifically to house the event, The Great Exhibition was the first of a series
of exhibitions of culture and industry that became popular in the 19th century. Great Britain, the
dominant producer of optical glass and instruments at the time, learned that “other industrialized
countries were fast approaching, and in places surpassed, her own achievements” at the event. 78
The challenge to Britain’s technological supremacy led to the establishment of Great Britain’s
Department of Science and Art, and through the institution, the term scientific instrument came
to be associated with practices “specially for the performance of experiments.” 79 Through class,
vision became associated with a trained eye and not with the exhibition of knowledge to a wide
audience.
These epistemological divisions between embodied knowledge and optical neutrality
were not based solely on the impartial pursuit of truth and knowledge. As scientific instruments
increasingly contributed to national wealth and prestige in the mid-1800s, scientists “tightened
their allegiance to an aristocracy of intellect and reiterated the moral virtue of their disinterested
search for truth.” 80 It is important to remember that this moral virtue was an ideal, rather than
universal, confidence. The search for reliable truth depended on resolving significant doubts
about both seeing observers and instruments of sight. One way that objective knowledge was
affirmed was through a belief in reliable, professional practices of observation – and, by
association, the instruments regularly used in those scientific practices. The distinction between
different kinds of instruments relied on, and affirmed, the idea that “the observations,
measurements and experiments of natural philosophers were made in a search for truth, and thus
differed from the observations, measurements and experiments which mathematicians and
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mechanics made for merely practical purposes.” 81 While this served to cultivate the regime of
practice necessary to justifying objective knowledge, the division of instruments also served to
delegitimize forms of subjective knowledge gained from practical, day-to-day experience. 82 The
lack of authoritative perspective presented by changing ideas of natural knowledge was giving
way to a reestablishment of truth through conventions that privileged aristocratic practices of
sight and perception.
What made optical science modern was the institutional stability of conventions that
made visual abstraction viable on a day-to-day basis. However, the professional embrace of
objectivity – optical neutrality – did not directly follow from the invention of technologies that
helped instrumentalize these ideas. Objectivity was an ideal, and as such, it was subject to failure
and error over time. The increased abstraction of a stable and local presence in day to day life
was motivated less by an institutional control motivated by scientific evidence and more by the
“anxiety linked with the revelation of a body that cannot even trust its own senses, when vision is
uprooted from the world and destabilized.” 83 Studies of vision and perception provided the
promise of efficiently managing social change, but they also unsettled prevailing beliefs about
the reliability of sight and perception. It was through debates about the extent to which observers
could trust technology that lenses found a place in professional practices of observation. While
this process of stabilization occurred across a number of different fields of knowledge, the
discourse around optical instruments – particularly the discourse engineered by Zeiss – would
serve as one of most formative grounds for the commercialization of lens-based vision.
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Visions of Science: Zeiss and Scientifically Designed Lenses
It is in the context of this anxious nineteenth century that Carl Zeiss, the son of a toy-shop
proprietor, opened a small workshop at Jena, Germany, for the manufacture of optical and
philosophical instruments in 1846. The bulk of Zeiss’ business was in selling eyeglasses and
doing small repairs, and only occasionally did the workshop sell telescopes and microscopes in
its early years. 84 However, following the advice of his former teacher, the botanist Mattias Jacob
Schleiden, Zeiss began producing simple microscopes, and later produced compound
microscopes throughout the 1850s. 85 Zeiss produced microscopes to supply scientists, and Carl
Zeiss justified his application to open a workshop in Jena based on the contacts he had made
with university scientists as an intern at the university’s institute of physiology. 86
In particular, microscopes figured strongly into the discourse about how to define and
understand distortion. The increasingly abstract conditions of visual knowledge, and the
suspicious relationship between sight and knowledge, unsettled the ontological grounds on which
scientists could confidently demonstrate truth – and, by association, distortion. During the 18th
century, professional science had established its metaphysics and methodology on nature’s
“uniformity and order:” distortions, anomalies, and the extraordinary were seen as variations on
the “regular and monolithic” workmanship of Nature. 87 As Daston and Park argue in Wonders
and the Order of Nature, over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, natural
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wonders shifted from religious consideration and became objects of scientific inquiry. 88
Distortion was largely defined as a fault or divergence in the natural order. However, due to
challenges to beliefs in visible evidence in the 19th century, the definition of distortion shifted
inwards “to the multiple subjective viewpoints that shattered a single object into a kaleidoscope
of images.” 89 Scientific studies of vision created a crisis of belief in the viability of human senses
to account for the world. Rather than a failure of natural design, scientists increasingly framed
distortion as a failure of human perspective.
At a basic level, scientists struggled to define what, precisely, counted as distortion in
microscopic images. It was difficult to say whether distortion was “a meaningful category, or
merely a term applied to representational styles that were unfamiliar and unconventional.” 90 This
is to say: while microscopes presented images, there was a period of time in which scientists had
to articulate conventions for explaining and interpreting new visual phenomena. Philosophical
instruments were considered to “distort” vision because they “did not provide the kind of
common, repeatable, direct sense experience from which philosophers usually drew their
premise.” 91 Indeed, microscopes were seen to have no place in serious scientific work well into
the 1830s. As Popular Science noted in its 1872 review of The Lens: A Quarterly Journal of
Microscopy and the Allied Natural Sciences, prominent physiologists denied that microscopes
had any use in scientific work as late as 1839. 92 Professional distrust of the microscope lessened
during the 1830s as German and central European biologists began to use newly available
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achromatic microscopes. However, early
treatises on microscope practice consistently
emphasized the importance of “proper
observational technique.” 93 There were no
reliable and repeatable explanations about
lenses that could prove how “the balls, blobs,
rings, halos and general fuzziness could exist
and still not threaten the basic premise of
microscopy: that, properly interpreted, the
microscopist could believe what he saw.” 94 For
most of the nineteenth century, the microscope
was “a piece of technology that artisans could
build, microscopists could use, but physicists
could not understand.” 95
Figure 2 Diagram of Bits and Blobs. The Lens: A Quarterly
Journal of Microscopy and the Allied Natural Sciences, No 1
Vol I: 1872. Chicago: The State Microscopial Society of
Illinois. Editor: S.A. Briggs.

Microscopists’ skepticism about lensbased vision in the mid-1800s had less to do

with physicists not understanding microscopes and more to do with their construction by
artisans. Until the 1880s, precision lens production was an artisanal practice. Nearly all workers
engaged in the production of optical instruments in the early and middle 19th century were
“tradesmen with training in metalwork and the construction of small machines who had picked
up their optical skills after gaining employment in a shop engaged in building and selling optical
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instruments.” 96 Even the best microscopes of the period were “not scientific achievements but
the results of hundred-fold trials.” 97 As Karl Brown writes in “Modern Lenses,” in the old days,
“the optician, guided by experience and a more or less trustworthy intuition, would grind lenses
by way of a trial, combine them, and then proceed to vary the curvature of the lenses and their
combinations until the desired result was attained in a more or less complete manner.” 98
Instrument making was seen as “a form of highly-skilled handicraft” and instrument makers in
Germany, France, and England found that “the use of machines tools was more appropriate for
industrial manufacturing than for small precision industry.” 99 Machine-tools operated by small
steam engines were used routinely in lens production after the 1850s, but the lenses produced by
these machines were largely considered to be of inferior quality to the hand-made variety and
were generally used for mass-produced instruments like spectacles, theater binoculars, or cheap
telescopes. 100 Belief in high quality optics was usually attached to a single craftsman who could
intuitively manage the distortions of a lens. Of the few precision instruments sold at Zeiss in the
1840s and 1850s, the belief in their quality was largely a belief in Zeiss’ journeyman, August
Lober, who made the difference between optical quality and “blurry junk.” 101
As late as the 1870s and 1880s, the prevailing belief remained that lens objectives were
“too difficult to be constructed in accordance with [purely] theoretical requirements.” 102
Photographic lenses like the Petzval Portrait Lens and the Steinheil Aplanat were constructed
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according to theoretical designs as early as the 1860s, but by and large these successes “did not
convince the optical world of the need for a good theoretical background.” 103 Opticians, as
Rudolph Kingslake historicizes, were “far too willing to make empirical trials and put together a
series of lens elements, hoping that a miracle would happen and that their system would turn out
to be better than those currently available.” 104 As Helmholtz concluded in his 1874 article “The
Theoretical Limits of Optical Capacity of the Microscope,” craftsmen could make scientific
instruments that approached, but could never exceed, fundamental limits in the physics of
magnification. 105
Ernst Abbe, a physicist who began to collaborate with Zeiss in 1866, was dissatisfied by
the idea that lenses had a fundamental limit. 106 Abbe was a lecturer at University of Jena who
was hired on the basis of his technical thesis on the calculation of errors in scientific
observations. 107 Abbe was drawn to a collaboration with Zeiss as his experience as both a student
and lecturer at the University at Jena made clear a need for reliable instruments. 108 Initially,
Abbe worked at Zeiss to develop an array of measuring instruments to precisely determine the
optical characteristics of lenses. 109 Abbe’s main goal was to furnish the university’s physical
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facilities with a proper set of physical instruments for teaching and research. To do this, Abbe
turned the physics of lens operation. Whereas the prevailing belief was that objectives could not
be constructed according to theoretical physics, Abbe maintained that “the old and timehonoured theory of the formation of microscopic images was wrong.” 110 At Zeiss, Abbe pursued
a theory of microscope lenses that scientists could rely upon.
The idea to manufacture lenses according to universal designs rather than through
intuitive crafting was not exclusive to Ernst Abbe. Ongoing studies of light, color, and
perception all suggested that there might be a way to construct lenses according to theoretical
principles. Between the 1840s and the 1860s, collaborations between academically trained
mathematicians and craft-trained instrument makers also become more common, especially in
the areas of telescope and camera making. 111 Their successes were suggestive of the possibilities
of a dependable, scientifically-explained production of lenses.
But, what was considered improvement by physicists was not always the same as what
was considered improvement by practitioners. While Abbe’s theories assisted in the production
of homogenous immersion lenses that increased resolution through a greater aperture, the
problem of chromatic aberration remained. “Abbe’s early ideas did not always advance the state
of the art, and one of his first calculated microscope designs proved to be inferior to that already
being produced by Zeiss.” 112 However, Abbe’s microscopes demonstrated that lenses could be
designed on optical theory. As Friedberg reminds us, while the technologies of glass and
transparency played “a determinate role in the scientific transformation of the modern world,” it
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is also necessary to emphasize “the nonscientific role of the glass-enabled instrument.” 113 In and
of itself, the establishment of a theory of lens construction was not enough to spur interest and
adoption of Zeiss’ optical instruments. The theory needed to be both reliable and relied upon.
Where Abbe succeeded was not only making the microscope an instrument that
physicists could build, but making the microscope an instrument that microscopists could
understand. Abbe successfully advertised the credibility of his lens theories to practitioners.
Abbe had to convince and “reeducate” users of the microscope “so they could appreciate the
features that made his objectives, produced by Zeiss, superior.” 114 Zeiss’ 1872 catalog featured a
brief introduction that suggested that Zeiss’ microscope systems were “entirely constructed on
the basis of the theoretical calculations of Professor Ernst Abbe,” but it was Abbe’s 1873 article
in Archiv für Mikroskopische Anatomie (Archive for Microscopic Anatomy) that did the most
work to communicate these theories to practicing microscopists, botanists, biologists, and
physicians. 115 Archiv für Mikroskopische Anatomie, published between 1865 and 1922, was a
specialty journal aimed at subject-matter experts who were not necessarily university
researchers. 116 Abbe’s article made the case that his particular brand of scientific knowledge, as
opposed to the “purely craft knowledge of the optician,” created a superior microscope
objective. 117 Abbe suggested that distortion was less connected to the craft of the lens than a
refined understanding of the physics of image formation. A belief in lenses’ capacity to
objectively depict the world – a capacity that was formerly understood to be purely theoretical –
became viable not only in the construction of lenses, but more importantly, in the mind of the
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practitioners by assuring them that the fault was not in technology, but in the untrained human
observer.
For all that the production of lenses with specific and reproducible physical properties
made lenses more reliable, science and rationality were not inherent linear improvements on
human perspective. The design of microscopic lenses that could provide close-ups of the material
and biological world did not only provide a basis upon which scientists could generate
knowledge: they also renewed the revelatory possibilities of vision. When Benjamin writes about
the optical unconscious in his 1931 “Little History of Photography,” he writes about how the
lenses of photography and microscopy alike blurred, rather than separated, science and magic:
It is through photography that we first discover the existence of this optical unconscious,
just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis. Details of
structure, cellular tissue, with which technology and medicine are normally concerned –
all this is, in its origins, more native to the camera than the atmospheric landscape or the
soulful portrait. Yet at the same time, photography reveals in this material physiognomic
aspects, image worlds, which dwell in the smallest things, but which, enlarged and
capable of formulation, make the difference between technology and magic visible as a
thoroughly historical variable. 118
If we consider that the difference between magic and technology is a “thoroughly historical
variable” rather than a natural progression of invention, we can see that the process by which
lenses became a technology made vision mystical by a different name. The close-up, which Jean
Epstein would later take up as the “emblem of cinema’s affective power,” evoked a cinematic
promise of new knowledge partially because its interest in the revelatory possibilities of vision
“recalls the possibilities inherent in observing things closely.” 119 The linkage between sight and
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revelation was significantly grounded in debates about lenses prior to film, even if the power of
vision is often associated with the indexicality of photography and cinema’s recording mediums.
The growing association between lenses
and objectivity was by no means a steady or evenly
distributed process. In the early days of Zeiss’
production of lenses according to scientific
principles, makers of optical instruments used to
recommend their microscopes by stating that they
were not like those being developed at Jena. 120
These professional doubts were also expressed in
the popular sphere of literature. For example, “The
Diamond Lens,” an 1858 short story by Fitz-James
O’Brien, tells a tale of a microscopist who uses a
diamond lens to discover a woman living in a
Figure 3 Herbert and Smith examine the "defect" on a
photographic plate. L'Île mystérieuse. 1874

droplet of water. When he accidentally lets the

droplet evaporate, though, the microscopist goes insane with grief. One of the earliest uses of the
term objectif to describing photographic lenses was in Jules Verne’s 1874 novel L'Île
mystérieuse (The Mysterious Island). After taking a photograph of the horizon, one of the
castaways, Herbert, discovers a speck on the photographic plate. While he first assumes the
speck to be a defect in the lens, he realizes that the photograph revealed a ship on the horizon of
their deserted island. Unfortunately, Herbert and the other castaways soon discover that what the
camera lens actually revealed was a ship filled with dangerous pirates.
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Exemplified by Verne’s irony of the term objectif, the popular response to lenses was,
very much, a suspicion of the visible in the mid-1800s. Yet, despite the different stages and
places of adoption, the increasingly regular practice of lens-based instruments in scientific
research helped to associate lenses with objectivity over time. Over the course of 1873 to 1880,
Zeiss increasingly became associated with prestige and quality, and so did their lenses. This was
due to the advertising of optical theory as well as Zeiss’ collaboration with universities and
research institutions, which legitimated these instrumental tools through their use in objective
scientific practice. In shifting the idea that distortion was caused by fundamental
misunderstandings of perception rather than poor techniques of lens crafting alone, Zeiss
cultivated a belief in the progressive benefits of theoretical science for the construction of lensbased instruments. By the end of the 1870s, the entire process of microscope and other optical
instrument production at Zeiss was “cut to meet Abbe’s theory.” 121

The Work of Glass: Anastigmats and The Industrialization of Vision
While Abbe had succeeded in emphasizing the professional benefits of a scientifically
oriented process of lens production to microscopists, another element of design became
increasingly insurmountable to the working quality of scientifically designed lenses: the raw
glass. Physicists were limited by the physical properties of the glass available for lens
construction. In 1876, on the occasion of the exhibition “The Special Loan Collection of
Scientific Instruments” in South Kensington, London, Abbe wrote an impassioned report on the
state of the optical field. Abbe lamented the fact that the optician had at his disposal “a fully-
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developed theory and thoroughly-tested practice ̶ everything, in fact, except suitable glasses for
the construction of the necessary lenses.” 122
The market for scientific instruments in the mid-19th century was quite small; the demand
for glass industries was predominantly for window glass and glassware. Consequently, glass
manufacturers had “little or no economic incentive to improve the quality of glass used in optical
instruments.” 123 Abbe suggested that improvements in the glass-making industry would benefit
not only microscopy, but “all sciences and arts that need optical appliances.” 124 Abbe sought to
link lenses to a broader ideal of using science in the service of a social modernity, but found no
promise of this change in the commercial industry alone. Abbe’s report attracted the attention of
Otto Schott, a young chemist who had completed a doctorate on “Contributions to the Theory
and Practice of Glassmaking” in sheet glass and was pursuing melting experiments in his father’s
sheet glass factory. 125 In response to Abbe’s report, Schott wrote Abbe a letter in May of 1879
inquiring whether some experimental lithium glass that Schott had made might have optical
applications. Schott sent samples of his experimental glass to Abbe, and the two struck up a
collaboration. 126 In 1882 Schott settled in Jena, and shifted from small-scale experimental glass
meltings that he had been performing in Witten to large scale experiments.
Optical historians have often anchored the modernization of glass as the product of Ernst
Abbe and Otto Schott’s collaboration. This inventor-centric narrative sustains the idea that
optical development occurred “a result of the collective creative mind of technologists; that
technologies in communications (and, indeed, everywhere else) are primarily the products of
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unfettered human creativity.” 127 The modernization of glass was not solely a product of Abbe
and Schott inventing new kinds of optical glass on the basis of their ingenuity. While Zeiss
actively linked the success of optical glass to its scientific production conditions, as noted in “A
Modern Scientific Industry” (1900), the experimental work carried out as Zeiss “was only
rendered possible by repeated and large subventions from the State.” 128 Ernst Abbe and Carl
Zeiss had previously personally financed the melting experiments, but eventually sought out
governmental support for investment in glass. In order to secure this support, in May of 1883,
Ernst Abbe traveled to Berlin to visit Hermann von Helmholtz. At the time, Helmholtz was a
professor of Physics at the University of Berlin. Both German and international scientific
communities viewed Helmholtz as “the most charismatic scientist of the late nineteenth
century.” 129 Following his groundbreaking work in thermodynamics, Helmholtz had become one
of the strongest proponents of German instrument culture. He was one of the initial members of
1882 Physikalisch-Technische Reichenstalt (The Imperial Institute of Physics and Technology)
planning committee, a German institute for scientific progress which sought to develop a
national institute for scientific mechanics. While the institute was not be formally created until
1887, Helmholtz advocated early on for the institute to exist as “an administrative authority that
granted funds for precision instruments.” 130 In connecting instruments to institutional support,
Helmholtz also connected lens-based vision to broader ideals of social modernity like
measurement and standardization.
Instruments, in Helmholtz’s view, made it possible for scientists to measure humanity
and nature in a common field. While Helmholtz is primarily regarded for his contributions to
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physics, most of Helmholtz’ early career was dedicated to physiological optics and acoustics. For
Helmholtz, “the eye and the ear were instruments,” an idea perhaps most directly expressed by
his invention of the opthalmascope in 1850. 131 In his tenure as the president of the PhysikalischTechnische Reichenstalt, Helmholtz advocated strongly for the creation of international
standards of measurement that could support “not only the natural sciences and technology, but
also the social sciences and humanities.” 132 The philosophy behind Helmholtz’ work in both
thermodynamics and his research on human perception was the desire to explain life in terms of
mechanical forces instead of vital principles – where the scientist “accumulated ‘intellectual
capital’ (Kapital des Wissens) that society eventually used to control nature's ‘hostile forces.’” 133
Helmholtz saw instruments as an important site of agreement necessary for the application of
science to social problems.
Abbe’s decision to seek Helmholtz’ assistance in securing funding for Zeiss’
experimental glass meltings was part of Germany’s broader national shift towards scientific and
industrial development in the late 19th century. The Second Reich, formed in 1871, saw
professional and technical instruments as important to the development of universities, the new
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Figure 4 Glastechnisches Laboratorium, 1884. Schott AG.

science-based electrical and chemical industries, and laboratories and observatories. 134 As
instruments became financially valuable to the development of the German national economy,
standards and understandings of these instruments became important to their regular use. Physics
contributed to the Reich’s material welfare and ideal values, but researchers lacked physical
workspaces and infrastructural support to carry out this work. The necessity for a strong, active,
and supported community of instrument makers led to the foundation of nationally supported
institutes, like the Deutsche Geselleschaft fur Mechanik und Optik in 1879, and the publication
of journals devoted to scientific instruments and their use. 135 The need for a belief in lens-based
instruments was extending from a singular professional capacity to a broader cultural demand –
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Figure 5 The Glass Works of Schott & Genossen. Felix Auerbach, The Zeiss Works. 1904. 22.

an extension that was ideally served by the potential of a nationally-supported precision lens
industry. Abbe convinced Helmholtz of the necessity of supporting the lab, and in 1882 Zeiss
was given 60,000 marks by the Prussian Ministry of Education to help support two years of
research on new kinds of optical glass. 136
Zeiss’ 1884 establishment of the Glastechnisches Laboratorium Schott und Genossen,
otherwise known as The Glass Works, marked a profound shift in the production of precision
lenses at Zeiss. In the same way that Abbe established professional beliefs in the scientific
construction of instruments, Schott established optical glass as a technical material: one that was
“precisely specified and reproducible in its properties.” 137 In 1886, the year that Kingslake marks
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as the beginning of the anastigmat era, The Glass Works began issuing catalogs for their new
optical glass. The catalogs contained 44 types of optical glass, of which 19 were “new
composition.” 138 The first catalogue for these new optical glasses clearly foregrounded Zeiss’
scientifically-grounded production conditions, emphasizing that “The industrial undertaking
which is here announced for the first time arose out of a scientific investigation into the
connection between the optical properties of amorphous fluxes and their chemical
constitution.” 139 In 1888 The Glass Works issued a supplementary catalog contained 24
additional glasses, of which 13 were “new.” 140 Among these, as Hovestadt highlights in Jena
Glass and Its Scientific and Industrial Applications (1900), were glasses intended for
thermometers and photographic objectives. 141 Hovestadt’s simultaneous foregrounding of
thermometers and photographic lenses invokes the long socio-economic legacy of Helmholtz:
linking body and society together through a common practice of measuring energy and
perception.
One of the most significant glass formulas at Jena was for barium crown glass. Barium
crown glass enabled the construction of new types of photographic lenses as barium crown glass
enabled a wider functional aperture than existing combinations of crown and flint glass
allowed. 142 The main contention at the time was that “high aperture and a wide angular field [of
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Figure 6 Demonstrating the benefits of scientifically-designed lenses was an important part of communicating
technical progress to a popular and professional community. Lens Test Chart, The Prism 2, no 1 (1908). 4-5.

view] were incompatible.” 143 As a result, many existing lens designs chose between allowing
chromatic aberration (a function of too strongly curved glass) or spherical aberration (a function
of too weakly curved glass). Barium crown glass quickly became an optical standard for
photographic lens construction because of its “absolutely clear transmission power” and freedom
from chromatic and spherical aberrations.” 144 Barium crown glass, in combination with flint
glass, enabled the simultaneous correction of both chromatic aberration and spherical aberration
without significant compromise to the amount of light that came in through the lens.
Barium crown glass was a necessary part of the design for the Zeiss Anastigmat lens.
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The physical properties afforded by barium crown glass enabled lens designers to overcome
what was largely assumed to be a stable and immutable relationship between light and refraction.
Professional practice to date had suggested that the larger the relative aperture on prior lenses,
the greater the necessary aberrations. Paul Rudolph, a physicist who worked on microscope and
telescope calculations, began to work as Abbe’s assistant in 1886 and came to design the
Anastigmat, which was released in 1890. The anastigmatic design enabled sharpness at both
center and edges while the lens was wide open. On a material level, Zeiss provided a model for
the production and circulation of distortionless lenses at a mass scale. On a conceptual level, the
prominent advertising of their production processes, testing practices, and production materials
in Zeiss’ catalogs promoted a particular faith in the capacity of lenses to accurately represent the
world. Furthermore, as Zeiss’ instruments came to be used regularly within scientific research
communities, the practice of using scientifically-designed lenses aligned lenses with their
capacity to objectively depict the material world.
As Schott suggested in his early report, the development of new optical glass quickly
expanded beyond its formative interests in measuring the precise operation of microscope
objectives. With the new kinds of quantifiable optical glass materials produced at The Glass
Works, optical glass production shifted from an artisanal production model to a large-scale
systematic production of lenses. In turning “optical glass into a technical material,” a material
“precisely specified and reproducible in its properties,” Scott enabled the reliable production of
multiple kinds of precision optical instruments. 145 New glass materials, as well as Zeiss’
concerted effort to define quality through scientific rhetoric, resulted in Zeiss significantly
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expanding its facilities and product lines in the 1880s. 146 Equally significant, as I will examine
later in Chapter 3, Zeiss also became the global distributor of precision optical glass. In 1877,
when the firm was still a workshop, Zeiss employed 36 persons. By 1891, that number had risen
to 500, and by 1900 it was employing over 1,000 employees. In 1917, at the height of World
War I, Zeiss employed over 10,000. 147 The workshop became a factory that encompassed not
only microscopes, but “the whole field of practical optics.” 148 By 1900, the German precision
instrument industry more broadly included nearly 800 firms that collectively employed more
than 13,500 workers. Among these firms, 125 were involved in glass manufacture. 149
As exemplified by Karl Brown’s 1922 “Modern Lenses” series in American
Cinematographer, the body of theoretical, technical, and trade literature that emerged around
lenses in the 20th century locates the anastigmat as a turning point that marked a modern era of
lenses. Not surprisingly, Zeiss predominantly locates its anastigmat as the quintessential example
of the modern lens. 150 Zeiss played a large role in connecting lenses with modernization, but the
association of modern and anastigmat extended beyond the advertising efforts of Zeiss and its
Zeiss’ industrialization of optical glass production encouraged these industrial logics of precision lens production
in other nations like France, England, and the United States. One of the reasons that Zeiss was so successful was
that it met a domestic need for optical glass. In the early 19th century, high quality optical glass predominantly
came from the English firm The Chance Brothers, Taylor Taylor and Hobson, and the French company ParraMantois et Cie. (Wills). German opticians were dependent on imported optical glass for their instruments – as late
as 1888, Germany imported nearly all of its optical glass from Britain. [The Aims of the National Physical Laboratory
of Great Britain (Glazebrook 135). French instrument makers in particular were considered the most reliable,
which was significantly tied to the encouragement of research in physics, optics, electricity, and chemistry by the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic regime (Brenni 614). The American demand for microscopes was met by
European imports from Paris (Nachet), Potsdam (Harnack), and London (R & J Beck and Henry Crouch) (Padgitt 90155). However, the “economies of manufacture brought about by mass production techniques introduced by
Bausch + Lomb [one of Zeiss’ distributors] and others doomed the large, complicated and expensive microscopes
that had been the standard in America” (Padgitt 48). The industrialization of vision was both a belief in scientific
progress and a belief in a particularly German model of socially-oriented industry.
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affiliated partners. One of Zeiss’ American distributors, Bausch and Lomb, would also mobilize
the term modern in their product catalogues throughout the 1900s and 1910s. 151 American lens
designer W.B. Rayton suggested that historians ought to consider Zeiss’ innovations as part of a
broader culture of industrialization instead of as a fundamental breaking point. However, he
nonetheless links anastigmats to this modernizing impulse. 152 Kingslake also argues that we read
modern lens history as a breaking point from 1886, suggesting the broader meaning of the
anastigmat: that it was significant not just as a tool, but as an expression of the wider shift in the
applications made possible by the reliable and reproducible design of optical glass. 153 The
anastigmat vitalized a technological future through professional beliefs in the utopian potential of
lenses: that lenses were a form of technological perception that existed outside the embodied
social contexts of human, and therefore potentially distorted, vision.
While Abbe’s theories and Schott’s glass were important to establishing a practical belief
in lenses, the success “can only be understood within the industrial structure first established by
Zeiss.” 154 Contemporary to parallel practices of scientific management performed by Frederick
Taylor, Ernst Abbe’s management of the Zeiss Works was predicated on the division of labor
and centralized decision making. 155 In comparison to Taylorism, which was rigid in its
mechanistic approach to social organization, Abbe used scientific principles to “rationalize
product development and product design.” 156 Zeiss’ success largely came from the “creation of

See especially “Introducing Ourselves and Modern Lenses” (Bausch and Lomb Optical Co Catalogue, 1912)
W.B. Rayton, “The Status of Lens Making in America,” Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers
(October 1939): 427.
153
Kingslake, “The Development of the Photographic Objective,” 73.
154
Cahan, “The Zeiss Werke,” 70.
155
For further comparisons between Abbe and Taylor’s scientific management systems, see Guido Buenstorf and
Johann Peter Murmann’s “Ernst Abbe’s Scientific Management: Theoretical Insights From a Nineteenth-Century
Dynamic Capabilities Approach.”
156
Buenstorf and Murmann, “Ernst Abbe’s Scientific Management,” 574.
151
152

50

an atmosphere in which the social relations between skilled technicians and (more) theoretically
oriented scientists could work to their mutual advantage.” 157 As Cahan suggests, Abbe’s theories
of image formation had less to do with improving lenses an more to do with ensuring that
craftsmen “properly executed the instructions given to them on the basis of Abbe’s theory and
calculations.” 158 In part, Abbe’s search for a reliable form of labor management was also due to
Carl Zeiss’ advancing age, which placed more work on Abbe alone. It became a matter of “vital
importance” for Abbe to find assistants who could take over management or who could become
department heads. 159 Furthermore, Zeiss’ decision to create a plant for the specific production of
photographic lenses in 1888 was motivated by a decline in microscope business, and Zeiss’
decision to license the manufacture of Zeiss lenses to other companies also came from an
uncertainty about the financial sustainability of the market for photographic lenses. 160 The
industrial production of precision lenses did not emerge from a disinterested search for truth or a
specific desire to improve camera lenses, but rather, from a constellation of industrial
investments in labor management and commercial profit.
While we ought to be skeptical and critical of industrial logics, Zeiss’ industrialization
expanded from Schott and Abbe’s deep-seated belief in the potential contributions of industry to
social progress. Schott turned down an 1882 opportunity to lead the optics department at the
Prussian Institute for the Advancement of Fine Mechanics – a tax funded series of experiments
that in all likelihood had “a stronger emphasis on national interests such as eliminating
Germany’s dependence on other countries for the production of military optics.” 161 Instead,

Buenstorf and Murmann, “Ernst Abbe’s Scientific Management,” 106.
Ibid. 72-73.
159
Auerbach, The Zeiss Works, 31-32.
160
Thiele, Carl Zeiss, 49.
161
Stephan Paetrow and Wolfgang Wimmer, Carl Zeiss: A Biography: 1816-1888 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), 117.
157
158

51

Schott decided to work with Zeiss and Abbe to pursue these optical developments at Zeiss rather
than in the government. Similarly, Abbe’s role in the industrial management of Zeiss was not a
betrayal of his impassioned 1876 call for a public, rather than private, investment in optical glass
development. Rather, his role in managing Zeiss spoke to his belief that industry was the best
way to social progress:
To be social means to work, and to work for the society. As long as we are living in
capitalist age and as long as an entrepreneur is forced by the economic system to produce
capitalistically, a profit must be made…The enterprise only becomes social [by] putting
its net profit, like the foundation, at the disposal of the state, that is of culture. 162
As Carl Zeiss grew older, Abbe became the joint-owner of the Optical Works in 1876, and in
1881 Zeiss’ eldest son became a third partner. 163 In 1888, though, a year after Carl Zeiss passed,
Zeiss’ eldest son retired and left Abbe in full control of the optical works. 164 In 1889, Abbe
established the Carl Zeiss Stiftung: both a foundation for the ownership of Zeiss and a set of
statutes for the administration of the optical works in the trust of the company. 165 In 1890, Abbe
“ceded all his proprietary rights, both in the Optical Works and the Glass Works” to the Stiftung,
and by 1891, the Stiftung was the sole shareholder of Carl Zeiss and the Glass Works. 166 The
Stiftung ensured that the company was run not in the interest of profit, but rather, in the interest
of social progress created by a balance between scientific progress, employee rights, and
efficient management techniques. 167
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Abbe was skeptical of industry’s political potential for economic equality, but believed
that progress was possible only through the support of collective labor organizations that worked
with progressive interests against “backward entrepreneurs.” 168 In an 1894 speech before the
German liberal party, Abbe stated:
[T]he thousands working in rusty garb for entrepreneurs are not beings of an inferior
kind, but members of the same people, who but lacked rich fathers to enable them to get
six to eight years more of education than they did…the call for subjection and obedience
is necessarily met in two ways: The strong, resentful natures will meet it with bitterness
and deep hatred; the weak, with hypocrisy or servility. I hold it to be a veritable piece of
good fortune for the German nation that there is a sufficient number in the lower classes
of such who meet such impositions with bitterness and scorn; for worse than this acute
poison for the soul of a nation is the insidious poison of growing accustomed to
hypocrisy and servility …A people whose regulations, political and social, make the free
development of the personality impossible will not be able to hold its own in the
industrial contest of the nations. 169
Abbe’s idea that the public interest, particularly the German national interest in scientific
industry, was best served by an efficient corporate body manifested the energistic philosophy of
Helmholtz. Zeiss’s corporate philosophy, and its industrialization during the 1880s and 1890s,
mirrored the rise of energeticism in European social reform. As Anson Rabinbach writes in The
Eclipse of the Utopias of Labor, while the physical and biological sciences seemingly offered
“an apparently neutral and objective basis for promoting the ideal of society that might ensure
social harmony,” it wasn’t until the last decade of the 19th century that reformers found a
“general synthesis” that they could draw on for policy and proposal. 170 Rabinbach primarily
locates the application of science to society, especially in Germany, through the work of Solvay,
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Waxweiler, and Ostwald – scientists who implemented social reform on the basis of physics and
physiology. Zeiss’ lenses were not simply used to visualize and capture the social modernity
enacted by these ideas: lenses also brought these ideals into social practice.
What the industrialization of vision supported was lens culture: a modern logic that
simultaneously dissociated and naturalized the linkage of technology and perception in popular
forms. As Coleman defines it in “Lentil Soup,” lens culture is “an interlocking set of instruments
and paradigms which permit the endless reframing of man as perceiver, the world as perceived,
and the lens image as both vehicle and repository for that transaction.” 171 The industrialization of
vision, exemplified by Zeiss and later practiced widely at optical companies like E. Krauss,
Bausch and Lomb, and Taylor-Hobson, linked optics to an industrial logic of objectivity,
standardization, and measurement. Lens-based forms of seeing like photography came to
displace other popular forms of perception like the stereoscope because, according to Crary,
photography made the camera “an apparatus fundamentally independent of the spectator, yet
which masqueraded as a transparent and incorporeal intermediary between observer and
world.” 172 As Coleman writes, even the most obvious distortions and rearrangements of vision
presented by the lens “tend to be taken for granted as a result of the enduring cultural confidence
in the essential trustworthiness and impartiality of what is in fact a technology resonant with
cultural bias and highly susceptible to manipulation.” 173 Despite the long history of photography
by the end of the 19th century, lens-based imaging was never necessarily or inevitably a mass
practice.
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Lens-based forms of vision became widely practiced and popular in the late 19th century
because of the increased mass production of distortionless lenses, and also because the
historically specific constellation of lens-based abstraction was particularly adequate to
representing the anxieties and industrial realities of social modernity. As Doane writes:
[T]he rationalization of time characterizing industrialization and the expansion of
capitalism was accompanied by a structuring of contingency and temporality through
emerging technologies of representation – a structuring that attempted to ensure their
residence outside structure, to make tolerable an incessant rationalization. 174
Lenses offered a productive thinking ground for modernity’s contradictory desire for both
rationality (in providing a way of seeing that allowed for measurement and a common basis of
reality) and contingency (in its multiple perspectives). While it is not causal, it is not coincidental
that the industrialization of vision that took place at Zeiss is contemporaneous with Muybridge’s
1872 & 1878 motion studies, Marey’s motion studies in the 1880s, Edison’s 1891 patenting of
the kinetoscope, or the Lumière brothers’ 1895 screening. The production of lenses both
participated in and were influenced by broader cultural shifts that, in turn, changed how and why
lenses became a vital material infrastructure for visual culture.
Anastigmats, as an emblem of social modernity’s contradictory interest in objectivity and
subjectivity, functioned as a visible threshold of an imagined past and present of modern vision.
As Bruno Latour contends, the use of pre-modern as a historical framing reduces the past to its
capacity to lead up to the progressive potential of a modern present. In the context of 19th century
visual culture, the abstraction of vision from a sensing human body, while simultaneously
reinstating the centrality of human vision through the centrality and reliability of the lens,
ultimately reinforced a narrow definition of human perception as optical neutrality. 175 As Crary
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writes, some of the most “realistic” visual technologies of the 19th century were, on closer
examination, based on radical abstractions of vision that allowed the “increasing rationalization
and control of the human subject in terms of new institutional and economic requirements.” 176
The linking of modern with measurement emphasized correction as the natural modern state and
normalized what were radically abstract processes of representation. In conjunction with Zeiss’
construction of lenses according to scientific principles, the production of scientifically-specified
glass like barium crown glass demonstrated the power of science and measurement in
overcoming both material and human capacities for perception. Zeiss’ anastigmats became an
emblem of social modernity: where science was seen to link humanity and progress together
through technologies.
Zeiss lenses were not used in many of the early experiments that characterize early
cinema. Dallmeyer lenses were used in Muybridge’s 1878 equine motion studies at Palo Alto,
Gundlach lenses were used in the 1892 Kinetoscopes, and Bausch & Lomb lenses were used in
the 1892 Kinetographs. 177 Bearing this in mind, though, it is noteworthy that some of the early
Lumière Cinematographes were built with E. Krauss Zeiss Anastigmats. In looking at the serial
numbers of cameras located at the British National Museum of Science and Industry, later
Cinematographes have non-descript unlabeled lenses, but we can see that a Cinematographe
early in the production series (serial #8) was fitted with a Krauss Zeiss Anastigmatic f/6-3 54mm
lens (although, one camera with the serial #357 is also seen to have a Krauss lens). 178 E. Krauss
was a Parisian lens maker who was licensed to make Zeiss designs, and Chapter 2 will examine
E. Krauss and Parisian instrument culture in closer detail. The use of Zeiss lenses on the
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Cinematographes is not a clear optical parentage of cinema so much as a confirmation that Zeiss’
lenses were amenable to the practices of motion picture production that sought to represent
modern culture. If cinema responded to a particular anxiety about the representability of time, the
conditions under which time became representable in the first place were influenced by the
interests and practices of measuring perception that characterized modern glass – the conditions
under which all that which melted into air could become solid and visible once more.

Figure 7 An E. Krauss lens on a Lumière Cinematographe. Camera Serial number 357.
http://www.theracetocinema.com/cameras/Lumière/

Conclusion
Optical instruments maintained a strong place in the modern cultural imagination that
often extended beyond their industrial scale. While the precision instrument industries were less
significant in size, scope, and impact than other more notable ‘modern’ industries like transit,
mining, or chemicals, a strong and highly regarded precision industry was a symbol of national
progress. 179 One of the more enduring effects of Zeiss on screen practice was their infrastructural
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role in 1) establishing and demonstrating the viability of an industrial model for the reliable
production of precision lenses and 2) supplying their new kinds of optical glass to optical
companies across the globe. While Zeiss was dependent on foreign glass for most of the 19th
century, by 1914, Zeiss had become the dominant global supplier of optical glass. Zeiss’ supply
of optical glass not only created an infrastructure for higher-quality optics on an increasingly
global scale, but also increasingly aligned the modernization of precision optics with a distinctly
German tradition of lens production. The alignment of technology with nationalism had both
commercial and material implications for how lenses developed at the turn of the century, ideas
that will be pursued at greater length in Chapters 2 and 3. Between 1886 and 1914, though, the
benchmark of optical modernization was intertwined with Zeiss’ industrial reputation.
In Felix Auerbach’s 1904 The Zeiss Works and The Carl Zeiss Foundation in Jena: Their
Scientific, Technical and Sociological Development and Importance Popular Described, Zeiss’
technical accomplishments were given one of their strongest populist treatments. Auerbach, a
renowned physicist in his own right who studied under Helmholtz, had written a broad and
publicly-facing history of Zeiss’ corporate history. As one cynical Nature reviewer noted on the
occasion of the book’s fifth edition in 1927, the fact that the first half of Auerbach’s book “is a
kind of conversational illustrated catalogue of the Carl Zeiss products and their history, an
excellent advertisement through its atmosphere of solid achievement and great potentiality, is not
without significance in explaining the production of the English translation.” 180 Auerbach’s 1903
publication exemplifies the difficulty in separating out corporate interests, scientific interests,
and cultural interests – these were, and remain, intertwined in social modernity. In the 1907
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edition, though, there is an interesting self-reflection by Auerbach on the ways in which Zeiss
imagined the role and import of its technology to society.
The Zeiss Works and the Carl Zeiss Foundation in Jena, after giving a historical
overview of the company, surveys the departments that make up the company. Microscopy was
the first listed department; photography was the third. Provocatively, though, the department in
between these two is “The Optical Projection and Photo-micrographic Department.” Auerbach
suggests that both microscopy and photography shared a common interest in how “the images
obtained are not directly, or subjectively, examined with the eye, but are first objectively
produced on a surface, as a wall, a focusing or projection screen, there to be either examined
with the eye or chemically fixed.” 181 While microscopy and cinematography came to
characterize very different professional fields of observation, in the context of their lenses, they
were connected by a common interest: projection.
Over time, lens design became concerned with the wide dissemination of images and the
questions and concerns that came with the projection of images. What was “modern” about the
new optical glasses and anastigmatic lenses was initially a reliable and agreed upon measurement
of optical perception in communities of professional observation. But, over time, what emerged
as modern from the mass production of lenses was the increased intersection of precision lenses
with a mass public.
In examining the conditions under which lenses became valuable and useful, we can
better understand the pressures and epistemic anxieties that led to the industrialization of lenses
at a time when lens-based practices were also taken up in more popular forms like cinema and
amateur photography. While the design of lenses was predominantly attached to debates about
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precision and objectivity in narrow professional practices of scientific investigation and
professional photography, in the application of mass production techniques to photographic
lenses, lenses came to be preoccupied with two new markets: those of the “laboratory of the
savant and the home of the amateur.” 182 The popular appeal of photography during the Victorian
period also “considerably widened the market for optical glass and lenses.” 183 As Doane reminds
us, cinema was not just a symptom of disciplinary changes in the sciences and industry: “It is a
crucial participant in an ongoing rethinking of temporality in modernity.” 184 The belief that
science was the best tool of social progress was experienced in the lab – but modernization was
also experienced in the streets, in the newspapers, and in the visual arts. Following this chapter’s
claim that the cinema owes, at the very least, something to the scientific spirit, the next chapter
will demonstrate how optics might also owe something to the cinematic spirit.
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Chapter 2 | Vision and/as Technology: E. Krauss and Parisian Instrument Culture
A curious fact is the transformation
undergone by almost all the great houses
of photographic articles: the proprietors
and founders retire after fortune made
and the firm passes into the hands of a
Company…And please believe that the
shareholders are not to be pitied, because,
according to the first reports given,
business is fully prosperous.
L’objectif (1897)
What made a lens a cinema lens?
The term cinema lens has come to denote lenses specifically designed for the practice of
motion picture capture, especially for studio work. These are lenses constructed with sturdy
materials, precise and smooth focus control, T-stops rather than F-stops, and optical elements
that ensure complete sharpness across the frame of a recording medium. The classification of a
lens as a ‘cinema lens’ is built on a series of practices, debates, and infrastructural arrangements
that make arguments about what constitutes cinematographic practice. In classifying certain
properties as ideally suited to cinema production, the material infrastructures of cinema lens
production make social, cultural, and economic arguments about what cinema is.
However, in the same way that spectators “clearly did not bring conventions already
learned by watching cinema, to the cinema,” practitioners did not immediately classify or think
of their lenses as cinema lenses. 185 Lenses are defined not only by their physical qualities, but
also their “location within systems of narrative and logic laid out by social discourses related to
technology, culture, economy and politics.” 186 Although there are some exceptions and uneven
developments, the dedicated category of cinema lens was not particularly widespread until the
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1910s and 1920s (a development that will be more closely examined in Chapter 4). The category
of cinema lens is not necessarily appropriate when examining early cinema, when cinema
emerged as one of many diverse visual practices – ranging from magic lantern shows to still
photography to stereoscopy – that relied on lenses to produce images of motion. A different
question is in order: before lenses became cinema lenses, what were they?
To expand an understanding of how lenses became cinema lenses – or, more precisely,
how lenses came to be used in early cinema – this chapter will examine the emergence of cinema
alongside fin-de-siècle Parisian instrument culture. To do so, this chapter will use the case study
of the optical firm E. Krauss. While their most famous cinema lens is the lens that appears in the
closing shot of Dziga Vertov’s Man With a Movie Camera (1929), E. Krauss’ place in early
cinema has remained unknown. 187 Established in 1882, E. Krauss illuminates a number of key
relationships between the emergence of early cinema and the late 19th century optical industry.
As a Parisian distributor, the firm demonstrates how photographic lenses were part of a wide
variety of optical instruments that were designed and sold in the newly urban spaces of
modernity. Specific to cinema, E. Krauss lenses were found on the cameras of Méliès, the
Lumière Brothers, and many Pathé Freres studio cameras. Finally, E. Krauss is also a useful
subject in that the firm expands this project’s cultural history of lenses to include an important
dimension of technological modernity: uneven development.
If the previous chapter considered the conditions under which Zeiss industrialized
professional and social desires for technological vision in the mid to late 19th century, this
chapter engages the decline of the French instrument industry. Whereas the industrialization of
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Figure 8 Mirrored images of E. Krauss Lenses in Dziga Vertov's Man With a Movie Camera (1929). 2014 BFI Restoration.

vision resulted in strong economic and culture capital for Germany, this was not the case in
France. France’s instrument industry maintained a craft production tendency much longer than
Germany, England, and America. The limited instances of French industrial lens production led
to both a lethargy of innovation in and, in some cases, a significant exploitation of workers in the
instrument shops. 188 E. Krauss, who had been licensed to manufacture Zeiss lenses as early as
1892, provides a complicated example of how the modernization of glass, and its connected
ideas of vision as both a technological and national commodity, came to circulate in cities in
ways that often exceeded and departed from the initial ideals of lens designers and distributors.
Additionally, in framing E. Krauss as a lens company in its own right and not simply considering
the company as secondary to Zeiss, I use E. Krauss to attend to complexities of international
exchange and national identity that formed in commercial optics.
A cinema lens is a practical category, but it is also a commercial category, and the
intertwining of these practical and commercial conceptions shaped how cinema emerged as a set
of technological practices distinct from other optical practices like microscopy or photography.
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As Bowker and Star argue in Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences,
“something actually becomes an object only in the context of action and use; it then becomes as
well something that has force to mediate consequent action.” 189 A cinema lens is a boundary
object: a term Bowker and Star use to define objects that “both inhabit several communities of
practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them.” 190 While an emergent
community of cinematic practitioners came to define cinema lenses through practice, cinema
lenses were also defined by an emergent community of international optical suppliers. It is not
solely a question of whose definition was more correct: a cinema lens is an ideal, a standard, and
a classification, which means that it is “never perfectly realized.” 191 Bowker and Star theorize
boundary objects as way of understanding how communities of practice with divergent
viewpoints and perspectives come to identify themselves and the boundaries of their imagined
communities. 192 As such, what early lenses offer are a way to understand how two communities
of practice – cinema and commercial optics – managed competing definitions of what constituted
an effective lens for cinematic practice.
In contrast to invention-centric histories of early cinema, I frame the emergence of
cinematic lenses in Paris as a cultural event rather than a technological teleology. Commercial
instrument culture was an integral infrastructure for the social behaviors that constituted early
visual culture, and I use E. Krauss’ lenses to consider how the commercial institutions
surrounding early cinema should also be understood as a material culture. As Ian Woodward
defines it, material culture is “the point where mass-produced consumer objects are encountered
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and used by individuals, who must establish and negotiate their own meanings and incorporate
such objects into their personal cultural and behavioural repertoires, sometimes challenging and
sometimes reproducing social structure.” 193 Lenses, which were increasingly mass produced for
commercial markets in the late 19th century, provide both a material and cultural site of analysis
for understanding the early visual culture of modernity. If modernity was cinematic before the
fact of cinema, as Charney and Schwartz argue, then lenses were not simply used to capture
images of modernity: lenses co-constituted modern visual culture. 194 In better understanding the
commercial optical cultures that constituted the early field of cinema technology, we can better
understand how the circulation of lenses in and across urban spaces shaped lens companies as
microcosms of global, rather than national, corporate capitalism.

Visions of Paris: Photographic Lenses and Urban Instrument Culture
In order to understand why E. Krauss lenses came to be so widely used in cinematic
practice, it is necessary to understand both the industrial and the national context of French
precision optics in the 19th century. As I’ve suggested in my analysis of Zeiss, lens technologies
were never adopted solely on the basis of technological progress or superior design alone.
Rather, the adoption of lenses was always embedded in a series of social, cultural, and economic
relationships. The dominant power of visuality in modern culture, as Anne Friedberg argues in
Window Shopping: Cinema and the Postmodern, emerged not from new technologies, but from
“the social behaviors involved in the examination of goods on display (shopping) and the
experience of “foreign” spaces (tourism).” 195 Because of the ways in which practices and
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materials of optical manufacturing developed unevenly at the close of the century, the national
origin of a lens strongly influenced how photographers and practitioners perceived and assessed
lens quality in the commercial market. One of the most significant influences on the
development of lens markets was the development of national optical industries, particularly that
of Germany. The development of national optics was entangled with the rise of cities and urban
spaces, and, in the context of France, the French optical industry was virtually synonymous with
the optical industry of Paris. 196
If the unfolding of modernity “cannot be conceived outside the context of the city,” the
capital of 19th century modernity was Paris. 197 As Walter Benjamin writes, 19th century
commodity culture finds its definitive image in the urban spaces of Paris. A confluence of
shopping arcades, panoramic exhibitions, world fairs, and expanded boulevards abstracted and
transformed the natural world into a visual phantasmagoria that could be consumed as a visual
commodity. 198 As Friedberg similarly writes, “The city itself redefined the gaze. New means of
transportation provided an unprecedented urban mobility, the broadened boulevards produced
unimpeded forms of urban circulation, shop windows invited passersby to engage in imaginative
new sites of looking.” 199 Cinematic spectatorship, particularly in the context of Paris’
architectural and social history, emerged from the “social and psychic transformations that the
arcades – and the consequent mobility of flanerie – produced.” 200 The infrastructural
developments of Haussmannization, the Metro system (first opened in 1900), and the city’s first
electrical grid (implemented unevenly from 1888) helped encourage “modern forms of
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movement, light, entertainment, and consumption.” 201 While other scholars have examined how
these practices created a favorable context in which cinema emerged as a particularly affective
experience of modern life, the cinematic modernity of Parisian urban development also gave rise
to a precision instrument industry intertwined with – rather than simply looking in on – urban
culture. 202
While Haussmanization may have been the defining influence on Parisian commercial
culture, the French Revolution of the late 18th century strongly affected how instruments came to
be designed, sold, and viewed in these urban spaces. According to instrument historian Paolo
Brenni, the French Revolution represented a “fundamental turning point for the Parisian
instrument industry. 203 Prior to the 19th century, British instruments were held in the highest
regard in the European market. In addition to forcing domestic production of instruments in
France due to trade blockades, the war blockades of the Napoleonic Wars forced the
development of France’s primary optical glass supplier, Parra-Mantois. 204 The Revolution also
had significant effects on the social organization of the instrument production community. The
strict division of instrument production between different guilds was abolished, the social status
of craftsmen and technicians was elevated, and the development of urban institutions such as the
Comité des Brevets (Patents Committee) and the Société d'Encouragement pour l'Industrie

Brian Jacobson, Studios before the System: Architecture, Technology, and the Emergence of Cinematic Space
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 128.
202
For further reading on the relationship between mass visual culture and Paris, see Vanessa Schwartz’s
Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Paris, Anne Friedberg’s Window Shopping: Cinema and the
Postmodern, Rosalind Williams’ Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late-Nineteenth Century France, H. Hazel
Hahn’s Scenes of Parisian Modernity: Culture and Consumption in the Nineteenth Century, Charles Baudelaire’s “On
Photography,” and Walter Benjamin’s “Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century” and his unfinished Das PassagenWerk.
203
As Brenni notes, if “a fondeur was using the tools of a lunetier, the equipment of his workshop as well as his
products could be seized. Paolo Brenni, “Artist and Engineer: The Saga of 19th Century French Precision Industry,”
Bulletin of the Scientific Instrument Society 91 (2006): 2.
204
Pat Choate, Dangerous Business: The Risks of Globalization for America (New York City: Knopf, 2008), 105.
201

67

Nationale (Society of the Encouragement of National Industry) resulted in new collaborations
between makers and scientists. 205 While progress and investment was predominantly tied to the
production of telescopes, astronomic telescopes, and microscopes, photographic lenses (such as
those produced by Chevalier for Daguerre and the Daguerretype) received a boost from
expansions in the field of medicine. 206 These new kinds of close infrastructural relationships
between lens designers and scientists opened up manufacturing to a wider range of ideas of what
made for a useful instrument. Makers not only provided instruments needed by scientists, but
“their workshops were often used as experimental spaces in an epoch when universities and
educational institutions were rarely equipped with proper laboratories and collections of
instruments.” 207 For several decades, the ateliers of optical instrument manufacturers “were the
meeting place for intellectuals and scientists who found in these [workshops] an ideal place for
expressing their intuition.” 208 The Revolution’s arrangement of urban labor gave rise to an
instrument culture defined not by the objective pursuit of truth, but from the intersection of
science, commerce, and aesthetics.
Coinciding with Haussman’s 1853-1870 boulevard expansion, the “Golden Era” of the
Parisian instrument industry was marked by the growing international visibility of French
instrument makers. Almost all the French precision instrument makers established before 1914
were located in Paris. The main market was located in the city, as were several international
exhibitions. 209 The visible opulence of Parisian instruments was the defining factor of their
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prestigious reputation. 210 While, as Jonathan Crary cautions, there is a tendency to “conflate all
optical devices in the nineteenth century as equally implicated in a vague collection drive to
higher and higher standards of verisimilitude,” the instruments of Paris were valued on the basis
of craftsmen’s sumptuous attention to instrument design that had little to do with realism as it is
classically defined. As was the case with scientific instruments, the “elegance of a lens was of
utmost importance. This was a viewpoint in line with the spirit of refinement and elitism which
characterized Paris in those years and was also shared by those bought these objects abroad.” 211
Post-1850, instrument visibility was also strongly promoted by the increased publication of
catalogues with hundreds of illustrations and popular French scientific textbooks, which often
featured a large number of detailed engravings of apparatuses and experiments. 212 In the same
way that guidebooks, serial novels, and newspapers widely disseminated the image of Paris as a
spectacular entity, these catalogues and textbooks circulated opulent images of instruments that
made Parisian instruments a spectacle in and of themselves. 213 While instruments were
characterized by their capacity to scientifically study vision, it was the elegant, well
proportioned, and lavishly materiality of French instruments that defined them as the “the nec
plus ultra of craftsmanship” from the 1840s to the 1880s. 214
Paris’ decadent instrument culture influenced the way that instrument makers thought of
both themselves and their products. Parisian instrument makers were described and selfidentified not as physicists or technicians, but as artist-engineers (artistes-ingenieurs). 215 For
more than a century, Paris’ situation as a capital for elegance and luxury goods put instrument
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makers into both a physical and imagined community of elegant/luxury goods producers. While
instruments were not historically considered luxury goods, in the context of a city with a
reputation for elegance, instrument makers nonetheless “shared the more or less unconscious
feeling of belonging to a special category of workers.” 216 While instruments may have been
intended for scientific research, the use of telescopes and microscopes by amateurs for parlor
entertainment encouraged the production of instruments that could also serve as “nice pieces of
furniture,” a tradition held over from the sale of instruments to nobility and the aristocracy. 217
What instrument makers sold was not only the instrument, but also a connection between optical
instruments and broader cultural practices of spectacular reality. In Paris, like many other cities,
reality was often constituted by experiences and sensations that exceeded classical pictorial
notions of representation. In this respect, elegant Parisian instruments were not a more
‘primitive’ stage of lens development that necessarily developed into more accurate or
scientifically correct optical instruments. Instead, instruments themselves expressed a mediated
relationship between vision and modern experience suited to the cultural context of Parisian
modernity.
However, in the 1880s, the basis of professional beliefs in optical quality began to shift
from a belief in the craft of individual opticians to a belief in the universal science of optics. As
examined in Chapter 1, the viability of lenses in professional practice was largely due to the
industrial and commercial efforts of the German optical company Zeiss. Following their
construction of The Glass Works in 1884, Zeiss began to manufacture new kinds of optical glass
and other varieties of optical instruments. 218 The Glass Works was the first large-scale glass
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factory capable of melting “chemically durable glass types with high reproducibility in those
properties that high end optical systems require.” 219 Among these was barium crown glass,
which made it possible for Zeiss to manufacture new kinds of distortionless photographic lenses.
In particular, Zeiss’ Anastigmat lenses, released in 1890, were especially influential in
convincing photographers that scientifically designed lenses were superior to hand-crafted
lenses. Anastigmat lenses were corrected for both chromatic and spherical aberration – a feat that
had previously been imagined to be outside the physical capacity of lenses, especially at the level
of light necessary for rapid-capture photography. Zeiss’ anastigmatic lenses were lauded for
capturing images with minimal distortion, and it was Zeiss’ manufacture of glass with specific
and reproducible material properties that made these designs viable both in practice and in the
minds of practitioners. Zeiss’ catalogues, trade demonstrations, and presence in educational
institutions encouraged consumers and practitioners to believe that scientific systems, rather than
individual professionals, could form the basis of reliable manufacture in optics. 220 Zeiss sold
glass, but more importantly, they also sold a belief in a new kind of precision lens industry.
The scientific design of lenses and precision was seen to hold a great deal of promise for
photographic practices, but the Parisian optical industry’s tendency towards craft production
meant that French lenses were increasingly perceived as out of step with the growing tendency to
value lenses on the basis of scientific criteria. On January 5, 1891, Charles Fabre gave an
extensive discussion on Zeiss’ new anastigmatic lenses to La Société française de photographie.
Fabre was a professor at Toulouse, author of the four volume Traité Encyclopédique de
Photographie, and an active member of the Society. During his lecture, Fabre frequently and
carefully reiterated the strength of the French industry to his audience, noting in particular how
219
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the lenses of French designer Berthiot suggested that, “when they fight on equal terms [original
emphasis],” French workers “do not yield in any way to those of other countries.” 221 Yet, Fabre’s
address also marked his position as one of the society members who believed the French lens
industry was entering a period of decline. Fabre reminded the audience of an earlier address he
had made in 1877 where he urged the Society to consider how progress in microscope
construction might be applied to the fabrication of photographic lenses – the same line of
technical development that had led to Zeiss’ optical prestige. Fabre’s 1891 lecture further
emphasized that the scientific principles adopted by Zeiss had “an infinity of applications” and
that the new highly refractive and little dispersive glasses presented advantages that seemed
“impossible to obtain with the old glasses.” 222 At the heart of Fabre’s lecture was an anxiety that
the modern promise of precision lenses was aligned with an industrial model that Parisian
instrument makers had not followed and, without convincing, would not follow.
Fabre delivered his lecture to La Société française de photographie at a time when sun
was setting on the Golden Era of French Instruments. Between 1880 and 1914, the French
precision industry experienced a period of slow decline. 223 Many blamed the success of Goerz
lenses, the Zeiss anastigmats, and Zeiss’ advertising strategies that (over)sold the technical
quality of non-French lenses. 224 However, a 1916 review of the French optical industry in La
Nature suggests that the “original supremacy” of French photographic lenses faded because
Charles Fabre, “Sur quelques nouveaux objectifs photographiques contruits par M. Zeiss,” Bulletin de la Société
française de photographie (1891): 131.
222
Ibid. 133-139.
223
Brenni, “Artist and Engineer,” 2
224
As Georges Brunel, director of the review journal Les Nouvelles scientifiques et photographiques and author of
Formulaire des nouveautés photographiques (1896), writes, “Optics, after the progress realized by the Zeiss firm, is
staying stationary. Whether this means that it has arrived today at perfection, we will say that we have almost
arrived and we will mention only the following systems…” Brunel goes on to highlight a number of Parisian lens
makers (Eurygraphes Anastigmatiques Extra-Rapides by Berthiot, Gorde’s Synoscope, Trousse-Bijou, Fleury
Hermagis, and Derogy). Georges Brunel, Formulaire des nouveautés photographiques (Paris: J.B. Baillière et fils,
1896).
221

72

“French makers did not use the new glasses and modern grinding methods, nor sufficiently avail
themselves of skilled technical knowledge.” 225 The greater inequality, to use Fabre’s term, that
led to the decline of French lenses in favor of German lenses was a lack of institutional support
for optics in France. Whereas the Glass Works at Jena was supported by German governmental
subsidies – a point Fabre emphasized early on in his address to the photographic society – the
increased institutionalization and mathematization of science in France had made for less
cooperation and a growing distrust between makers and scientists. 226 These changes were only
further heightened by the opulence of French instruments, which became seen as starkly out of
touch with contemporary desires for scientifically-assured precision lens design. As Brenni
writes, “[I]f this love for elegance and formal accuracy was appreciated for several decades, at
the end of the 19th century it became a disadvantage…French instruments appeared as oldfashioned scientific cabinet artefacts compared to these new German instruments.” 227 The
opulence of French instruments was believed to be the cause of France’s “late” industrial
development, and the idea that industrial development was a natural and necessary improvement
on artisanal production was frequently validated by the profits and culture capital gained by
German instrument makers.
The clashes between French and German lenses echo the conflicts that characterized
national cinemas in its early years. As Charles Musser writes, the impact of nationalism on the
cinema “was perhaps most profound when shaped by the presence and perceived threat of others
– of foreign rivals.” 228 Although the late 19th century French industry is classically narrated as
being out of step with the marching progress of ever-sharper lens design, the opulent tradition of
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Parisian instrument makers was not quickly nor wholly replaced by the scientific tradition of
industrial production. Rather, the clash between French opulence and German engineering was
an encounter in which the lens, as a boundary object, served as a site of renegotiation for the
national and international identities of lens manufacturers and distributors. In the same way that
motion pictures expressed not only the shock of modernity, but also “the shock of a new
nationalism,” lenses were microcosmic encounters between nationally-specific conceptions of
technological vision. 229 The criteria of optical representation, while increasingly falling under the
domain of scientific research, was nonetheless entangled in existing beliefs that visual
technologies were the product of specifically national industrial practices.
Spectacle, the sensory and the opulent – the qualities that defined French industry – were
becoming incompatible with emerging scientific-rational ideals that defined a useful and quality
instrument. The sense that French opulence was seen as antithetical to an objective “modern”
vision changed how lens manufacturers organized their craft. As reported in an 1897 issue of
L’objectif, a Belgian photography journal, many national lens companies began to reorganize
their business structures at the turn of the century. Whereas most optical companies were named
after their proprietors, the optical maisons began to pass into the management of optical
companies. 230 The reorganization of lens manufacture on the basis of companies, rather than
around individual opticians, sustained the dissociation of vision from the human body: what
Crary refers to as “the denial of the body, its pulsing and phantasms, as the ground of vision.” 231
As boundary objects, lenses and lens companies were sites in which this dissociation of vision
and body became legible and not just infrastructural or ideological. The proprietors’ names often
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remained, with French lens companies like Berthiot, Chevalier, Darlot, Derogy, Hermagis,
Jamin, and Lerebours. But, what those names began to invoke were a series of manufacturing
processes rather than a series of embodied practices.
Following Fabre’s lecture, there was an increased interest in the new anastigmatic lenses
for their technological promise of distortionless vision. The broader interest was not due only to
Fabre’s lecture – interest was also aided by the advent of Zeiss lens production in Paris. In the
late 19th century, French patent laws initially prohibited the importation of patented goods from
Germany. 232 Part of a broader imperial attempt to capitalize on colonial markets, the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 was intended to secure import
monopolies without any obligation to produce the patented article in the patent-granting
country. 233 As a result, Zeiss Anastigmats could not be imported and were required to be
manufactured in France, and this was done through the adoption of a Zeiss manufacturing
license. The exclusive license to manufacture Zeiss anastigmats in France was given in 1892 to a
friend of the prominent Zeiss physicist Ernst Abbe: Eugene Krauss. 234

E. Krauss and Early Cinema
Jules Carpentier, the engineer of the Lumière Cinematographe, was unable to attend the
Lumière Brothers’ screening at the Grand Café in December of 1895. Georges Méliès attended,
though, and following the Lumière Brothers’ refusal to sell him a camera, Méliès decided to
make his own. While unlikely, we can imagine a moment where Méliès and Carpentier crossed
paths at E. Krauss’ shop at 21 and 23 Rue Albouy. E. Krauss lenses were used on both Méliès’
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first camera and a number of Lumière Cinematographes. According to Laurent Mannoni, George
Méliès’ camera was found with “an Anastigmat Weiss [sic] E. Krauss 1:63 F:54).” 235 A number
of Lumière Cinematographes have also been archived in museums with E. Krauss lenses,
including the Institut Lumière, and E. Krauss catalogues advertised the inclusion of their lenses
with Lumière Cinematographes in the early 1900s. In an October 1895 correspondence, Jules
Carpentier also explicitly mentions lending Louis Lumière a Zeiss lens. 236 It is difficult to tell
whether E. Krauss lenses were the original lenses used or the extent to which they were, in fact,
used. But, the presence of E. Krauss lenses on some of the more iconic cameras in early cinema
suggests that these lenses held a place in the commercial market that made them particularly
amenable to or desirable for motion picture production. E. Krauss’ commercial reputation was
strongly influenced by their commercial affiliation with Zeiss.
E. Krauss was founded in 1882 by Eugene Krauss at Luetzowstrasse No. 68 in Berlin,
and in the 1880s and 1890s, the company created branches in Milan, London, St. Petersburg, and
Tokyo. E. Krauss had established a branch in Paris as early as 1893 (first at 32 Rue de Bondy
and later at 21 et 23 Rue Albouy). While the company began in Germany, E. Krauss became
closely associated with their Parisian location in the late 19th and early 20th century. Foreign
periodicals regularly referred to E. Krauss in the context of their Parisian location, such as when
American Amateur Photographer and Revue Suisse de photographie advertised E. Krauss’
1896/1897 photography contest. 237 A newspaper notice about Eugene Krauss’ marriage to Agnes
Hoering also suggests that he was residing in Paris as early as 1895. 238 E. Krauss sold a wide
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variety of optical instruments, but their exclusive 1892 license to manufacture Zeiss anastigmats
made the company one of the few places in Paris where photographers could purchase the
increasingly popular Zeiss anastigmats.
E. Krauss highlighted the Zeiss name on their catalogue covers and also prominently
advertised their “anastigmat” lenses in trade publications. In 1893, for example, E. Krauss
created a full-page advertisement in Les Nouveatés Photographiques announcing their exclusive
production license of Zeiss lenses in France. The phrase “ANASTIGMATS-ZEISS” is the
largest text on the page, larger even than the company’s name at the top of the page. 239 In
addition to two large images of the lenses – one with a cross section to show the inside of the
lens, and another displaying the side of a lens with elegant engraving – the bottom of the
advertisement included a testimony from Carl Zeiss. The notice, dated February 1892, reassured
consumers that E. Krauss had the same processes and quality as those produced by Zeiss in
Germany. E. Krauss repeatedly and emphatically linked the quality of their lenses to the
reputation of Zeiss. As a Parisian company with strong ties to the German tradition of lens craft,
E. Krauss complicated the popular belief that lens quality was the product of a particularly
national set of practices. In doing so, E. Krauss made visible the reality that lens quality was
predicated on international, rather than solely national, practices.
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Figure 10 Notice of Krauss' Exclusive License for the
Production of Zeiss Anastigmats. Les Nouveatés
Photographiques. Frédéric Dillaye. Paris: 1893.

Figure 9 E. Krauss advertisement for binoculars. 1897.

E. Krauss prominently advertised their anastigmats, but they also manufactured and
distributed a wide range of optical instruments. In addition to their photographic lens offerings,
the firm’s 1899 catalog offered binoculars, loupes, microscopes, and telescopes. This was not
particularly uncommon in late 19th century Parisian instrument culture. The sale of photographic
lenses was a typically a secondary business within a larger practice of Parisian instrument and
apparatus sales. As Paolo Brenni suggests, it is unlikely that instrument makers produced
everything that they advertised. 240 There were three broad categories of Parisian instrument
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sellers: 1) makers, who manufactured their own instruments but also sold other apparatuses, 2)
maker-retailers, who only produced the most basic instruments and whose business was
primarily reselling more expensive instruments and repairing apparatuses, and 3) retailers, who
simply sold instruments. 241 As Mari E. W. Williams similarly suggests, optical firms at the turn
of the century were genuinely fluid rather than narrowly specialized:
They might have specialised in a particular type or range of measuring device, but if
requested they would diversify into new areas. It was possible to distinguish between
makers of different types of instrument in a general way, for example, producers of
meteorological instruments as opposed to optical, but often this difference was mainly
one of emphasis rather than of any fundamental kind. 242
Much in the same way that early film studies has recognized cinema as one of many visual
attractions at the turn of the century, distinctions between different kinds of optical instruments
were more fluid than they came to be in later years. This lack of optical specialization – and a
commercial emphasis on variety – created an urban instrument culture that emphasized an
aesthetics of variety over technical specialization.
Even though E. Krauss was not exclusively dedicated to manufacturing photographic
lenses, the benefit of E. Krauss’ licensing of Zeiss strongly differentiated E. Krauss’ lenses
against its domestic competitors. As Bernard Vial suggests in a 1974 retrospective of Krauss,
obtaining the license to construct Zeiss objectives was like a “consecration.” 243 Krauss-Zeiss
anastigmats offered experimenters like Méliès and Carpentier the promise of technical
affordances that were, at the very least, optimal for the technical requirements of motion picture
capture. To record images on flexible celluloid film stock, practitioners needed fast lenses that
could capture distortionless images at quick exposure speeds – a practical feat that anastigmats
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were particularly suited to in comparison to other lenses. As McKay would later suggest in the
1927 Handbook of Motion Picture Photography:
The lens used with the motion camera may be any photographic lens, but in practical
work, the choice is limited to a great extent. The motion picture lens must be an
anastigmat. The anastigmat is the only lens which will give the critical definition all over
the frame which will stand the two hundred and eighty-eight times linear enlargement
which is not uncommon. 244
E. Krauss lenses, more than other lenses in a struggling French optics industry, were particularly
suited to fulfill a practical need for fast lenses that could 1) benefit the capture of images on
celluloid film and 2) capture motion pictures with enough fidelity to be effectively projected for
an audience. Fast lenses were not exclusively Zeiss lenses – and, as motion pictures became an
international industry at the turn of the 20th century, the use of Voigtländer, Dallmeyer, Goerz,
and Cooke lenses quickly became more common. In mid-1890s France, however, the popular
sentiment was that these qualities were most closely aligned with lenses of German manufacture.
E. Krauss advertised their Zeiss anastigmats in an attempt to differentiate their lenses on
the basis of scientific construction rather than practical specialization. By the 1890s,
manufacturers were beginning to specialize in the production of photographic lenses, such as
Dallmeyer and Taylor-Hobson in England, Voigtländer and Zeiss in Germany, and Derogy and
Berthiot in France. However, in Paris, lens vendors were rarely dedicated to the production of a
single instrument or product – particularly when it came to the commercial culture of selling and
distributing these lenses. Even Parisian vendors who specialized in the sale of photographic
lenses typically sold a variety of products. According to the Syndicate of Precision and Optical
Instrument Constructors’ 1901-1902 survey of the French precision instrument industry (a
survey initiated on account of France’s poor national performance at the 1900 Exhibition), a
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number of firms did specialize in the sale of photographic lenses, such as the Maison C. Berthiot
and the Maison A. Darlot. 245 More often than not, though, photographic lenses were sold as part
of a broader range of optical apparatuses, devices, and instruments. Louis Feuillet, whose firm is
recorded as producing over 30,000 photographic objectives a year, primarily lists its products as
photographic, cinematographic, and projector lenses, but also lists a secondary tier of binoculars
and viewfinders. 246 Clément & Gilmer, which initially only built a series of common
photographic lenses, had expanded its work to include tele-photography, anastigmatic lenses,
lenses, prisms and mirrors of scientific experiences, etc., and came to specialize in apparatuses
for light projection and photographic enlargements. 247 The emphasis of a given optical firm or
lens vendor often changed over time, and the Syndicate’s 1901-1902 industrial survey often
included notes about how a firm changed over time (for example, the Maison Eard Degen was at
one point preoccupied with optics for binoculars and instruments, but later specialized in
photography while also selling microscopes). 248 Makers did not only make instruments, but also
organized production, managed the workshop, prepared catalogues, and conducted sales. 249
While distinctions between lenses used in still cameras and other optical instruments were clear
at the level of practice and design, at the level of the instrument maker, these distinctions were
more ambiguous and often shaped more by agreements with suppliers more than practitioners. 250
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Figure 11 Horses in motion, Lumière film strips, and a micrograph of a fly are all used as part of a Planar Advertisement in a 19021903 E. Krauss Catalog. 12-13.

Although lenses were used for motion picture production since the mid-1890s, there was
a period of delay before lenses became specifically identified as useful for the practice of
cinema. Consider how E. Krauss advertised their Planar lenses in a 1902-1903 catalog. The
Planar was a relatively fast lens, with an f/3.8 aperture, and E. Krauss’ catalogue specifically
designates a number of variations of the Planar for cinematographic work. The use of the Planar
lenses for cinematographic use is listed second in the catalogue entry. While it is a brief mention,
the inclusion of a large image of a horse in unsupported transit (a possible homage to
Muybridge’s motion studies) and an enlarged Lumière film strip printed on the catalog page
indicates that E. Krauss sought to explicitly link these Planar lenses to contemporary high-speed
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image practices. The Planar was released in 1896 and appears in an earlier 1899 E. Krauss
catalogue, but the lens was not identified as being useful for the practice of cinematography in
this 1899 catalogue: instead, the Planar was primarily advertised as a photographic objective.
Sometime between 1896 and 1902, the advertisement of lenses for cinematographic practice
became commercially viable.
The period of delay in identifying lenses as such for the cinema was not a period of
waiting in which practitioners slowly or inevitably perfected what a lens needed to be for
cinema. As Miriam Bratu Hansen writes, cinema did not inevitably or necessarily develop into
the hegemonic practices of classical Hollywood production. Cinema emerged as more than just a
series of technological artifacts and forms: cinema was “a regime of productivity and
intelligibility that is both historically and culturally specific.” 251 Rather than developing simply
as an outgrowth of photography or as a linear path of development rationalizing a Bazinian total
cinema, the classification of a lens’ utility for cinematic practice was shaped by a combination of
factors. The same series of Planar lenses specified for cinematographic work in the 1902
catalogue was also advertised for use in a wide variety of applications. In addition to its use for
cinematography, E. Krauss identifies the Planar as useful for rapid capture photography, for
portrait and group photography, for reproductions, for enlargements and reductions, and for
microphotography. The catalog’s juxtaposition of a Lumière negative and a microphotograph of
a fly suggest not only the power of the photographic image, but also the range of views made
possible by the photographic lens. Indeed, the images do not identify the subject of the
photographs; instead, the captions identify the 50mm and 20mm focal lengths used to take these
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views. The juxtaposition and inversion of small and large photographic subjects advertised the
way that the ‘same’ lens could expand human perspective across both time and space.
While E. Krauss’ lenses were defined by their reputation for scientific engineering more
than either Parisian opulence or photographic realism, we should be cautious about overstating
the centrality of scientific construction in defining how early filmmakers considered ideas like
realism. What constituted a standard motion picture lens was shaped by a combination of
affordances that made a lens ideally suited to the light and speed needs of capturing an image on
celluloid for later projection. A cinema lens negotiated a series of competing necessities: the
need for wide apertures, versatility in shooting conditions, and a focal length that resulted in an
image that appeared photorealistic when projected on a screen. Projection significantly
influenced how camera operators captured images differently from still photography. As noted in
The Handbook of Kinematography (1911), while motion picture operators could hypothetically
adjust the lens and the aperture to obtain a crisp image without blur on the negative, “In
kinematograph work one is not concerned with the freedom from movement blur or otherwise of
each single picture.” 252 Such clear photographic images “would not project as well seen as would
a film in which the individual pictures were distinctly blurred through using a comparatively
wide shutter aperture.” 253 Blurring, while often discussed as a deficiency in still photography,
actually helped audiences see movement better in projected images. What this tells us about the
relationship between science, realism, and aesthetics is that E. Krauss lenses were adopted on the
basis of their functionality for screen practice more than an inherent material affinity for
representing reality objectively or without distortion.
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At the turn of the 20th century, E. Krauss actively promoted the use of their lenses on
cinematographic machines by connecting consumers to other Parisian manufacturers. In the rear
of their 1902 catalog, E. Krauss lists an extensive number of Parisian apparatus makers, along
with their addresses and instruments, that could use the Krauss-Zeiss lenses. The list is extensive,
ranging from the photographic binoculars of Jules Carpentier to the Gaumont stereoscopic
camera. 254 Of particular note, though, are the cinematographe machine manufacturers. KraussZeiss lenses were listed as the lenses on a number of different cinematographe machine
distributors. In the rear of the 1902 E. Krauss catalogue, Dr. Doyen’s cinematograph was
advertised with a Planar 50mm and an Unar 136mm; the Lumière Cinematographe included a
Protar II 54mm with the option of a Planar 50mm; Pathé Frères Cinematographe for 35mm film
was included with a Protar II 54mm. 255 Later catalogs indicate that E. Krauss expanded into
projection apparatuses (1906), but then later concentrated their business on photographic lenses
(1908) and eventually still photography (1914). 256 During the 1890s and 1900s, though, the firm
was in the position of selling a significantly diverse body of lens based instruments, and the
Zeiss brand was a way for companies to create a sense of mutual quality assurance between
camera manufacturers and optical manufacturers.
The brand name of Zeiss, in the context of an emerging cinema, invoked a burgeoning
international lens culture that was beginning to have standards and expectations of quality that
crossed national borders instead of remaining within them. As evidenced by E. Krauss, Zeiss
licensed patents and formulas to a select number of international firms in addition to
manufacturing their own lenses. As Hartmut Thiele writes, licensing helped to offset Zeiss’ risks
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of investing too heavily in the material production of photographic lenses. While Zeiss promoted
its expansion into photographic lenses as the continued application of science to different areas
of technical development, Thiele suggests that the plant was established in 1888 due to the
decline of Zeiss’ microscope business. 257 Rather than significantly expanding domestic
production, licensing allowed Zeiss to capitalize on the reputation of its brand with little material
investment in lens production itself. The decision was made to grant licenses to lens
manufacturers in every country with an optical industry. Zeiss initially licensed the construction
of Carl Zeiss objectives to Bausch and Lomb in the United States, Koristka in Italy, Ross Ltd. in
England, Voigtländer in Germany, and E. Krauss in France. 258 As lenses were increasingly
circulated on an international level, consistency and the standardization of information became
important to upholding both the reputation of the firm and the functionality of these lenses in
multiple sites of practice. The national branding of optical products provided a structural logic
for an emerging mass market that was drawing upon social markers to identify, brand, and sell
commodities in new urban spaces.
E. Krauss sold lenses, but they also sold the connection of photographic technologies to
broader beliefs in the effectiveness of scientifically-driven design. As Gerittsen and Riello argue,
objects are not simply caught up in an ever shifting world of human action and culture. Rather,
objects are sites of “creating, constructing, materializing, and mobilizing history, contacts and
entanglements.” 259 Lenses were not simply passive instruments that existed to serve the creative
energies of Méliès and Lumière: the use of E. Krauss lenses tapped into an emerging belief in the
power of science and technology to both capture and represent reality. The invocation of the
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Zeiss name, in the 1890s, enabled E. Krauss to structure a place in an increasingly international
commercial market that, as it grew, had technical needs that exceeded both the opulent tradition
of hand-crafted lenses and the initial scientific specifications of photographic lenses.
I would argue that the function of Zeiss’ brand name for E. Krauss was more than just a
clear indication of an objectively superior objectif. The imagination of what anastigmats
promised often exceeded the precision design of the anastigmats themselves. According to
Rudolf Kingslake, the reputation of the 1890 Zeiss anastigmat far exceeded the actual
performance of the lens. Zeiss withdrew most of the Anastigmats from the market when their
Planar, Unar, and Tessar lenses were circulated on the market. 260 While there are a number of
contentious design disputes in the history of optics that challenge what counts as optical progress
and who made what advancements, collectively, anastigmat became useful as a cultural
shorthand for the wide variety of lens correction that became normalized during the 1890s. As
Benjamin writes, “the most precise technology can give its products a magical value, such as a
painted picture can never have for us.” 261 Whether it was opulence or scientific adjectives, the
increased sale and popularity of anastigmatic lenses spoke to a popular imagination of
technological realism based on the mystification of technology.

Interlude: Lens Culture and Film Practice
Practitioner attention to Zeiss lenses was the exception rather than the rule when it came
to professional discourse about photography, motion studies, and screen practice in the 1890s.
Despite their centrality in image making processes, lenses maintain a conspicuous absence in
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discussions of early cinematic practices. Etienne-Jules Marey insisted that “all images be taken
with a single lens, demanding constant intervals between them when both recording and
projecting,” but provided few details about which lens provided the best basis for objective
representation. 262 Even in one of the few direct mentions of lenses by Louis Lumière, we can see
him deflection attention away from lenses. In a letter from October 12th, 1895, Carpentier
expressed some anxiety about the price of the Cinematographe, especially the lens: “The first
Cinematograph has thus cost something like 950 francs not including Monsieur Cartier’s time or
the cost of the Zeiss lens which I lent you…As far as I can tell from your notes, you have used
only the small Zeiss lens.” 263 In reply, Louis Lumière refuted this claim, noting that “I obtained
the picture by means of the small, ordinary lens, which is perfectly adequate – and not with the
Zeiss.” 264 While many Cinematographes would, in fact, later be equipped with Krauss-Zeiss
lenses, in emphasizing the use of a “small, ordinary” lens, Lumière suggested that a motion
picture lens did not need to be a specialized tool. Marey and Lumière’s comments do not suggest
that the lens was not important. Rather, what their inattention to the specifics of their lenses
suggests is that lenses, as technologies of vision, became increasingly ordinary and
unremarkable.
The consistent oversight of the lens is not a question of forgetfulness or insignificance.
Rather, the absence of the lens in film history is symptomatic of the ideal that lenses promised:
that lenses supplement or enhance other practices of seeing. As Crary writes, the rise of
photographic images was part of a broader modernization of sensation that took place over the
course of the 19th century. Lens-based technologies of image production became the dominant
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model of visualization because they helped dissociate perception from the body for the purposes
of circulation, exchange, and measurement in commercial culture. As technological modernity
decentered the role of the human eye in perception, the lens functioned as “a guarantor of the
identity of the visible with the normality of vision.” 265 This is to say: in their invisibility, lenses
affirmed the centrality of human perspective in the midst of increasingly abstract visual
experiences of circulation and exchange.
Photographic images may have been more amenable to capitalism’s desire to abstract
sensation from the body, but photographic abstraction remained connected to embodied
practices. As Mary Ann Doane writes, Crary often neglects the motifs of “failure, deception,
deficiency, and flaw” that accompanied discourses of visuality in the 19th century and he is
“unable to consider the psychical dimension of the subjectivization of vision, its inevitable
production of anxiety linked with the revelation of a body that cannot even trust its own senses,
when vision is uprooted from the world and destabilized.” 266 Similarly, Anne Friedberg also
argues that Crary ignores the ways in which cinematic visuality was actually a combination of
the optical systems of the camera obscura and the stereoscope. For Friedberg, neither the camera
obscura nor the stereoscope adequately accounts for the mobile and virtual gaze of the spectator.
Rather, the cinema was a combination of both of these models of vision that “combined optical
trickery with the projective illusions of the camera obscura…cinema was a device that combined
both of these models of vision.” 267 In Doane and Friedberg’s critiques of Crary, we can see a
common framing: one that recognizes cinema as deeply interconnected with the space and place
of film projection. If, as Coleman writes, “even the most blatant distortions [of a lens] tend to be
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taken for granted as a result of the enduring cultural confidence in the essential trustworthiness
and impartiality of what is in fact a technology resonant with cultural bias and highly susceptible
to manipulation,” then we need to recognize that the invisibility of lenses – when lenses are
accepted as “ordinary” lenses – came to be shaped as such through the historical entanglement of
lenses with another significant technology of the late 19th century: film. 268
There was nothing inherent about 35mm film as a format that made it the standard
material for indexing time. 35mm was one of many formats, and never necessarily the recording
format that so much of film production would come to be centered around. As John Belton
contends in “The Origins of 35mm Film as a Standard,” W.K.L. Dickson’s decision to use 35mm
film was, initially, a way to double the amount of footage that could be used from Eastman
Kodak. At the time, Kodak was producing 70mm and 90mm celluloid strips for still cameras.
Dickson cut the 70mm stock in half, and the 35mm dimensions also ensured enough space for an
image large enough to ensure satisfactory reproduction and provided enough sharpness and
clarity to guarantee “the illusion of reality” required for the Kinetoscope and eventually small
screen projection. 269 Edison and Eastman’s license agreement established these standards within
the film industry, the adoption of a 35mm standard by the Lumière Brothers (who became the
largest producer of raw stock in Europe), and the reliance of British producers on 35mm by the
Blair Co. solidified the position of the 35mm format on the international marketplace. 270 As
Deac Rossell notes, with the exception of glass-plate cinematography for amateur use, there were
“no serious alternatives to celluloid in motion picture work.” 271 The alignment of cinema with
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film was a relationship of standards and conventions rather than an inherent material affinity
with indexicality.
Lenses are also consistently secondary to discussions of recording formats in the history
of photographic development in the 1880s. In particular, the arrival of gelatin-silver bromide
plates in the early 1880s overtook the contemporaneous developments occurring in optical
development at Zeiss. As Jean-Claude Gautrand writes, these newly sensitive plates were not just
a question of mechanical improvement, but rather, “an overturning of existing practices, a
revolution which came about through cameras, new portability, ease of use, the speed with which
they could take pictures, and the photographer’s desire for anonymity.” 272 Indeed, it was the
improved processes of photographic emulsion that led to Antoine Lumière and George Eastman
to systematize and rationalize the manufacture of photographic equipment, transforming the
practices of emulsion production from workshop practices to commercial production. 273 In the
midst of a nuanced discussion of emulsions, Gautrand remarks on Zeiss’ new lenses as a
“miracle of optics” that seems to simply happen alongside the changes to the emulsions. While
many changes were occurring in lens development, in the 1880s and 1890s, recording formats
dominated discussions of technical invention and historical ‘progress’ during this time.
Cinema studies has been historically preoccupied with a definition of indexicality that
privileges the registration and record function of celluloid film. This is due, in no small part, to
the long legacy of Andre Bazin and the centrality of Peircean semiotics in 1970s film theory and
its lingering half-life in film studies. Indeed, even Benjamin’s notion of the optical unconscious
rests on the idea that instruments of mass communication – radio, film, and photography –
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served as “virtual and actual prostheses for human perception.” 274 What indexicality has come to
mean, though, has been significantly restricted by the centrality of celluloid film to conceptions
of cinema. There have been efforts to recoup the index in the face of film’s displacement by
digital formats – most notably, the collection Opening Bazin: Postwar Film Theory & Its
Afterlife (2011). However, a preoccupation with the material of film has continued to obscure
indexicality in terms of celluloid.
Indexicality has not always connoted the “reflection of a coherent, familiar, and
recognizable world.” 275 Rather, as Mary Ann Doane contends, indexicality “has acted
historically not solely as the assurance of realism but as the guarantee that anything everything –
any moment whatever – is representable, cinematic.” 276 As Miriam Bratu Hansen similarly
suggests, we should expand our definition of photographic indexicality beyond the recording
medium of film. Rather than a clear documentation of a place and time, photographic images
also actualize “a here and now that bridges the gap between inscription and reception.” 277 What
was perceived in the site of the film was not just a record of reality, but a virtual experience of
reality that was real in and of its perception without legitimation according to hierarchies of
aesthetic or cultural value.
Early cinema manifested technology as a primary, rather than secondary, site of
experience: where mechanically reproduced images came to function as a primary site of
experience rather than simply functioning as a reproduction of, or substitution for, nature.
Cinema’s social value, as Jennifer Wild contends, was not found in individual films but in the
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way it manifested the collective display techniques found in exhibition spaces, the daily life of
the street, in magazines and print culture, and in “the epistemological strata of an era that
upended age-old distinctions between word and image, and reframed the classic activity of the
beholder in both popular cultural and intermedial terms.” 278 The invisibility of the lens was a
symptom, if not a necessary precondition, for rationalizing this abstraction: its invisibility
emphasizes the importance of the view and viewership. While the late 1880s and 1890s were
strongly characterized by the increased use of flexible celluloid film in screen practice, these
practices were also coincident with a global shift towards the production of precision lenses – a
technology whose conspicuous absence in discussions of early filmic apparatuses sustained the
centrality of the spectator apprehending film’s indexicality of a new, abstract modern reality.

A Growing and Changing Lens Market
Krauss-Zeiss anastigmatic lenses became used in motion picture work due to the quality
of their lens designs, particularly in comparison to the domestic French market in the mid-1890s.
But, the language and criteria of lens quality quickly moved beyond the initial designs and
intentions of Zeiss. Shortly after Zeiss, E. Krauss, and their associated distributors began selling
their specifically branded “Anastigmat” lenses, many other lens producers began to use the term
anastigmat to describe their own lenses. Photographers and camera operators were increasingly
interested in purchasing these distortionless lenses, and the construction of lenses based on the
Anastigmat patent increased. Higher end lens makers such as Emil Busch, Ernemann, Goerz, and
Voigtländer all used the term ‘anastigmat’ to describe their lenses. CP Goerz also introduced the
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Dagor (Doppel-Anastigmat GOeRz) in 1893, and this lens was received to great acclaim. 279 The
popular association of anastigmatic lenses with quality was initially influenced by the way the
term anastigmat was used to describe a particular class of precision lenses.
While scientific construction provided the basis for differentiating the quality of a lens in
the 1890s, this language became less meaningful as more and more companies began to 1)
specialize in photographic lens production and 2) use the term anastigmat to describe their
lenses. As noted in The Camera (1918), the term anastigmat was “appropriated or rather
misappropriated by many a maker of lenses, whose instruments are anything else than
anastigmat.” 280 Although the term anastigmat was initially used by Zeiss to brand and denote
high quality lens correction, the term anastigmat quickly came to be associated with lower
quality lenses – which were, frequently, French lenses. As Collin N. Bennett, author of the
British standard technical manual The Handbook of Kinematography, noted in a 1915 The
Moving Picture World article on “High Grade Lenses:”
Anastigmats have sometimes in the past been given a bad name because the word was
used loosely to describe more or less cheap French goods which were not truly
anastigmatically at all. Unfortunately the French, although excellent allies, have not
always in the past proved themselves as careful photographic lens makers as one could
wish. 281
While Bennett over-emphasized British goods as the technical vanguard in “High Grade Lenses”
– and also promoted similar kinds of national hierarchies in the equipment listed in The
Handbook of Kinematography – a number of sources do confirm that French lenses were
frequently sold under dubious labels of quality. Microscope objective makers and distributors
suggested the importance of including maker names on objectives as early as 1889, noting that
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the European custom was generally to omit placing a makers name on a lens and that “French
objectives quite often reach [the United States] without name.” 282 Although the lack of a maker
name was often a tendency of custom rather than a nationally coordinated attempt to subvert the
market, the lack of maker name nonetheless came to signal dubious quality on the international
optical market.
If E. Krauss lenses continued to be used in motion picture work, it was no longer on the
basis of being the only anastigmats on the French market. Rather, their use was due to a
constellation of industrial affiliations that revolved around the perceived reputation of their
lenses. The utopian promise of scientific vision was complicated by the material realities of
commercial vendors who mis-branded lenses circulating across national lines. E. Krauss and
Zeiss attempted to control the discourse and teach consumers how to properly understand lens
technologies. When the brand “Anastigmat” finally became a generic term for corrected lenses,
Zeiss rebranded these lenses under the name of Protar in 1900. 283 In the front matter material of a
1902 catalogue, E. Krauss wrote the following explanation for the changes in brand naming:
We have named our premiere objectives “anastigmats,” for the reason of their excellent
anastigmatic correction. But since the term “anastigmat” is only a scientific expression,
many houses have used it to introduce their productions in the market, creating a
regrettable confusion. We decided therefore to abandon the term “anastigmat” and took
its place with the PROTAR which is the proper name for our series IIa, IIIa V, VII, and
VIIa lenses. The construction of these lenses did not suffer, without saying, from this
change. 284
While the term anastigmat may have come from the optical lab and was intended to denote a
reliable form of scientific design, the idea took on its own life in the streets and the markets.
Anastigmat came to function as a shorthand for the role that lenses played in photography and
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cinema: it was a general promise that the lens could accurately express reality without distortion.
As Zeiss – and, by association, Krauss – was no longer as distinct on the basis of manufacturing
their glass and lenses according to scientific principles, these construction principles were no
longer enough to differentiate E. Krauss’ distortionless lenses among the many other
‘anastigmats’ that populated the market.
For all that the modernization of lenses was characterized by the ideal of scientific
design, the market saturation of anastigmats ultimately weakened the prestige and quality
associated with scientific lens design. As lens production became an international market with
broadening communities of practice – expanding from the scientific community to the
commercial market – the market for lenses made technical terms like anastigmat unreliable. If
lenses became standardized, it was not because technical standards were the best and necessary
practice, nor was standardization solely motivated from within the industry on the basis of
improving technology. Rather, lenses became standardized because the mass market for lenses
made it increasingly difficult for consumers to reliably determine the functional quality of a lens.
In 1900, at the same time that Zeiss was rebranding its Anastigmats under the name of
Protar, The Commission of the International Congress of Photography held a conference that set
out a series of decisions for the numbering of lenses, diaphragms, and kits. As lenses became an
important part of a growing commercial industry for photography and cinema, engraving began
to shift from solely a question of aesthetic flourish and a guarantor of lens quality and began to
include technical information useful for the practice of photographic capture. One of the
committees – which included Academy of Sciences president Alfred Cornu, Louis Lumière, and
representatives from Gaumont, Parra-Mantois, and E. Krauss, among others – provided a report
on proposed standardization initiatives for lenses. Among the proposed statues, the Commission
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suggested that opticians engrave 1) the name of the maker and the place of fabrication, 2) the
name of the objective type, 3) the working diameter of the biggest usable diaphragm, 4) the
absolute focal length, 5) a serial number, and 6) if possible, the position of the nodal points. 285
The reason being for this was that lens makers did not necessarily have to include this
information on their lenses – and frequently did not.
In the context of an explosion of lens manufacturers attempting to capitalize on the
promise of scientific quality and giving none, and the increased standardization of basic
information, the reputation of a given firm served an important role in the selection of a lens.
While the scientific design of lenses was intended to avoid the negative connotations of intuitive
lens design, the newly modern precision lens industry came to heavily rely on the assurances of
reputation that had, ironically, been more closely associated with the artisanal production of
lenses. In general, a quality objective was often labelled with a maker name while lower quality
lenses had no marking. In response to a question about why maker’s names were put on
objectives in The American Monthly Microscopial Journal (1889), a series of optical companies
provided statements. The United States optical company Bausch and Lomb, an affiliate of Zeiss,
contended that:
All reputable makers of objectives both in this country and abroad have their names
engraved on objectives, which is a guarantee for the quality of the lens. There are some
microscope objectives made in England and France which are sold with the cheap
imported microscopes brought into this market by importers of optical instruments which
bear no inscription as to who the maker is. 286
Another contributor, Fr. J. Emmerich, made special note about Zeiss, whose tendency was to
engrave their firm name on each of their objectives in order to ensure a belief in quality.
However, Emmerich also wrote a caution: that buyers should “beware of counterfeits” that
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simply adopted the Zeiss name. 287 The tendency in the US and Germany was to place the name
on the objectives, but the European custom – particularly with France – was to place the name on
the box.288 This tendency spoke to the state of the French industry as one that was either not well
known enough or not well aligned with the firms to guarantee quality. Like the term anastigmat,
though, the proscription of lens makers names did not necessarily mean that the names were of a
high quality: the brand name merely identified the (mostly) reliable national provenance of a
lens’ production, which increasingly took on more significance than the promise of scientific
measurement alone. Lenses, as technologies of vision, were organized on the market according
to corporate reputations more than individual craftsmen or the science behind the lens.
The imagination of lens quality and standardization was strongly influenced by the origin
of where a lens company was located – not because of an inherent technological or national
superiority, but because of how lenses circulated across international lines. As Williams writes,
because the cost of importing basic materials was so low in France, German companies had a
tendency to set up subsidiaries where they could send raw materials that could be worked into
instruments and “sold at prices which undercut those of the indigenous French industry.” 289
These price discrepancies often served to reinforce the imagined quality of the Zeiss lenses.
Zeiss lenses were frequently more expensive than other lenses. In many cases, the difference in
price was due to the customs duties on foreign goods rather than an inherent difference in build
quality. 290 As Motion Picture News (1916) similarly suggests, in most instances “the Tessar
lenses made by Bausch and Lomb, Ross, and Krauss are equal in performances to the genuine
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Carl Zeiss objectives.” 291 However, despite being largely equivalent, lens quality was
accompanied by a pervasive doubt closely aligned with national origin. Because imported Zeiss
lenses were more expensive than the more cheaply produced domestic E. Krauss lenses, the
‘genuine’ Zeiss lenses were imagined to be of a higher quality.
It is likely that the lower domestic price of E. Krauss lenses is the reason that so many E.
Krauss lenses were included with Pathé Frères motion picture cameras. Pathé Professional
Cameras were the most popular cameras that emerged from the pre-1913 era, and remained the
standard camera for many years afterwards. 292 In the years before World War I, Pathé cameras
were some of the most widely used cameras for motion picture work until the introduction of the
1911 Bell & Howell 2709 cine camera, and even after the war the Pathé studio cameras were
often used as second cameras. It's been estimated that, before 1918, 60% of all films in both
Europe and the United States were shot with a Pathé camera. 293
A number of documents indicate that the Pathé Professional was sold with Krauss-Zeiss
Tessars. In their 1902 Catalogue, E. Krauss indicated that Pathé Frères cinematographes could be
purchased with Krauss-Zeiss lenses. As late as a 1920 Pathé Consortium advertisement, the
camera is also listed as including a 50mm Tessar-Krauss lens. 294 While a number of
advertisements indicate that Krauss lenses were used on Pathé cameras, they were not the only
lenses included with the Pathé cameras. In a 1913 French language catalogue and in a 1915
English language catalogue, the Pathé Professional Camera was provided with a Voigtländer
51mm f/4.5 Helier [Heliar] lens, although the 1915 catalogue also offered the option of adding a
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Figure 12 Pathé Freres Catalogue 1915. 5.

Zeiss Tessar 50mm f/3.5 lens. 295 The inclusion of these multiple lenses suggests that, depending
on where the camera was distributed, different lenses were attached or built into the sale of a
camera. Technological distribution, rather than companies alone, had a strong influence on
which kinds of lenses were used and available for purchase with certain cameras.
While there is little evidence to concretely track the use of E. Krauss lenses on specific
films or by specific filmmakers, the saturation of Pathé cameras in combination with the active
inclusion of E. Krauss lenses in the product literature is suggestive, at the very least, of how
much these lenses were used in cinematic practice. Again, this is no guarantee that these lenses
continued to be used with the cameras. But they did indicate a baseline imagination of what kind
of lenses were idealized and valued as necessary for the capture of motion pictures. Camera
295
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makers would not have had to tell consumers which kind of lens – and, if the lens was often of a
particularly poor make, they often did not include this information. But the names of Krauss,
Zeiss, Voigtländer, and other ‘prestige’ lens companies helped to assure consumers of the
perceived value and quality of the cameras.
Lenses may have left the laboratories, but lenses did not really ever leave the city. Instead
of an upper class market of scientists, lenses shifted to another distinctly urban market: the mass
market of amateur photographers and a growing field of cinematographers. On one hand, the
explosion of lens manufacturers dubiously branding their lenses as anastigmats was a practice of
commercial exploitation that attempted to capture this wider market. But, on the other hand, we
can also think of the rise of questionable lenses as an example of cultural continuity: where the
aesthetic opulence of French instruments migrated into the mystification of scientific branding.
Connecting both was a consumer a desire for aesthetic pleasure in technologies of vision: one
baroque, one modern.

Conclusion
Urban commercial culture influenced how optical commodities came to be identified and
standardized against the commercial expansion of the international optics industry. In their
invisibility, lenses demonstrated the potential – both real and imagined – of technology’s
capacity to express reality without distortion. It was not a technological realism where lenses
were ‘truly’ able to represent reality. Rather, in their invisibility – especially in the cinema – the
use of lenses affirmed the reality of an increasingly human-built world where technology did
more than simply reproduce or imitate nature. The increased naturalization and invisibility of
lenses in the cinema spoke to an emerging imagination of a certain kind of technological realism
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– the reality of commercial culture, where the functioning of technology was obscured and
mystified and nonetheless experienced as real in those processes.
Much like the cinema industry as a whole, the broad range of applications that
characterized early instrument culture began to shift towards specialization in the 1900s and
1910s. The early years of the twentieth century resulted in increasingly standardized and
specialized production needs. However, as was the case with cinema, the ideals and goals of lens
design did not develop in isolation of their broader historical contexts. As Williams summarizes
the changes in the French industry between 1907 and 1915:
Overlap of interest between the industry and government concerns increased; organised
research, within universities, under the auspices of government, and within science-based
industry generally became more widespread; the union movement gathered momentum;
the question of science education at different levels moved back on to the agenda; and, of
increasing and eventually overwhelming significance, the international political and
military situation worsened. 296
For E. Krauss, the eventual advent of the Great War meant that its photographic lens applications
became wholly dedicated to France’s war effort. As E. Krauss wrote in its 1919 catalogue,
during the war, “all the fabrication of our workshops on photographic objectives was reserved to
aviation. Thanks to the precision of our methods of calculation, thanks to the perfection of our
industrial realization, French photography planes were able to obtain, at more than 1,000 meters
of altitude, admirable shots.” 297 Following the war, E. Krauss returned to its “peaceful work” and
resumed manufacture of all its former series of photographic lenses for “amateurs, for
professionals, for scientists, for all the varied works of the Arts, Sciences, and Industry.” 298
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World War I would prove to mark significant changes for the design, production, and use
of lenses at an international scale – changes that will be specifically discussed in the following
chapter. While some international optical companies benefitted from the war, in France, the war
aggressively reshaped the instrument industry. As Brenni writes, after World War I:
the increasing salaries and costs of raw materials, the reorganization of industry and
labor, the evolution of instruments, and the growing rationalization and mechanization
production, completely transformed the landscape of the French instrument industry.
Most of the glorious 19th century firms disappeared or merged, others were absorbed by
larger companies, and the workshops left Paris. 299
Much like the French instrument industry as a whole, E. Krauss never quite achieved the same
level of prominence that it did in its golden era. In 1934, E. Krauss was purchased and absorbed
by the Barbier, Bénard and Turenne (BBT), a company internationally renowned for its
construction of lighthouses and later for systems used to illuminate operating rooms, aviation,
and streets. 300 While Krauss maintained production longer than other turn-of-the-century French
optical companies, as of 1934, it appeared that “the Krauss empire collapsed overnight. No more
lenses, no more apparatuses, no more catalogues.” 301
The century-long survival of precision lens companies like Zeiss, Bausch and Lomb, and
Cooke is the exception rather than the rule, and their endurance in the popular imagination of
quality or historical lenses was not necessarily the result of inherently superior lens design. How
we understand failure is contingent on the way that progress is measured against history. When
assessed as a commodity, rather than as a tool, lenses clearly developed around and in response
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to a variety of commercial and cultural contexts that were often more complicated than an
objective valuation of technical merit. Technological spectacle was experienced as its own form
of reality, and lenses came to be shaped and designed around emerging practices of representing
the reality of urban living, technological modernity, and soon, war.

104

Chapter 3 | “The End of a Foreign Monopoly:” Bausch and Lomb and the Wartime
Expansion of Optical Glass Production
The camera lens is the eye of the Army.
Moving Picture World (1917)
In the February 1920 issue of Popular Science, Bausch and Lomb Optical Company ran a
full-page advertisement titled “The End of a Foreign Monopoly.” Below a large illustration of a
heavily-muscled man pulling a large core of hot optical glass from a low fire, the advertisement
describes a dramatic tale of wartime peril:
Optical glass assumed, over night, a new and terrible importance, when the world went to
war with Germany. For the world, so far as it knew, was largely dependent on Germany
for the higher grades, dependent on an enemy for the very eyes of fleets and armies periscopes, aeroplane camera-lenses, searchlights, field glasses, range-finders. And
optical glass cannot be made over night. 302
While many countries had robust commercial capabilities for manufacturing optical instruments,
the war revealed that the glass necessary to construct those precision instruments was almost
exclusively supplied by Germany. 303 As Chapter 1 discussed, Zeiss became the dominant global
supplier of optical glass and precision lenses in the late 19th century as a result of its nationally
supported industrialization and its advertising campaigns, which convinced practitioners of the
practical applications of scientifically designed optics. Photographers found Zeiss’ distortionless
lenses extremely useful, and as Chapter 2 discussed in the context of Paris, optical firms
increasingly designed and sold lenses for commercial markets rather than specialized
professional markets. As the practices of photography and cinema became more ubiquitous,
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Figure 13 Bausch and Lomb Optical Company Advertisement, Popular Science, February 1920.

lenses became increasingly invisible. After the beginning of World War I in 1914, though, the
optical glass industries of France, England, and America were cut off from German optical glass
supply – with no existing infrastructure to support an immediate wartime need for optical
glass. 304 Glass, which had begun to fade from view, became abruptly visible.
To illustrate how the uneven development of national optical industries influenced
photographic lenses, this chapter will examine the American production and circulation of
photographic lenses from 1914-1918. World War I has been discussed in relationship to the
military’s use of cinema, the war’s systematization of perception as a form of violence, and the
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development of motion picture technical standards. 305 However, less attention has been paid to
how the war also dramatically rearranged the manufacture and circulation of photographic
lenses. The production of precision lenses for photography and cinema – both in the United
States and abroad – was significantly affected by the ways in which Allied optical manufacturers
addressed abrupt changes in the origin and circulation of materials from which photographic
lenses were made.
While the war affected optical industries across the world, this chapter will largely focus
on the United States. The American industry is a useful case study in understanding how the
industrialization of vision proceeded across both national and international fronts, as well as how
these design practices were motivated by xenophobia and national security. Additionally,
America began to develop professional institutions and literature on optics that established a
history of technological development that was told through decidedly nationalist genealogies.
The development of optical glass communities, in terms of both production and
professionalization, expanded optical infrastructure and helped support the growing
technological needs of an expanding motion picture industry.
Specifically, this chapter examines the effect of a wartime shortage of optical glass on the
production of photographic lenses at Bausch and Lomb, an optical company based in Rochester,
N.Y. While Bausch and Lomb is more widely historicized in cinema studies for their production
of Cinemascope lenses in the 1950s, I center this chapter on Bausch and Lomb’s relationship to a
broader network of optical markets and suppliers during the first World War. 306 If, as David
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Noble suggests in America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate
Capitalism, “the history of modern technology in America is of a piece with that of the rise of
corporate capitalism,” then the history of precision lenses in America is also of a piece with the
wartime expansion of Bausch and Lomb. Although these industrial networks were not directly
preoccupied with motion picture production, they were nonetheless a vital part of the
technological infrastructure that studios and exhibitors drew upon in their efforts to create and
distribute films. 307 By examining the wartime development of Bausch and Lomb, I ultimately
argue that national anxieties about the provenance of optical glass played a key role in expanding
international optical industries in ways that were unintentionally beneficial to the
industrialization of film production.
At the same time that multiple nations were developing their optical infrastructure, the
film industry was also undergoing its own industrialization process. ‘Early’ cinema is
traditionally recognized as ending in 1915, a threshold year in film history that marks the
increased normalization of industrial cinema practices. 308 By 1915, the tendency towards multireel films, a consolidated producer system, and the articulation of professional roles and
responsibilities meant that the growing cinema industry had a great need for a support
infrastructure that was regular and standardized. While 1915 marks a formal threshold of the
Classical period with the consolidation and standardization of classical narration, the Great War
also had significant effects on the circulation of motion picture materials. Recent scholarship has
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begun to consider this time as a period of institutionalization. 309 Institutionalization emphasizes
that the broad shift to narrative production was strongly attached to infrastructural changes in the
film industry (rather than an inevitable maturation or progression of film form). Due to decreased
European film production, a ban on shipping film stock, and the replacement of London by New
York as the center of film distribution, the motion picture industry began to change in ways that
was closely linked to its conditions of production. 310
Film lenses were not as visibly affected by the war in comparison to changes in film
distribution, which more directly affected programming. Nonetheless, the wartime circulation of
lenses had lasting repercussions for the ways in which motion pictures came to be produced. The
most obvious effect was an increased scarcity of photographic lenses. During the war,
photographic lens production was predominantly restricted to the wartime operations of the
United States Signal Corps. Yet, the scarcity of lenses was only a symptom of a more significant
effect of the war: a cessation of imported foreign glass. Optical companies, both in the United
States and abroad, practically ceased the production of photographic lenses for motion picture
use as these optical companies were engaged with the production of instruments used in warfare
by several branches of the US government. 311 Professional knowledge of lens design became
divided along national lines with few existing institutions that could support an immediate need
for optical research. Often behind the scenes, these changes reevaluated what counted as
development in optical design.
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In analyzing the wartime movements of American glass industries, I historicize how
World War I accelerated both the material and conceptual infrastructure of glass production that
was significant in supporting an expanding cinema culture. In doing so, I will build on early film
history and argue that the end of early cinema, and the rise of industrial production, ought to be
considered in relation to parallel changes that were occurring in optical production. The supply
crisis of World War One significantly motivated the nationalizing of optical industries that were
capable of producing the kinds of high-quality lenses necessary to industrial film production on a
large scale. The aggressive expansion of optical glass production was also accompanied by the
organization and publication of optical science outside of Germany. Ultimately, the wartime
optical glass supply crisis revealed that visual space was not simply something to be captured:
visual space was something that had to be manufactured.

“To Greater Vision Through Optical Science:” Bausch and Lomb Optical Company
Bausch and Lomb Optical Company began in 1853 when John Jacob Bausch, a German
immigrant, set up a tiny optical goods shop in Rochester, NY. The crop failures and rampant
poverty of 1848 Europe resulted in the emigration of numerous skilled German workers to the
United States, including Joseph Zentmayer (a prominent microscope maker based in
Philadephia), the Grunow brothers (microscope makers based in New Haven and New York),
and John Jacob Bausch. 312 Bausch had originally taken up a position in Rochester as a wood
turner, but lost two fingers when his hand was drawn into a buzz saw. Afterwards, Bausch fell
back on his secondary trade in the spectacle business and set up a small optical workshop. 313 The
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shop sold eyeglasses, microscopes, and other
imported optical products from Europe. 314 Henry
Lomb, another German immigrant who lent Bausch
sixty dollars to begin his shop, managed sales for
the company. Following an embargo on European
imports during the American Civil War, Bausch and
Lomb became successful selling spectacle frames
and diversified to produce a variety of optical
products, particularly those that required a high
degree of precision. 315 Following its success in
supplying optical supplies during the Civil War, the
company expanded and opened a sales office in

Figure 14 Bausch & Lomb's Store, 1853. Undated
newspaper clipping, JJ Bausch Scrapbook. Courtesy
of Bausch and Lomb Archives.

New York City. 316 Building on its successful eyeglass business, Bausch and Lomb diversified to
produce a variety of optical products, particularly those that required a high degree of precision.
Bausch and Lomb’s position as an American optical company was historically defined by
its capacity to provide a domestic supply of goods that were classically imagined as European.
Much like the dye industry, optical glass was regarded as “one of the exclusive, industrial
heritages of a few European countries” and “Popular prejudices decreed that everything optical
must come out of Europe.” 317 Prior to the 1880s, most lenses for microscopy, astronomy, and
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photography were imported from English, French, and German manufacturers. 318 The European
origin of a lens was not a guarantee of quality. Rather, it was a shorthand used to describe a
tradition of European lens craft that largely did not exist in the United States. As late as 1916,
there were no schools in the United States where the practical foundations of a lens grinder’s
trade were taught. 319 The American institutional matrix of science, industry, and education that
had led to economic success in agriculture, manufacturing, and electricity had yet to extend to
the production of precision optics in the United States. 320 While the optics were designed,
shaped, ground, and polished at the Bausch and Lomb plant, all the rough glass blanks still
originated from Europe. 321 The German provenance of optical glass meant that U.S. lens
production was fundamentally an international enterprise – even if the overseas origins of optical
glass tended to overemphasize the national craft of lens production.
While Bausch and Lomb is better known in the current era for its eye health products and
contact lenses, the company has a rich history in photographic lens development. The company
began making photographic lenses in 1883. Beginning in 1888, Bausch and Lomb became the
primary lens provider for another famous Rochester company, Eastman Kodak, and Bausch and
Lomb lenses were used to outfit Kodak’s first camera. 322 During World War I, Bausch and Lomb
became the primary site of production for the military’s optical glass needs and the first
American manufacturer of optical glass in the United States. In the 1950s, Bausch and Lomb was
also responsible for the redesign and accelerated production of the Cinemascope projection
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lenses by rebuilding machinery used to produce wide-beamed Navy searchlights in World War
I. 323 Bausch and Lomb richly intersects optical history, photography, cinema, and the military,
and serves as a useful case study in understanding how nationalism was a key influence on the
industrialization and professionalization of lens production.
In the prewar years, Bausch and Lomb were not well known for their motion picture
lenses or even their own domestically designed photographic lenses. Rather, a significant part of
Bausch and Lomb’s pre-war success in lens production and distribution was due to its close
business relationship with Zeiss. Bausch and Lomb, like E. Krauss in France, was exclusively
licensed by Carl Zeiss in 1892 to make Zeiss Anastigmats and other lenses for the American
market. 324 The production of Zeiss products in the U.S. enabled Zeiss to bypass costly import
tariffs and establish a bigger business in the United States. 325 Bausch and Lomb began to
produce a newly patented series of anastigmat lenses designed by Abbe and Rudolph of Zeiss.
Although Bausch and Lomb domestically distributed Zeiss lenses, the designs and supplies of
high-quality optical glass remained attached to their German provenance.
It was the mass-manufacturing of photographic lenses in the tradition and name of Zeiss
that made Bausch and Lomb a prosperous company at the turn of the century. 326 By 1903, the
company had produced 500,000 photographic lenses, and by 1910, the company reported that it
had produced over a million photographic lenses. 327 After the formation of “The Triple Alliance”
in 1908, Zeiss moved from a licensing relationship to a partnership with Bausch and Lomb and
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one of Bausch and Lomb’s subsidiary partners, the Saegmuller Company, which was the primary
producer of gunsights for the U.S. Navy. The Triple Alliance was formed in part by personal
relationships cultivated by Henry Lomb’s son, Adolph Lomb, who had spent considerable time
studying at the Carl Zeiss Works in Jena. 328 As Bausch and Lomb wrote in a preface to their
1912 catalog, The Triple Alliance was an international partnership that “concentrated the
resources, the experience and the energies of the two leading optical firms of the Old and New
World.” 329
The narrative of an Old and New World of optics consistently structured the popular
imaginations of American optical glass. These imaginations sustained the belief that German
lens production was synonymous with quality design long after industrial optical practices were
globally adopted. European optical glass, particularly German glass, was held as the international
standard of quality, and nearly all optical-quality glass was imported from Europe in the 19th and
early 20th century. 330 Optical glass was intertwined with multiple professional practices and
discourses that were not necessarily limited to photography or photographic images. For
example, the association of Germany with optical quality was assisted by the travel patterns of
American doctors, who often finished their education in German universities and were familiar
with those instruments. American post-graduates who studied abroad used, often for the first
time, optical equipment in their research. Upon returning to the United States, many felt that the
American system lacked the professional education and scientific instruments available in
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England and Germany. 331 The educational systems for professional practices like medicine
served to reinforce a broader belief in the high fidelity and scientific superiority of European
glass. 332
Consumers closely associated lens quality with Europe because, for most of the 19th
century, precision lens production was predominantly an artisanal practice. Nearly all workers
engaged in the production of optical instruments in the early and middle 19th century were
“tradesmen with training in metalwork and the construction of small machines who had picked
up their optical skills after gaining employment in a shop engaged in building and selling optical
instruments.” 333 The quality of a lens was closely tied to the individual reputation of an optician,
a relationship reflected in the practice of engraving lenses with maker names like (Johann)
Voigtländer, (Carl) Zeiss, (Andrew) Ross, and (John Henry) Dallmeyer. As one New York
dealer phrased it, “we would have more confidence in a lens bearing the name of its maker than
in one without it, because the latter would not dare to put his name on a bad or objectionable
article if he cares for his reputation.” 334 Furthermore, the professional craft of melting, grinding,
and polishing optical glass was historically passed down through apprenticeship rather than in
schools. A belief in lens quality was implicitly a belief in technology as technique, and in the 19th
century, the professional infrastructure for optical craft was largely limited to England, France,
and Germany. The provenance of a lens implied its quality on the basis of these material
practices.
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Bausch and Lomb’s relationship to Zeiss complicated the imagined division of optics
along national levels of supply, production, and distribution. The Triple Alliance unified the
corporations’ interests and, according to a 1908 booklet titled A Triple Alliance in Optics
published by Bausch & Lomb, the “interests of the firm of Zeiss in the United States therefore
become one with those of the Bausch & Lomb Optical Company.” 335 The association was more
than just a marketing scheme: Zeiss owned about 20% of Bausch & Lomb’s shares, and the
companies worked closely together towards mutual business interests. 336 The firms were
effectively aligned as one entity, and the companies proceeded to publish materials with the
Alliance logo, a set of three prisms with the initials of the participating entities (B-L, Z, and
S). 337
The international growth and expansion
of optical manufacturing – the combination of
the Old and New Worlds – found a growing
market for precision lenses in the motion picture
industry. While any lens could hypothetically be
used for film production, the lenses generally
used in taking motion pictures were “ultra-rapid
anastigmats.” 338 Or, more simply put: camera
operators desired corrected lenses that were fast
enough to capture crisp, clear detail for when

Figure 15 The Triple Alliance logo. Courtesy of Bausch
and Lomb Archives.
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the negative was projected in theaters. According to Motion Picture News, American
Cinematographer, and The Handbook of Kinematography, the most popular anastigmatic lens
with cameramen during the prewar period was the Zeiss Tessar. 339 It was not quite as sharp as
the Voigtländer Heliar, another ideal lens for cinematography at the time, but the Tessar was
twice as fast and offered “reserve speed in case of emergency.” 340 Bausch and Lomb
manufactured Tessars in the United States, and while there was debate over whether
domestically produced lenses were equivalent to ‘genuine’ Zeiss lenses from Germany, they
were largely accepted as equal. Assurances of optical quality implied by the national provenance
of Zeiss lenses helped facilitate the increasingly international exchange of film technologies, and
by the early 20th century, cinema had become a strong influence on the development and design
of photographic lenses. 341

A Lack of Glass
Beginning in 1914, the predominant influence on the manufacture of photographic lenses
shifted from cinema and photography to war. The first rumblings of this change were felt in
Britain, but the effects quickly rippled out to the rest of the Allied nations. In August of 1914,
Britain's Navy blockaded the German Imperial Fleet in its ports to restrict the mainland’s access
to supplies. Though the blockage eventually cut off Germany's food supplies and starved the
German people into food riots, it also “created an immediate economic crisis in the British
empire,” particularly in the instrument industry. 342 Prior to the war, Jena-Zeiss supplied between

“Picture Lenses are Ultra-Rapid Anastigmats,” 2948; Brown, “Modern Lenses: Section Three,” 4-5; Bennett, The
Handbook of Kinematography.
340
“Picture Lenses are Ultra-Rapid Anastigmats,” 2948.
341
W. Taylor and H.W. Lee, "The Development of the Photographic Lens," Proceedings of the Physical Society 47,
no. 3 (1935): 509.
342
Choate, Dangerous Business, 105.
339

117

60 and 90% of Britain’s optical glass supply. 343 The Chance Brothers, Britain's largest domestic
supplier, were only able to provide about 10% of Britain’s wartime optical glass demand.
Britain’s only other substantial alternative supplier of optical glass, the French company ParraMantois, was quickly overwhelmed by orders from other European instrument makers whose
German optical glass supply was also compromised. 344 While many countries had robust
commercial capacities for the production of producing optical instruments, the glass for those
instruments came almost entirely from Germany. 345 The United States was beginning to develop
an optical glass industry, both because of the threat of losing access to German optical glass and
for the promise of supplying Europe. However, the United States wasn’t able to fill these
shortages until late in the war. Because the Allied nations were so heavily dependent on German
supply, the war created an immediate shortage of glass with no domestic industry capable of
immediately satisfying that deficit on either a national or international scale.
One of greatest wartime challenges for the United States was the manufacture of visual
space. This was true not only of the photographers and cinematographers who struggled to
represent the reality of life at the warfront, but also for the optical companies who faced new
challenges in manufacturing the optics that helped the military visualize the battlefield. The most
pressing reason for the growth of optical glass industries was the use of optical glass in military
weaponry. High quality optical glass was an essential part of early 20th century military logistics.
The expansion of precision optical production was part of a broader initiative to create domestic
technological infrastructures for national defense. In comparison to the American Civil War,
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which generally relied on sighting by eye, advances in artillery power and precision had
increased target ranges to as high as 60,000 yards. To fire accurately over such distances, guns
required optical rangefinders, panoramic sites, field glasses and other fire-control devices “which
were only as precise as the optical glass in them.” 346 Military weapons were not just tools of
destruction, but also of perception.
The war shortage was so significant that both the US and the British governments
requisitioned lenses from the public. At first, the British government satisfied the need by
purchasing German lenses from its citizens, but in November of 1915, all unsold optical
instruments in private or commercial hands were commandeered. The British War Office was
also forced to open secret negotiations with the German government for a supply of optical glass
through a Swiss intermediary. 347 In 1917, the US Signal Corps of the Army also asked for
individual owners to sell lenses. While the article assured that England and the United States
were working to correct the shortage and “making lenses better than the German ones formerly
imported,” suitable lenses were not being produced fast enough for national use. 348 The call for
lenses asked specially for the Zeiss Tessars, Bausch and Lomb Zeiss Tessars, and Voigtlander
Heliars: all German glass. At theater screenings, “four-minute speakers” urged audiences to
“loan whatever glasses they might have to Uncle Sam.” 349 These were temporary measures,
though, and served to address a short term lack of lenses while the government invested in long
term infrastructural development continued to expand.
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A lack of both material and professional optical glass infrastructure, combined with
increasing needs for military applications, led to American, English, and French companies
cutting production of optical needs for any other reason than military applications. During the
wartime period, companies like Kodak sought alliances with other optical glass companies as
their own optical supply for both business and government supply was at risk. As early as
August of 1915, Kodak’s optical division Hawk-Eye Works informed Eastman that the French
optical company Parra-Mantois “cannot guarantee any deliveries whatsoever” and that catalogue
prices were increasing by 60%. 350 Kodak also reported that the optical Works of Taylor-Hobson
“have been almost entirely commandeered by the British Government for the manufacture of
clinometers, gun sights, and other instruments used in warfare” and that as a result, Kodak was
for some time unable to receive lens deliveries. Taylor-Hobson were also experiencing
difficulties in obtaining glass from Parra-Mantois. 351 In 1917, French authorities were largely
opposed to shipping optical glass across the Atlantic for war purposes and firmly stated that “no
glass will be allowed to go out for any commercial purposes.” 352 While Parra-Mantois provided
some limited shipments of optical glass, it seems that later they were provided under the express
stipulation that it was only to be used for the production of optical parts for the US Army and
Navy.
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As a result of the British Government commandeering the Taylor-Hobson glass works,

along with Taylor’s difficulty in obtaining glass from Parra-Mantois, Kodak found itself with a
shortage of lenses. 354
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The war affected French and British optical industries in similar ways. France and Britain
were heavily reliant on imported optical glass, and both national optical industries were heavily
subsidized during the war. In France, the optical glass producer Parra-Mantois took over the
majority of optical glass supplies; in 1916, the laboratory of Armand de Gramont at LevalloisPerret was transformed into a workshop for the production of wartime optics; and a large factory
was built by La Société française d’Optique, which was formed in conjunction with the firm
Lacour-Berthiot, to meet foreign competition. 355 In June of 1915, the UK’s Optical Munitions
and Glass Department offered the optical company Chance Brothers a deal which offered
funding for plant expansion, scientific expertise, and “guaranteed exclusivity in military
contracts for ten years” in exchange for increases in optical glass production for the British
military. 356 In Germany, Zeiss’ operations were similarly dedicated to government production,
although the company lacked rubber rather than optical glass. In nearly all cases, the war
resulted in governments directing, subsidizing, and expanding national optical industries.
Military applications fostered significant government intervention and investment in the
precision instruments industry. As Mari Williams writes, “it was during the First World War
itself that the longest strides were taken with respect to government intervention in science
generally and in the precision instruments industry in particular...As munitions of war, however,
certain types of scientific instrument underwent transformations during the First World War in
ways which seemed impossible in peacetime.” 357
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World War I immediately reframed the partnership between Zeiss and Bausch and Lomb
as threatening to the interests of the German military. 358 While America did not formally enter
the war until 1917, Zeiss severed its alliance with Bausch and Lomb in November of 1915 after
Bausch and Lomb took on contracts for the manufacture of field glasses for the British, French,
and Russian governments. 359 On November 20th, 1915, Zeiss sent a letter to Eastman Kodak Co
informing them that Zeiss had been “compelled to dissolve our agreement with Messrs. Bausch
and Lomb Optical Co, Rochester, and to stop the community of interests with them because they
have been supplying military instruments to countries being at war with Germany.” 360 As Bausch
and Lomb had been producing Zeiss lenses and would continue to supply Kodak with lenses,
Eastman Kodak would ask Bausch and Lomb to make a statement that they would protect Kodak
from any claims of unlawfully using Zeiss products following the dissolution of The Triple
Alliance.
Both because of the fear of losing access to German glass and because of the economic
promise of supplying a Europe at war, the United States began to industrialize its precision
optical industry in 1914. Bausch and Lomb had been experimenting with melting new kinds of
optical glass as early as 1903, but it was only in the winter of 1914-1915 that multiple buildings
were specifically constructed at Bausch and Lomb for the purposes of creating a national supply
of precision optical glass. 361 These experiments took on new urgency when Zeiss dissolved The

The Alliance was a close partnership, and it interesting to speculate whether this merger would have been a
more complete unification of international interests without Schott’s stipulation that Zeiss was to remain a
German company and stay in Jena (This would come to pass in the Cold War, when Zeiss was split into two
companies due to the division of West and East Germany.) Zeiss was legally bound “to maintain in perpetuity their
entity at Jena” according to the conditions laid down by Abbe in the Carl Zeiss Stiftung. The Stiftung ensured that
Zeiss would remain attached to its national origins and encouraged the kind of national division that would remain
between Zeiss and other optical glass industries up to, and including, the war.
359
Benedict Cromwell, America's Munitions 1917-1918 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 578.
360
Zeiss to Eastman Kodak Corporation. November 20, 1915. Courtesy of Eastman Kodak Archives.
361
Smith, “America’s Optical Emancipation,” 455.
358

122

Triple Alliance in 1915. Although Bausch and Lomb and other domestic glass companies were
beginning to research how to create optical glass at a mass scale, by the time the United States
entered the war in 1917, the domestic production of optical glass was still inadequate to the
standards and volume required by military. 362 Much like Pittsburgh, the other newly industrial
city in the United States where wartime glass production took place, Rochester was able to fulfill
the wartime need for optical glass production because of its access to waterway transportation.
Precision optics required a constellation of materials, many of which needed to be sourced from
far off distances. To sustain a domestic precision optical industry, the United States needed to
vitalize three material industries: fuel, clay, and sand.
Lower quality glass melting was typically fueled by coal, but precision glass required
significant amounts of gas heating. The regularity and control of temperature was crucial to
effectively melting the glass. City gas, supplied by the Rochester Gas and Electric Company,
was the only fuel used for the many necessary heating operations. 363 The 1912 Bausch & Lomb
glass plant was said to have “used more gas at a time than a thousand homes,” and Bausch &
Lomb was the Rochester Gas & Electric Company’s largest customer. 364 Glassmaking in cities
like Rochester and Pittsburgh benefitted from adjacency to steel producers, who had similar
infrastructural needs for fuel.
To melt the glass, Bausch and Lomb also needed to secure new sources of clay for their
melting pots. A persistent problem prior to the war had been the composition of the glass melting
pots, which contained impurities that reacted poorly with the glass melts. 365 As British geologist
P.G. Boswell wrote about his trip to America, a combination of three or four different raw clay
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sources had enabled Americans to make glasshouse-pots which had “superseded almost entirely
the Grossalmerode [Großalmerode] clay upon which they had relied in the pre-war days upon
Germany.” 366
When the importation of foreign sand was found to be impossible during the war, surveys
found that “abundant quantities” of silica suited for the manufacturing of precision lenses were
located in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio,
New York, Maryland, and many other states. 367 Although the U.S. had formerly imported better
grades of potassium carbonate from Germany, sand that was suitable for optical glass was
located at Rockwood, Michigan, Hancock, Maryland, and Ottowa, Illinois. 368 While the best
European sand was located in Fontainebleau, in France, the sand at Rockwood was found to be
“even freer from iron than that of Fontainebleau.” 369 The Sylvania Sandstone quarry at
Rockwood, located just south of Detroit, was also ideally positioned for easy transportation to
Rochester and Pittsburgh via the Great Lakes.
The United States’ lack of optical glass was not due to a fundamental lack of resources or
an inherent German superiority. The fuel, clay, and sand necessary for the manufacture of
precision optical glass were all present in the United States. The problem was that, prior to the
war, manufacturers and inventors were chiefly concerned with increasing production volume and
lowering labor costs. According to Colonel F.E. Wright’s 1921 analysis, one of the biggest
problems facing optical production during the war was “precision and factory control.” 370 The
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primary difficulty for the Geophysical Laboratory, which coordinated the American initiatives to
scale up domestic glass production, was establishing methods of high precision with sand
manufacturers to obtain the desired chemical purity. 371 As F.E. Wright reflected in his 1921
report, The Manufacture of Optical Glass and of Optical Systems: A Wartime Problem:
the making of modern optical glasses does not consist solely in the mixing together of a
secret batch, handed down from father to son, in melting this down in a furnace, and in
allowing the melt to cool properly...The problem is essentially one of precision and
factory control; and although the glassmaker's experience is not to be disregarded, optical
glass of high quality can not be produced by it alone. 372
As the United States found itself without access to foreign materials, it became clear that while
the domestic industry had invested heavily in machinery improvements, “a knowledge of the
glass itself, its behavior, the ingredients that go to make up the batch [of glass]” had been
neglected in domestic industrial development. 373 In the same way that Zeiss’s lenses required
microscopists to both understand and believe in the benefits of scientifically designed lenses, it
was necessary for the Geophysical Laboratory to educate and convince silica manufacturers to
accept a shared definition of what criteria constituted high chemical purity. 374 The problem was
not a fundamental lack of resources, but rather, an investment in refinement and quality control.
What is significant about the material shortages of the war are the ways that they reveal
how optical corporations functioned as a force that efficiently managed and transformed the
material world. A photographic lens typically doesn’t contain inscriptions of its optical glass; we
don’t see markers of Michigan quarries or the silica of Fontainebleau if we look at a lens. Lenses
prominently display inscriptions of corporate management and scientific standardization: the
Bausch and Lomb logo, the Kodak logo, the f-stop, a particular brand name like the Tessar or the
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Heliar. Lenses had long carried engravings of their creators, but during the war, what these
names and technical specifications meant began to shift. Faced with a crisis of production, a
lens’ quality was increasingly constituted not by physics or natural laws of light, but by industrial
management. If modern vision was characterized by increasingly abstract practices of
representing the world, precision lenses embodied industrial modernity’s transcendent process of
transforming the material world into the ephemerality of vision, melting all that is solid into air.
The war divided lens supply along national lines, and this division complicated existing
alignments between the belief in optical fidelity and its national origin. The practical capacities
of optical representation – lens correction – could not be abstracted from the national contexts of
the material and professional infrastructures required to produce such representations. Despite
vocal advertisements by American companies that domestic lenses were equal to European
lenses, popular and professional thought maintained the belief that the best optical glass must be
purchased from either Zeiss or Parra-Mantois. 375 Zeiss lenses retained their association with
quality, and the association of Germany with optical quality was often used as a rallying cry to
encourage glass production as a form of wartime nationalism.

Wartime Expansion at Bausch and Lomb
To support the aerial surveillance of the Signal Corps and long-range weaponry, the
United States required a domestic optical glass industry – and they needed to develop it quickly.
Following the optical glass supply crisis, Bausch and Lomb became the primary site of the
United States military’s investment in domestic glass production. In 1917, a research lab was
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established at the Bausch and Lomb factory on advice of the council of National Defense. 376 The
task of the lab was not only to reproduce the kind of optical glass that had long been produced in
Europe, but also to develop information about the process of its manufacture. 377 After seven
months of work at the Bausch and Lomb plant, by the end of 1917, the essential details of the
manufacturing process had been developed. The amount of usable optical glass produced across
the United States increased from about 3,000 pounds per month in April of 1917 to 79,000
pounds per month in October of 1918. As Wright reflected in his 1921 report, “the records show
that in the short period of 19 months, we did accomplish much to overtake decades of German
experience.” 378
While the prominence of German glass prior to the war was repeated ad nauseum in press
coverage of the optical shortage, there is reason to believe that Germany’s prominence was overnarrated as a way to foster a sense of dire need for domestic optical glass production in the
wartime years. In the 1916 Revue generale des sciences, M.A. Boutaric, faculty member at the
University of Montpellier, suggests that Zeiss “surrounded its products with scientific
propaganda” and that Zeiss’ success was largely due to these perceptions rather than a
fundamental superiority. 379 As suggested in Nature, in the fifteen years leading up to the war,
British manufacturers of optical glass were “confronted with a more serious competition from
Mantois than from Schott.” 380 In affirming the superiority of foreign glass, these wartime scare
narratives motivated national security on the basis of national insecurity.
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Although the underdevelopment of domestic optics was due to a lack of investment in
professional training and material refinement, both during and after the outbreak of the war in
1914, domestic optical glass production in the United States was frequently juxtaposed against
the threat of German superiority and technological advancements. As a 1920 Bausch & Lomb
advertisement suggested, “a favorite dream of our founders was of emancipation from foreign
control of raw material; and for some years we had been quietly experimenting. When war came,
we were ready - and ready not merely with methods and formulae, but with a modern and
complete glass plant - the first in America for making optical glass on a commercial scale.” 381
The 1920 Pathé Review No. 37 also featured a short film titled “Another Worry for Fritz.” The
film included views taken at the Bureau of Standards in Washington and illustrated experts
“showing the manner in which the rough blocks of glass are ground out and polished.” 382 In the
description for the film in The Moving Picture World, wartime needs “gave government experts
opportunity to develop the science of lens making which was monopolized by Germany before
the war.” 383 Nationalism was a way to motivate the aggressive expansion of the domestic
industry, but it was also a logic that sought to celebrate technological innovation as the
(inevitable) result of ongoing American labors.
The idea that Bausch and Lomb had been historically fighting for independence from
Germany was not entirely true. Bausch & Lomb had been experimenting with different optical
glass materials some years prior to the war, but these experiments were not as significant as
many postwar articles made them out to be. In 1903 William Bausch, son of JJ Bausch, had
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performed some experiments on synthesizing optical glass in a small glass-pressing plant erected
on the Genesee River flats behind the Bausch and Lomb factory, but these tests largely failed.
These tests were taken up again in 1912 when Bausch privately funded Victor Martin, a Belgian
glasscutter, to begin additional tests. After the advent of the war in July of 1914, a second
building was constructed on the river flats in the winter of 1914-1915. It was only at the end of
May 1915 that the experiments produced their first batch of usable light crown and dense flint
glass. 384 Independence from German glass supply was an ongoing concern for Bausch & Lomb,
but postwar publications often re-narrated this historical progress along more sharply divided
national lines than the material practices suggested.
By the time the United States entered the war in 1917, the quality and quantity of
domestic optical glass was still inadequate to the standard or volume necessary for the military.
This was true not only of Bausch & Lomb, but also of all other American optical companies.
Bausch & Lomb’s narrative indicates a proud nationalism that had become vital to the identity of
the optical glass industry in the Great War, and one that was taken up by many optical glass
industries such as the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, Keuffel & Esser in Hoboken, and the
Spencer Lens Company at Buffalo. 385 The production conditions underlying the supply of lenses
and motion pictures became enmeshed in a broader constellation of visual technologies that were
“the very eyes of fleets and armies.” 386
It was not just the supply of optical glass, but the quality of glass that guided the
American wartime effort. As Germany held such a high reputation for optical glass quality prior
to the war, American optical industries needed to reassure the military and other domestic
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industries of the equality, if not the superiority, of domestic glass. In summer of 1916, Bausch
and Lomb exhibited some of their products at the American Medical Association and American
Optical Association “to allay the somewhat panicky fears of the trade and the professions at
large.” 387 In another example, in the winter of 1916-1917, Bausch and Lomb produced a batch of
optical glass that was used in “the manufacture of several hundred high-priced anastigmat
photographic lenses” which had previously only been created using the “highest grade Jena
glass.” 388 The lenses were fitted to speed cameras and, after being subjected to “exacting tests,”
the testing manufacturers wrote that the tests demonstrated that the new Bausch and Lomb lenses
were “not only equal, but superior to the same type of lenses heretofore made from the imported
glass.” 389 Regardless of whether the lenses were, in fact, superior, the publication of this
information in Bausch and Lomb’s 1919 catalog indicates that lens suppliers were as much
concerned with proving that domestic lenses were superior to foreign lenses as they were
concerned with meeting supply numbers. The technical accomplishment of crisp, clear images
demonstrated not only good design, but a particularly national form of success that continued to
be defined against a history of German provenance.
The production of optical glass quickly became a question of both national security and
insecurity. In 1917, a research lab at the Bausch and Lomb factory was started on advice of the
council of National Defense, headed by Arthur L Day and Captain FE Wright. 390 As Wright
observes in his book-length report, everything involved in the American war-time production of
optical glass, including expense, was subordinated to speed. 391 The government’s support of raw
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materials, the construction of new glass plants, expanded professionalization, and the exchange
of professional information across industries fueled an aggressive expansion and industrialization
of an industry largely dependent on foreign goods. Following seven months of work at the
Bausch and Lomb plant, at the end of 1917, the essential details of the manufacture had been
developed and glass in considerable quantities was being produced. The efforts at the Rochester
site were then extended to the Spencer Lens Company and the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company,
companies which had achieved significantly less success the production of optical glass. From
1915 to 1917, American companies like Bausch and Lomb aggressively increased optical glass
production, in some cases transitioning from producing 2,000 to 20,000 pounds of glass per
month. 392
From the supply crisis of 1914 until the end of the war in 1918, the American optics
industry expanded in a concerted effort to not only produce an adequate infrastructure for the
production and supply of optical glass, but to strengthen the professional reputation of
specifically American glass. While Zeiss’ industrialization in the late 19th century emphasized
the fidelity that theoretical science lent lenses, World War I revealed that science and progress
was intimately connected to national provenance and emphasized fidelity as a question of
production conditions and professional reputation. As Germany held such a high reputation for
optical glass quality, it became important to the industries to also promote the equality, if not the
superiority, of American glass as a way to emphasize the integrity and technological progress of
the United States.
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Wartime Visions
The wartime period from 1914 to 1918 demonstrated the incredible, and devastating,
effects of technologically enhanced vision. The invention and deployment of submarines, poison
gas, and aerial bombardment “severed notions of modern progress from machine culture and
linked the latter instead to mass death and unparalleled human suffering.” 393 The use of artillery
that could devastate targets beyond direct human perception, the increasingly immediate
relationship between vision and death, and the use of photography in aerial warfare made it so
that representations of the world were equally as vital as the realities they depicted. As Paul
Virilio suggests in War and Cinema, the landscape of war, through the use of increasingly visual
forms of warfare, “became cinematic.” 394
Despite Virilio’s claim that that war became cinematic, photographers and
cinematographers frequently struggled to represent the war. The difficulty in representing the
war was both a material and a conceptual struggle. At a material level, photographers found it
difficult to capture images of action. Battles often took place at distances too far to be captured,
or at dawn or dusk when a low amount of daylight made photographic capture impossible with
existing recording formats. The act of holding a camera was itself a dangerous act. In the case of
one Austrian photographer, upon arriving at the front, an enemy “spotted his lens and thought it
was an observation telescope and directed all fire on that spot. So getting shots at the front was
not really possible, and the film people limited themselves to shots of engineers, field bakeries,
airfields, and so forth.” 395 The confusion of the photographic lens and the observation lens is a
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poetic example of how vision was synonymous with danger in the war: to see, or be seen, was to
enter a position of death.
The difficulty in representing the war was also a conceptual struggle. Photographs and
film recordings of the period were often at odds with the experience and scale of violence
enacted by the war. In July of 1917, while filming the war drama Hearts of the World (1918),
D.W. Griffith declared that “it is only possible to film snatches of a battle, and these could not be
pieced together to give the public a sufficiently comprehensive idea of what a battle is like.” 396
By November of 1917, though, Griffith had changed his tune, proclaiming that “Only the
modern motion picture camera makes it possible to give both the scope and the intimate details
of modern warfare.” 397 On these shoots Griffith had been using a new telephoto lens which had
been developed by French designers, which according to Griffith, “makes it possible to secure
long shots that heretofore could never have been taken.” 398 Griffith overstated the authenticity of
his production, and while some footage and newsreel scenes were used in the film, a number of
the battle scenes were staged in Los Angeles. In combining original footage and modern acting,
cinema popularized an image of the war where it was difficult to distinguish between authentic
and staged shots, where the blurring between artifice and reality was an image of the war “as it
really was.” 399
The objective ‘truth’ of the war exceeded traditional models of a distortionless, corrected
vision of the natural world. As Huppauf writes in “Experiences of Modern Warfare and the
Crisis of Representation,” World War I was a culmination of ongoing aesthetic practices of
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abstracting humanity by modern technological means. War photography and films, in ‘failing’ to
represent experience, revealed that “human perception was changing and adapting to the view of
the camera lens…the model of the new relationship between man’s hardened senses and his
world.” 400 While images from The Battle of the Somme (1916), Hearts of the World (1918), or
photographs by Ernest Brooks have become lodged in the historical imaginary of the war, the
images that best expressed the new cinematic quality of the war were the aerial photographs
taken by the Signal Corps.
If war became cinematic, it
became cinematic in the tradition of the
avant-garde cinema that emerged over the
following decade. While synthetic rather
than dialectical, functional rather than
transcendent, the images of reality that
emerged from aerial surveys relied on the
interpretation of abstract and fragmented
scenes of reality. Aerial shots did not
represent “sensuous or moral experiences
of space;” rather, in order to be
understood, “the code of the visible
landscape of destruction has to be
Figure 16 The abstract image from the warfront often required
decoding and interpretation to make sense of their depicted reality.
Ives. Airplane Photography 1920. 362.

decodified and recodified in military
terms.” 401 Aerial photography was
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Figure 17 Diagrams of ineffective aerial photography bear a striking resemblance to Sergei Eisenstein’s diagram of Japanese
illustrations. Ives. Airplane Photography (1920). Page 309. Eisenstein. Film Form (1977). 41.

important to gather information about the battlefield, guide artillery attacks, and assess the
progress of the war. In its displacement of bodily perception through virtual technologies, the
wartime photographers rent apart classical ideas of time and perception. The lived experience of
soldiers was displaced by new technological worlds that shifted truth and meaning to “an abstract
and enigmatic virtual realm.” 402
The violence of the war was not just physical, but also phenomenological: it shifted the
legitimacy of what counted as the field of the visible and sensible. 403 Visual abstraction began to
systematically take place at a scale of inhuman perception that was only sensible through the
levels of management and protocol of the state. What was visible, or sensible, was designed
around the needs of nations at war. As Nadia Bozak writes, “it is the image, personalized point of
view, and culturally inscribed vision that have formulated landscape as a specific way of seeing
and thinking about nature and, by extension, managing it.” 404 As an advertisement calling for
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citizens to donate their photographic war effort similarly suggested, “the camera lens is the eye
of the Army.” 405
And yet, while these images were brought to life by military codes of orientation and
interpretation, the lenses required to capture these aerial views had their own material life. As
Lisa Parks writes on the use of drones, aerial media do not just represent the natural world, but
also demonstrate “materializing capacities and effects” where aerial photography’s relation to the
material world “becomes intelligible, vivid, palpable, and contestable.” 406 The optical glass of
gunsights, binoculars, aerial photography, and wartime cinematographers helped to represent the
war in its various forms, but lenses were not external to these various practices. Like a person
recognizing that their photograph is being taken, the optical infrastructure of the war rearranged
how people moved and were moved in war. While unmanned drones and manned aerial
photography should be recognized as historically distinct, both reveal the ways in which lensbased imagery manifests an embedded series of professional and material power relations that
inform how images are made, circulated, and understood.
While photographic lenses were increasingly produced in France, Britain, and the United
States during the war, commercial cinematographers and photographers had limited access to
these supplies. Many optical companies made a reserve stock of motion picture camera
objectives, but nearly all optical companies who formerly made photographic objectives were
limited to military production. 407 When the scarcity of precision lenses for aerial surveying led
the US Signal Corps to requisition photographic lenses from the public in 1917, they asked
specially for Zeiss Tessars and Voigtländer Heliars – German lenses that were also preferred in
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cinematography for their speed and sharpness. As Karl Brown noted in American
Cinematographer, “No greater tribute could be paid a lens than the willingness of cameramen to
pay fancy prices for the Tessar when importations were impossible during the war.” 408 In
comparison to prewar catalog prices of 25.00 for a Bausch and Lomb Tessar f/3.5, prices for a
f/3.5 Zeiss lens ranged from 40.00 to 100.00 at the beginning of the war. 409
Both still and motion picture camera lenses were in short supply, and the war had
extensive effects on the field of photography, particularly in New York. The last photo exhibit at
291, Alfred Stieglitz’ famous art gallery, was shown in 1916, and with the last issue of Camera
Work in 1917, the Photo-Secessionist movement came to a quiet close. Aggravating these
changes were economic changes that made it difficult for photographers to secure equipment, but
as McCandless writes, “art photography began to seem not only more difficult but less important
as many photographers began to concentrate more on the wartime needs of the country.” 410
Photographers like Edward Steichen and Karl Struss sought out employment in the Signal Corps,
and both the military and the art scene’s suspicion of Struss’ pro-German allegiances would
ultimately lead him to abandon New York and pursue a career as a cinematographer in
Hollywood, where he would eventually film Murnau’s Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans
(1927). 411
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The government’s control over optical supply also caused dramatic shortages in the
supply of motion picture projector lenses. 412 According to The Moving Picture World, many
exhibitors changed their screen size immediately in order to accommodate impending restrictions
on lenses. 413 Manufacturers became concerned that distributing projectors with missing or
incorrect lenses would “require the exhibitor opening a new house to use a different size picture
from that which his screen and stage had been designed for.” 414 The trade press expressed a fear
about the effects that a lens shortage would have on the broader business of motion pictures.
Smaller exhibitors might have entertained the idea of moving location, but it was unlikely that
larger scale exhibitors would change their location as a result of improper lenses, particularly
given how important location was becoming in theatrical exhibition in the late 1910s. As
Gomery observes, location was frequently more important than the quality of the films
themselves. Balaban & Katz’s 1917 and 1918 theaters were specifically located along the
terminus of the Chicago ‘el’ lines, and the buildings were constructed not only for motion
pictures, but also for adjoining small vaudeville acts. 415 The right kind of projector lens may not
have been essential to the practice of movie exhibition, but the shortage of lenses revealed that a
certain level of standardization and quality in projector lenses was nonetheless becoming
valuable in the emerging motion picture industry.
These fears also indicate how important the quality of cinematic exhibition was becoming
to film theaters. Lenses were treated not just as technical tools, but as an integrated part of
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motion picture exhibition. In a 1919 presentation to the Optical Society of Great Britain, Charles
Gamble further affirmed the idea that the comfort of the theater was, in fact, a concern of optics.
“Comfort is not alone, as many might think, the services of polite attendants, quietude, soft
chairs and pleasing decorations,” Gamble argued, and contended that comfort was “largely
conditioned by the degree to which all causes of visual fatigue or irritation are eliminated.” 416 To
change a lens was also to change a whole slew of other interconnected practices. Hypothetically,
theaters could function with lower quality lenses. But in practice, the fear of losing exhibition
quality spurred initiatives to counter such a possible situation. The development of cinema as an
industry relied upon the design and distribution of lenses for cinema’s claim to quality.
The wartime expansion of The Precision Machine Company, which sold the Simplex
projectors used in a wide number of theaters, suggests the extent to which a stable lens supply
was valuable for exhibition. During the war, one of the optical companies that was under
contract to supply the Precision Machine Company with lenses stopped making projector lenses
as a consequence of their new government obligations. 417 Under the direction of Edwin S. Porter,
who became an active manager of the Precision Machine Company in September of 1916 when
his brother, Edwin M. Porter, took over as acting general manager of the company, the company
sought to establish their own lens factory. Edwin S. Porter, better known for The Great Train
Robbery (1903) and his films for the Edison Manufacturing Company, established a $25,000
plant at Morris Park, Long Island, which was specifically dedicated to the production of
projection lenses for Precision Machine Company’s Simplex projectors. 418 Much like Bausch &
Lomb, Simplex promoted the fact that their lenses were tested by optical experts who declared
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that these lenses were “superior to the commercial lenses now in use, each of them measuring up
to the standard.” 419
The material history of cinema lenses during the war was often disconnected from its
formal and aesthetic tendencies – at least, on the surface. The shortage of lenses did not have a
direct influence on film form. But, the material shortage did have an indirect influence on the
photography and cinema’s infrastructure: its supply companies, its exhibition spaces, its laborers,
its internal notions of value and quality. If the wartime period presents something of a lacuna
between the rise of narrative of the 1910s and the rise of the studio system of the 1920s, in
looking at how and why lenses were used during the war, we can see that lenses served as sites
where manufacturers, practitioners, and exhibitors continued to reimagine their practices of lensbased representation and optical quality.

The Optical Society of America
In addition to expanding its material infrastructures, America needed to develop a
professional optics community that could sustain and grow precision optical glass production. In
the same way that Germany had a virtual monopoly on the supply of optical glass, prior to the
war, Germany also had the most robust body of professional literature and training in the field of
optical design. By and large, the dedicated communities and libraries of optical research were
located in Germany. 420 While there were ongoing efforts to build a professional optics
community in the United States, educational opportunities for optical design were slower to
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develop. One of the first courses took place at Ohio State University in 1916, where Astronomy
professor H.C. Lorde ran a course on applied optics, but it wasn’t until 1929 that the University
of Rochester founded its Institute of Optics, the first educational program dedicated to optics in
the United States. 421 The Institute was founded through a grant from Eastman Kodak and
Bausch and Lomb, and its founding faculty member was optical designer Rudolph Kingslake. 422
The war led to an acute and urgent need for increased optical skills and knowledge. As
Hilda Kingslake, prominent historian of the Optical Society of America (OSA), writes, “No
center in the country felt this more than Rochester.” 423 There were many scientific societies in
Rochester including a microscopical society, a chemical society, and an optometric group, but
“none of these provided a scientific home for those interested in the relatively new study of
applied optics.” 424 The Optical Society of America, begun by 30 optical scientists and instrument
makers in Rochester, was founded in 1916. 425 Under the direction of Perley G. Nutting, who
worked at the first Optical Division at the U.S. Bureau of Standards in 1903 and later for Kodak
in 1910, the OSA focused primarily on increased professionalization and bringing American
optical instruments to the level of quality of German instruments. 426 The organization tended to
distance itself from the entertainment business, which was largely seen as the province of the
Society of Motion Picture Engineers (SMPE). 427 The SMPE was also founded in 1916 as a way
to advance “the theory and practice of motion picture engineering and the allied arts and
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sciences, the standardization of the mechanism and practices employed therein and the
dissemination of scientific knowledge by publication.” 428 According to Jonah Horwitz, the
SMPE came from two impetuses: the federal government was increasing its use of motion
picture technology and was invested in its standardization, and the emergent studio system
sought a “permanent forum” for the coordination of film industry technologies. 429 While SMPE
worked towards the aims of studio support, only a few of its engineers were truly from the
studios. Many SMPE members came from research and manufacturing firms that serviced the
industry like Bausch and Lomb, Eastman Kodak, and General Electric. The SMPE was one of
the more notable professional organizations that emerged from the war that was dedicated to
cinema’s technological infrastructure. 430
While the OSA was not as directly concerned with motion picture production as the
SMPE, they nonetheless were responsible for cultivating a strong academic and professional
infrastructure for the publication and circulation of optical scholarship. Notably, one of the first
major initiatives of the OSA was to create an English translation of Helmholtz’ Physiological
Optics, which was first published in 1867. As noted in Chapter 1, Helmholtz’ theories of energy
and vision were crucial to Germany’s efforts to expand its scientific infrastructure in the late 19th
century. The English translation of the 1911 third edition of Physiological Optics, as Hilda
Kingslake writes, was “one of the great publications of the Optical Society. 431 The translation
project was begun in 1921, and the three parts of the volume were published between 1924 and
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1926. 432 The translation effort was financed heavily by Bausch & Lomb vice-president Adolph
Lomb, who was Bausch and Lomb co-founder Henry Lomb’s son. A foundational text “which
marked the dawn of a new era in the science of the physiology of the senses,” the translation of
Physiological Optics was seen as a necessary step for the creations of new scientific treatises and
textbooks in the American field of applied optics. 433
The English language circulation of scientific treaties and journals supported the
education of new generations of non-German speaking optical engineers who came to fill
positions in the expanding American optical industry. Helmholtz’ theories, as Jocelyn
Szczepaniak-Gillece writes, had a lasting influence on exhibition technicians and engineers well
into the 1930s. The continued influence of Helmholtz “illustrated a fixation on the optical impact
of the motion picture screen and the physiological dimensions of the cinematic experience.” 434
The migration of these ideas through societies like the OSA and the SMPE was largely due to the
wartime effort to develop professional optical societies. Under Nutting’s tenure, the OSA also
worked closely with the International Commission on Illumination (CIE), a French organization
that established fundamental standards in the measurement of light and color, and the
International Congress of Photography. 435 While societies like the OSA rarely engaged with
cinema during the war, as Chapter 4 will discuss, professional research in optical science was
aggressively redirected to peacetime areas of development, like cinema, in the early 1920s.
Although not concerned explicitly with cinema, the OSA was nonetheless a crucial agent in
forming the optical infrastructure from which cinema benefitted.
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The OSA and SMPE were not connected by a shared interest in cinema, but rather, a
shared interest in the organization and publication of optical science by corporate engineers. The
wartime development of electrical and chemical industries carried the scientific revolution into a
broader array of industries. As David Noble argues, through patents, control over scientific
research, and corporate support for institutions that produced both “scientific knowledge and
knowledgeable people,” modern science-based industry emerged from the “growing willingness
of the capitalist to embark upon the costly, time-consuming, and uncertain path of research and
development.” 436 Following the war, corporations came to believe that “large-scale continuous
operation and extensive organized research and development were the essentials of financial
success…these demanded big companies, corporate organization, and stable markets.” While
Noble develops his argument through an analysis of the electrical and chemical industries, the
same patterns of corporate progressivism supported the development of optical organizations like
the OSA and Bausch & Lomb. Indeed, during the 1920s, the OSA operated on a continual
deficit, and Adolph Lomb donated somewhere between $2,000 and $3,000 every year to support
the organization. 437 Corporate progressivism was motivated not by greed, but by “a shared
dream, a compelling vision of an affluent, humane, tranquil, and powerful America.” 438 Or, as a
1908 Bausch and Lomb pamphlet proclaimed, the industrial spirit “aims to subserve the good of
mankind as a whole. To give to science the best instruments…is surely to advance the welfare of
humanity.” 439
The blurred lines between the corporate engineer and scientist indicated the extent to
which science and corporate capitalism had become intimately intertwined in the late 1910s and
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early 1920s – a connection that influenced the technology industries that supported the growing
film industry (regardless of the extent to which they were explicitly concerned with cinema). The
OSA and SMPE emerged out of a growing interest in standardization and optical fidelity, and
both organizations came to strongly influence the direction of optical development in the United
States and abroad. While prewar literature and professionalization was strongly divided along
national lines, in these optical communities, there was a shift from a nationalist position to an
internationalist attitude in optical design which saw international agreement and standardization
as essential to trust in knowledge. 440

Conclusion
Optical manufacturers quickly found themselves with a surplus of optical glass following
the end of the war in 1918. Without the military demand, many of these cottage industries were
forced to redirect their investments or fold. 441 As F. Twyman suggests, the greatest innovations
in the optical industries occurred during the postwar conditions of austerity. 442 Camera lenses
introduced during the war found alternative uses in photographing theatrical productions with
ordinary theater lighting, projecting images in larger moving picture halls, and capturing
increasingly fast movement on cinematographs. 443 While Bausch and Lomb were renowned for
their photographic lenses prior to the war, afterwards, they were more well regarded for their
cinematographic lenses. Much like the Precision Machine Company, Bausch and Lomb also
turned their wartime optics to projector lenses, and Bausch and Lomb Cinephor projector lenses
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were held to be an industry standard in motion picture projection. Wartime innovations in optics
were increasingly applied to the motion picture industry, and as The Moving Picture World
proudly declared in 1919:
The lenses which make possible motion picture photography and projection, have until
recently all been made from optical glass imported from Europe. The glass for the
cameras being made in America is now being turned out by the Bosch [sic] and Lomb
plant, among the largest customers of the company being the Eastman Kodak Company,
who buy all their lenses from Bausch and Lomb. 444
The Moving Picture World’s nationalist sentiment was characteristic of a postwar tendency to
narrate optical history as a singularly national endeavor. In comparison to the OSA and the
SMPE, who were both vocal in their support for international collaboration and support, there
was a very strong tendency in the popular press to claim lens progress along decidedly national
genealogies. Many postwar articles on lenses invoke a specifically American history of optical
glass in a way that is absent from many earlier trade articles. With titles like “America’s Optical
Emancipation,” (1919) “America’s Conquest of Optical Glass” (1919), “Breaking A German
Monopoly” (1919), and “Make Lenses Better Than Germans” (1919), articles in both the popular
press and professional trade journals framed Bausch and Lomb as a triumphant example of
American industry. This continued on as late as 1939 with Bausch and Lomb engineer W.B.
Rayton’s article “The Status of Lens Making in America,” where he claims that early European
success in lens production was due to the fact that the US was largely preoccupied with
agriculture and industrial transportation, and that “the production of instruments for the
projection of pictures has been preeminently “an American achievement.” 445 Given anti-German
sentiments in the United States, one might also speculate about how a company founded by
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German immigrants may have felt particularly compelled to demonstrate its national
character. 446
Perhaps nothing demonstrated this nationalist mythology more than a Bausch and Lomb
advertisement in The Book of the Rochester Centennial (1934). A full page advertisement on the
inside of the book’s cover, bookending the history of Rochester along with a rear inside cover
advertisement from Eastman Kodak, framed the success of Bausch and Lomb as a mythical story
of individual triumph:
Motherless, fatherless, friendless and jobless, John J. Bausch landed in the United States
in the rude, roaring days of ’49. No financial assets were ever lower than his. His
vicissitudes read like the trials of Job. But he had ideas, courage, honesty and energy.
And he soon found a wonderful friend – Henry Lomb. Today the world beats a path to
the doorway of an institution whose name is known wherever science throws its
light…Industry, education, government – all rely on its fidelity to the standards that have
governed it for more than eighty years. 447
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Figure 18 John J. Bausch illustrated as a visionary immigrant, looking out at an image of Bausch and Lomb on the horizon.

Depicting a waif on the docks, gazing up at a massive building hovering dreamlike in the clouds,
the advertisement collapsed the mythology of the immigrant story with a dream of corporate
expansion. The advertisement invoked the success of the land upon which Bausch began his
business: one that rewarded individual tenacity and spirit.
The postwar tendency to write nationally-traced histories of lens development presents an
interesting paradox. While the history of optics became closely aligned with questions of
national heritage and identity (much in the same way that the ‘origins’ of cinema have been
falsely divided along distinct national lines), the international expansions of optical industries
ultimately unsettled the historical relationship between optical quality and national origin.
Although Europe was seen to be the provenance of all things optical prior to the war, afterwards,
practitioner beliefs in the quality of precision lenses were more firmly based on the reputation of
large optical corporations. If, as Noble suggests, scientific engineers reproduced corporate logic
in scientific research – a field whose interests in objectivity and knowledge were seemingly
antithetical to modern capitalism – this was due in no small part to the replacement of nation
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with corporation. Although the expansion of corporate power was done in the spirit of
progressivism, it had the effect of securing the power of corporate logic in American life, which
proved to have more dubiously progressive effects over time.
The corporatization of technological production, examined in this chapter in relationship
to lens production, was constitutive of a broader ideological shift in technological modernity. In
The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918, Stephen Kern argues that new ideas about the nature
of space brought about by transit and communication technologies challenged the popular notion
that space could be objectively homogeneous – the idea that had motivated Helmholtz’
measurement initiatives in the 1880s. Faced with a rapid and unevenly accelerating world,
philosophers, physicists, and artists embraced the idea that space was not simply a void where
objects existed, but rather, that space was “a multitude of qualitatively different spaces that
varied with the shifting moods and perspectives of human consciousness.” 448 Rather than
thinking of lenses as passive tools that were used to represent the “pluralism and confusion of the
modern age,” lens production was itself co-constitutive of a world that was increasingly seeing
and being seen through different lenses. 449
The national expansion of optical production across the globe affirmed the potential of
industry, rather than nation, to advance and progress technology – which, through the linkage of
science and industry, was itself a form of social production. The rapid development of national
optics – both as an industry and a professional community of knowledge – broke down the
uncontested place that objective science held in the popular and professional imaginations of
optical glass quality. If Zeiss established the field of expectations about optical fidelity in the late
19th and early 20th century, the war destabilized the firm association of nation with objective
448
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scientific progress. The national development of optical industries like Bausch and Lomb made
high quality lenses more available and, significantly, visual fidelity became more easily
accessible by photographers and cinematographers. Alongside a widespread industrialization of
lens production, emerging professional communities of optics began to consider lens
development not as a question of universally objective science, but as a design process with
multiple definitions of correct (and distorted) perspective.
The dramatic wartime expansion of optical glass industries created an industrial base
ideally suited to business relationships with the motion picture industry, especially following the
cessation of wartime demands for military applications. The industrialization of glass did not
have an immediate or direct impact on the ways in which films represented reality and motion.
Neither the deep focus style of the silent period nor the soft focus style of the 1920s resulted
from the use of “crude” or dedicated soft focus lenses alone. 450 More significantly, the national
push for optics industries expanded the study, writing, and professional organization of optical
knowledge, among which included the cinema (which came to occupy a particularly prestigious
place in precision optics design). The motion picture industry, in turn, shaped the ways in which
lenses became designed for seeing the world in terms of the studio.
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Chapter 4 | Fast Glass: Cooke and the Cinematic Lenses of 1920s Hollywood
Agriculture, steel, oil, transportation – all
indispensable weapons. But there is another
weapon to be fittingly grouped with them –
a weapon of the heart – motion pictures!
Famous Players-Lasky (1918)
Perhaps more than any other lens, the Cooke Speed Panchro is entangled in the history of
Classical Hollywood. Designed by the British optical company Taylor, Taylor, and Hobson, the
lens was first introduced to cinema studios as the F/2 Opic lens in 1924 and formally branded as
the Speed Panchro in 1930. 451 Cooke’s fast lenses were used extensively in the 1920s film
industry – particularly by the Famous Players-Lasky/Paramount Corporation. In 1926,
Kinematograph Weekly reported that over a hundred Cooke lenses were in use by the
photographic department of the Famous Players-Lasky studios. 452 In 1928, The Kinematograph
Year Book reported that Paramount had standardized the use of Cooke’s F/2 lenses on all of their
cinema cameras. 453 The wide apertures made Cooke’s cine-lenses a useful tool for
cinematographers who were grappling with a wide range of industry-wide changes that occurred
throughout the 1920s, such as the adoption of panchromatic stock, incandescent lighting, and
sound filmmaking. While these technological changes have often been historicized in
relationship to their aesthetic consequences for film form, these changes also created new
challenges for optical suppliers who sought to manufacture lenses for studio practice. From film
to lighting to sound, the speed of Cooke lenses helped cinematographers address changes that
formed the technological foundations of Hollywood’s golden era.
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In the 21st century, Cooke has used their historical involvement with the studios to
cultivate an aura of film history around its lenses. Most notably, in 2016, Cooke Optics resumed
manufacture of their Speed Panchro lenses. Speed Panchros had not been manufactured since
1965 – the year that Cooke stopped producing these lenses to focus more specifically on
television production. Cooke resumed manufacture of the Speed Panchros in an attempt to
capitalize on contemporary desires for classic Cooke lenses. As Cooke Optics CEO Les Zellan
mused in a 2018 interview, the Speed Panchro Classic line was produced to supply
cinematographers who were using old lenses as a way to capture a specifically ‘cinematic’ look
on digital recording formats. Many of the Speed Panchros being used were old and required
multiple look-up tables (LUTs) for each lens to function effectively on set. 454 When Zellan
described the history of Cooke at the 2019 British Society of Cinematographers Exposition, he
emphasized that the quality of Cooke was built on a Taylor-Hobson’s long tradition of solving
problems for studio production:
[W]hen sound movies came in, it’s the Speed Panchros that we developed that made
sound movies possible, to be sure, because all the lenses were just too slow…when
Technicolor was a three-strip camera process…the lens had to throw out of the back of
the lens through a prism, and so it had to go a long way. Nobody could figure that out.
Then Technicolor sent their engineers to Cooke, and we solved that problem, and these
principles that we developed along the way are used in every lens today…at a lot of turns
in the industry, when there was a problem, Cooke solved it. 455
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Figure 19 November 1930 Announcement for the Speed-Panchro Lenses. American Cinematographer.

The lens, from the perspective of Cooke, was central to the development of Classical
Hollywood’s technical infrastructure. Zellan uses Cooke’s historic involvement with the studios
to suggest that the quality of Cooke lenses comes not only from exceptional construction, but
also from a long tradition of successfully addressing technical problems in cinematic practice. As
a lens that gained fame from its use in Hollywood’s golden era and eventually became a casualty
of rising television production in 1965, the Speed Panchro has played a central role in the
guiding corporate mythology of Cooke: that Cooke lenses are cinema lenses, and that these
lenses revive cinema’s technological aura in an era when celluloid film is increasingly displaced
by digital formats. Like so many corporate narratives, though, the success of Cooke occurred at
the intersection of multiple cultural influences – not just corporate research and development –
that constituted cinema in the 1920s.
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Focusing on Taylor-Hobson and their Cooke lenses, this chapter examines how and why
Cooke lenses became so closely linked to cinematic practice. 456 As I’ve demonstrated in the
previous three chapters, the modernization of the precision lens industry was historically defined
by the scientific production of distortionless lenses. Zeiss, E. Krauss and Bausch & Lomb – who
were all corporate affiliates – made up the industrial infrastructure of the “anastigmat era,” an era
where distortionless photographic lenses became mass produced and internationally distributed.
In many ways, the national initiatives to industrialize domestic optical industries during World
War I marked a shift in the anastigmat era. Anastigmats were still used in production, and
practitioners continued to extol the importance of corrected, distortionless lenses. However, in
the wake of the war, lenses were increasingly manufactured for more clearly defined markets and
communities of practice. Lens correction was an important quality, but correction became one of
many criteria that constituted lenses as a specifically cinematic technology in the emerging
1920s cinema.
When the Opic was redesigned and rebranded as the Speed Panchro in 1930, the year that
Taylor-Hobson was purchased by motion picture camera company Bell & Howell, the release of
the Speed Panchro revealed the extent to which studio production desired technologies that were
specifically designed for the integrated systems of studio production. Optical companies, much
like the engineering and professional societies that Luci Marzola examines in Engineering
Hollywood: Technology, Technicians, and the Science of Building the Studio System, 1915-1930,
were becoming part of a horizontally integrated network of technologies that supported the
emergent film industry. While Hollywood’s success in the 1920s is frequently historicized as a
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product of the studios’ vertical integration, as Marzola argues, it was the “horizontally organized
trade associations and collaborative endeavors around technology which allowed the system to
dominate motion picture production for decades.” 457 The success of the Speed Panchro was due
to how the lens – as both a material object and commercial commodity – worked efficiently and
reliably across the multiple and growing departments that constituted cinema’s horizontal
infrastructure. Furthermore, Cooke’s brand reputation helped foster a strong imagined
connection between amateur movie makers and studio practice, which was especially beneficial
to vendors selling equipment to an emerging consumer class of semi-professional filmmakers.
In addition to capitalizing on the growth and profitable mythology of studio production,
Cooke’s cinema lenses were also the product of an increasingly corporate engineering culture.
Following the war, electrical, chemical, dye, and optical industries began to adopt a “corporate
system of science-based industry” as a way to maintain more extensive control over research and
production processes. 458 The expansion of the scientific-industrial matrix was motivated by the
economic possibilities of mass consumption – a practice of commercial expansion that many
wartime industries pursued during peacetime. 459 The consequence of these industrial shifts was a
rise in engineering culture that instituted technology not simply as tools or objects, but rather, a
“fundamental social development in itself” constituted by “the preparation, mobilization, and
habituation of people for new types of productive activity, the reorientation of the pattern of
social investment, the restructuring of social institutions, and, potentially, the redefinition of
social relationships. 460 This is to say: these infrastructural rearrangements changed not only the
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design of lenses, but the broader corporate industrial structure necessary for the production of
lenses. As Bausch & Lomb director W.B. Rayton mused in Cinematographic Annual (1930),
although the optician might be tempted to think that “without optics there could be not
cinematography,” such an “idle and superficial” impulse immediately gives way to the
contributions of the chemist and the precision mechanic. 461 While Rayton’s 1930 observation
frames cinematic development as a technocentric process – not dissimilar from Les Zellan’s
2019 logic – Rayton’s statement reveals the extent to which optical engineers conceived of the
cinema as a system of production.
I argue that the studio use of Cooke’s fast glass – a term that neatly expressed
modernity’s ideals of speed and visibility – both reflected and constituted a wider shift towards
the manufacturing of visual space rather than its objective capture. First, I will illustrate how
Cooke’s optical reputation was strongly influenced by its national reputation following World
War I. Second, I will illustrate how Taylor-Hobson migrated these wartime optical innovations
into the commercial market of the cinema, particularly in the field of projector lenses. Third, I
will examine how Cooke cinema lenses were defined not only by their use in studio production,
but also in relationship to a growing semi-professional camera market. Finally, I will examine
the Cooke Speed Panchro to demonstrate how lens design became predicated on studio-specific
needs for the manufacture of visual space. In examining the entanglement of Taylor-Hobson
lenses with 1920s Hollywood, we can better understand how cinema lenses became defined as
such on the basis of studio-specific practices.
Cinema lenses became defined by their capacity to function in the studios: they
manufactured an environment built to conceal its technological construction. Rather than simply
W.B. Rayton, “Optical Science in Cinematography Bibliography,” in Cinematographic Annual, Vol. 1, ed. Hal Hall
(Hollywood: American Society of Cinematographers, 1930), 41.
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representing or simulating the world, studios were themselves constitutive of a broader modern
tendency to manufacture the world. As Brian Jacobson contends, studios were models of the
“human-built” world where “modern technologies came not so much to dominate the natural
environment as to replace it with artificial alternatives.” 462 Ensconced within the technology of
the studio, “the real becomes more artificial than fiction itself, accessible only, and
paradoxically, through the camera’s lens, the single location from which one can imagine the
artificial scene free of illusion.” 463 Jacobson echoes Walter Benjamin, who similarly writes that
studio production manufactures an environment where it is “impossible to assign to a spectator a
viewpoint which would exclude from the actual scene such extraneous accessories as camera
equipment, lighting machinery, staff assistants, etc. – unless his eye were on a line parallel with
the lens.” 464 The impossible viewpoint of the cinema mystifies a reality effect of the lens that
was also shared with microscopy and photography: the lens reveals a world that can only be
perceived as such from the perspective of the technology.
Benjamin’s impossible viewpoint is reflected by the dearth of behind the scenes
photography that look directly at the lens. Behind the scenes photos of Hollywood production are
rarely positioned from the perspective of the actor, and if so, they never look directly at the lens.
On an economic level, this makes sense: the space of the actor is at the center of a constellation
of labors that have been carefully coordinated to ensure “the thoroughgoing permeation of reality
with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment.” 465 Positioning a
behind-the-scenes camera in the place of the actor runs the risk of interrupting a series of
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expensive labors. On a somewhat more mystical level, though, the absence of photographs that
look directly down the barrel of the lens also serves an ideological function. As Benjamin
suggests, to replace the aura of art, studios manufactured an aura around technology. While the
1920s entrenched classical Hollywood cinema form as “timeless and natural,” as Miriam Bratu
Hansen contends, the seemingly natural form of classical cinema was a “regime of productivity
and intelligibility that is both historically and culturally specific.” 466 Despite being elegantly
inscribed with lens maker names, focal lengths, and apertures, the lens is an empty space of
archival record: as though it is taboo to look directly at the location from which artifice becomes
reality. In the human built world of the cinema – both in the vertically aligned studios and the
horizontally aligned technology industry – the auratic absence of the lens naturalized and
humanized increasingly artificial practices of manufacturing visual space.

Taylor-Hobson and the Postwar British Optical Industry
By the end of World War I, Taylor-Hobson had cultivated a reputation as a particularly
prestigious British optical manufacturer and were well known for their photographic objectives.
By 1930, Taylor-Hobson’s Cooke lenses had become a standard name in both professional and
amateur cinematography in nearly all the Hollywood trade press. How, exactly, did TaylorHobson come to be associated so strongly with the cinema in the 1920s? The adoption of TaylorHobson’s lenses in the studios was not based solely on the basis of Cooke lenses being the ‘best’
or fastest lenses available, nor was their use in the cinema based on an inevitable or progressive
‘evolution’ of photographic technologies for cinematic use. Cooke’s reputation as a precision
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instrument maker was intertwined with its role in the war and with the promise that its ‘British’
products provided for postwar optics – both on a professional and commercial level.
Taylor-Hobson, like many lens designers of the late 19th century, became commercially
successful on the basis of designing lenses with minimal distortion. In 1886, the same year that
the Jena Glass Works began to distribute its scientifically designed optical glass, engineer
William Taylor and optician T. Smithies Taylor created a company that produced and sold a
variety of optical instruments. In 1887, Herbert Hobson joined and became the sales face of the
company; although his name is carried on in the company, he left in 1896. Based in Leicester,
Taylor-Hobson built its reputation on the basis of its high-end, precision instruments.
The Cooke lenses produced by Taylor-Hobson take their brand name from an acquisition
made in the 1890s. Thomas Cooke was a scientific instrument manufacturer based in York, and
Cooke had a factory from 1837 to 1868 that produced spectacles, telescopes, and surveying
equipment to sundials, clocks, and lathes. 467 In 1893, one of Cooke’s engineers, H. Dennis
Taylor (no relation to any of the Taylor brothers) designed and patented the Cooke Triplet, a
distortionless photographic lens. In 1894, Thomas Cooke offered the Taylor-Hobson the
manufacturing rights to the Triplet photographic lens design and the Cooke name. TaylorHobson made a wide variety of optical instruments, but the Cooke Triplet was one its most
successful products. Rather than layering more and more glass elements to reduce optical
distortion, the Triplet was made of three optical elements. Photographers were widely enamored
of the Triplet’s sharpness and the simplicity of its design, and its simple construction resulted in
many optical companies adopting a triplet design for lens construction. 468
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From Leicester, Taylor-Hobson both sourced the necessary materials for precision glass
manufacture and supplied a growing network of international photographers. In 1899, TaylorHobson’s business had grown to the extent that they moved from the Slate Street Works and
erected a new factory and office building, known as the Stoughton Street Works, with “every
modern convenience.” 469 By 1902, a New York Office was established by a J. Ronald Taylor, a
third Taylor brother, and the New York office was primarily set up to supply Eastman Kodak. 470
Although the precision optics industry was not nearly as large as other more classically modern
industries – such as the textile industry or the machine tool industry – precision instruments were
a significant and often emblematic marker of British industrial progress. 471 Prior to the war,
British makers often showed little concern for foreign competition. As Mari Williams writes, it
wasn’t that British makers were unaware of this competition: many makers sold German
products, and several used parts manufactured in Germany. 472 The British industry largely
operated on the basis of keeping costs low, and these cost-saving measures resulted in a lack of
domestic investment in worker training and a significant dependence on imported materials.
British indifference to German optics quickly shifted to nationalist hostility when Britain
declared war on Germany. While arguments about British industrial performance were generally
carried out outside the precision instruments industry, at the outbreak of the Great War,
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Figure 20 Cooke 1902 Catalog. 10.

Germany’s optical superiority played into fears of national degeneration that had been endemic
to British culture since the late 19th century. 473 Nationalism proved to be an effective rallying cry
for the massive mobilization required to sustain the British war effort on both a material and
ideological level. Although optical discourse was strongly focused on German antagonists, one
of the strongest reasons for the optical crisis was a lack of suitable silica from France. British
manufacturers had generally used sand obtained from Fontainebleau, just south of Paris. In
addition to its chemical purity, even grade, and suitable size and shape, Fontainebleau sand was
widely used because it could “be transported cheaply and conveniently to most British glassmaking districts. This is partly due to the insular position of Britain, and partly to the fact that the
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sand can be directly shipped from Rouen.” 474 The war emphasized the sharp limits of the modern
promise of industry built upon international practices of resource extraction.
The sand necessary for precision optics was often discussed in terms of its chemical and
material purity, even though the most significant barrier to sourcing British silica was a lack of
adequate domestic refinement and processing. As Boswell wrote in 1915, “There does not appear
to be anywhere in the British Isles a sand so suitable, from all points of view, as either the
Fontainebleau or Lippe sands…This does not mean that sands as pure and well-graded as those
cannot be found.” 475 Although these discussions described material qualities necessary to the
construction of precision optical glass, the scientific emphasis on purity and homogeneity
obscured the economic incentives that encouraged British glassmakers to build an industry on
the basis of cheaper foreign materials in the first place. These discussions were only further
reinforced by nationalist discussions of optical labor. Despite a long tradition of foreign workers,
postwar discussions about the preservation of the British optical industry emphasized the
economic threats of “unfair foreign underpaid labor” and routine labor “best suited to the
German worker.” 476 Together, anxieties about the underdevelopment of both material resources
and domestic labor were used by optical companies to rationalize a nationalist push for the
invigoration of a specifically British optical industry.
Although Taylor-Hobson had been producing lenses since 1894, they achieved national
recognition for their manufacture of photographic lenses during World War I. Much like France
and America, Britain’s optical industry rapidly expanded during the war to compensate for an
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abrupt loss of access to German optical glass, which had become immediately vital for a wide
range of military applications. The British manufacture of optical glass was undertaken by
Chance Brothers, a British glass company who, once upon a time, supplied the glass for the
Crystal Palace of the 1851 exhibition. The Chance Brothers was offered some of the most
significant state financing to increase their production, which increased from 70,000 lbs of
optical glass in 1916 to 92,000 lbs in 1918 – somewhere close to fifty times its normal pre-War
quantity. 477 Taylor-Hobson were largely responsible for manufacturing photographic lenses for
aerial surveillance. Similar to Bausch & Lomb in the United States, Taylor-Hobson received
special recognition for their work in the war for the construction of precision optics. While
secondary to the wartime need for range-finders, gun sights, and binoculars, precision
photographic optics functioned as a highly visible example of Britain’s wartime technology
effort.
Most notably, the Cooke Aviar visibly affirmed the success of the British industrial
effort. The Aviar was a lens designed for use in aerial photography and adopted by the Royal Air
Force in 1916. As aerial photographers were, out of necessity, often working with a hodge-podge
of requisitioned lenses, refinements in the clarity and supply of aerial photography reinforced
beliefs in Britain’s domestic independence, the perceived technological supremacy of Britain’s
rapidly developing air force, and its actual viability in surveying, photographing, and
representing the war. English optical glass makers juxtaposed the quality of their glass against a
German standard, and the war-driven embargo intensified practices of legitimating optical glass
along national lines. We can see this explicitly in a review of a 1916 test of the Aviar, which
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strongly parallels a similar 1916 lens test by Bausch and Lomb. 478 A blind test was made
between a Zeiss lens and the Cooke Aviar. Plates were exposed simultaneously at a high altitude,
and plates received identical exposures and development. John H. Gear, president of the
Photographic Society, made an address about this test:
I was subsequently asked to give an opinion upon the quality of the lenses used in making
the negatives, not knowing what lenses had been used. Very little examination was
necessary before I unhesitatingly selected one negative as being superior to the other—
that one was made with the British Lens. 479
Regardless of whether this test was purely for publicity, the comparison between English and
German glass was symptomatic of efforts to remove the stigma from British industry and to
prove that English lenses were superior to German lenses. The test also linked the Royal Air
Force with British science and manufacturing, creating an explicit link between technological
progress and military might. The Aviar was lauded as a symbol of Britain’s optical industry
managing to create lenses that not only equaled, but surpassed, lenses of German construction.
William Taylor was awarded an OBE (Order of the British Empire), and the King visited the
Taylor-Hobson Stoughton Street Works in June of 1919. As a way to concretely measure Britain
against Germany, Cooke’s precision lenses produced and affirmed images of domestic
technological progress. 480
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Taylor-Hobson’s wartime innovations were one of a growing network of scientifically
driven industrialization projects in Britain. While arguments about British industrial performance
and its links to technical training and education were largely carried out outside the precision
instruments industry prior to 1914, these conversations became central to optics in the war. 481
Much like the American OSA (Optical Society of America) and the French OPL (Optique et
précision Lavallois), the British Society of Glass Technology grew out of a wartime lack of
knowledge about the infrastructure of optical glass production. It also mirrored the emergence of
dedicated motion picture standards organizations such as the Society of Motion Picture
Engineers (1916) and the Deutschen Kinotechnische Gesellschaft (1920). 482 Inaugurated in 1916,
in the midst of the war, the British Society of Glass Technology was founded for the general
advancement of knowledge and practices in glass technology. The Society was a means by
which English manufacturers and scientists could share knowledge about a wide range of glass
crafts. At the Inaugural Meeting on November 9th, 1916, Society Secretary W.E.S. Turner – a
chemist who had established a Department of Glass Manufacture at the University College of
Sheffield in 1915 – noted that there was a desire for manufacturers to be more closely associated
with both each other and with men of science “by which means alone the deadening influences
of generations past could be overcome.” 483 These organizations helped glassmakers build a body
of professional knowledge that could circulate outside of the traditional apprenticeship models of
knowledge that had led to the abrupt scarcity of optical glass. In its early years, the Society’s
journal was dedicated to surveying literature relevant to glass in both British and foreign journals
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since 1915, and following the war, the journal served as a site of emergent discussion about what
the future would hold for the newly formed British optical industry. 484
On May 15th, 1918 – six months prior to the end of the war – The Society of Glass
Technology held a general discussion in London around the topic of “The Glass Industry After
The War.” The wartime expansion the optical industry suggested the rich benefits of national
science and research, but these utopian visions were met with the immediate fear that this
impetus would not sustain in the postwar era. Opticians and glassmakers were anxious about
whether the newly expanded domestic optical industry would be protected against German glass,
which was soon to enter the market after the cessation of the war. A number of members
advocated for government protections from foreign imports, particularly as the Sheffield
Telegraph had reported that German glass-manufacturing had been taken over by the
government and been “amalgamated into one great company.” 485 The amalgamation of the
German industry was not entirely true, and neither was it significantly different from the
government subsidies provided to the British industry. What the fear of German industry did tap
into, though, was a domestic anxiety about the quality of British products. Although members
were optimistic about the newly vitalized British glass industry, members were fearful that the
British market would “undoubtably be deluged with foreign glass during a period of time when
we shall all, more or less, feel we ought to have a rest and a holiday.” 486 Other members of the
Glass Society quickly noted that unless the British glass industry became more equitable for its
workmen – the same economic inequalities that had contributed to Britain’s underdeveloped
glass industry in the first place – Britain’s glass industry would immediately collapse.
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Following the war, the British optical industry replaced the stimulus that the war
provided with “national prestige” and “the stimulus of good, honest pride in ourselves.” 487 In
concert with their efforts to distinguish their industry, British optical engineers began discussing
cinema in more explicit terms after the war. For example, while The Optical Society of Great
Britain had published a number of articles about photographic lenses and shutters since its initial
proceedings in 1899, these articles rarely identified the application of photographic lenses for
cinematography. It was only in 1919 that The Optical Society of Greaat Britain explicitly
engaged with cinema in the form of Charles W. Gamble’s article, “On Projection Screens.” In
the article, Gamble argued that opticians should approach the improvement of image projection
more systematically. He contended:
Although screens for receiving projected images may be regarded as optical devices, and,
reasonably, devices of a delicate nature, it is perhaps singular that there has been until
recently little or no attention paid to investigating the conditions which determine their
efficiency. By far the largest use of projection screens occurs in the cinematograph
theatres, which are so widely distributed. 488
Unhappy that experiments on improving the screen had thus far been the result of practical tests
rather than “quantitative methodological investigation,” Gamble suggested that considering both
the screen and the lens as an optical system would increase the comfort and value of exhibition,
particularly in relationship to cinematograph theaters which were the largest use of projector
screens.
Gamble’s article picked up a conversation about optical projection that had been largely
forestalled by the war. After the 1909 Cinematograph Act, which regulated film exhibition at a
national level, cinema-building boomed in London. 489 While scholarship has primarily focused
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on how the Cinematograph Act established censorship precedents, the Act also served as a
powerful impetus for British exhibitors to standardize and improve the quality of exhibition
spaces. 490 As F.H. Richardson wrote in 1915, in contrast to British exhibitors, American film
manufacturers were paying for a highly corrected camera lens and then proceeding to “wipe out
the good effects of the high grade camera lens by projecting the picture with the cheapest thing
we can get.” 491 As Kinematograph Weekly staff member Collin N. Bennett bemoaned, had the
European war not switched the lens companies Dallmeyer, Ross, R&J Beck, and Taylor-Hobson
to government work, “the effect of what they are doing for the motion picture exhibitor would by
this time be considerably more apparent than it is.” 492 Following the war, optical companies
committed to government work turned back to the cinema as a site to sell higher quality optical
equipment, and the industrial focus on cinema as a potential market was also reflected in
professional optical publications.
The discussion about Gamble’s article was minimal in the published Optical Society
proceedings, but over the following decade, the Optical Society published more articles and
proceedings that directly examined cinematic applications. 493 Of particular note is a lecture
delivered by W. Day on “The Birth of Kinematography, and Its Antecedents” on January 25,
1923. It is extremely likely that W. Day was Will Day (Wilfred Ernest Lytton Day), an early
amateur British film historian and author of the unpublished 25,000 Years to Trap a Shadow.
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Day’s lecture at the Optical Society suggested the extent to which optical societies were directly
focusing on cinematic practice in the 1920s as means of building up the prestige and popularity
of their craft – particularly in an era where many optical companies were forced to redirect their
wartime innovations into other markets or fold. Shortly after Day’s January lecture, H. Dennis
Taylor, designer of the original Cooke Triplet, gave an address in March 1923 to The Society of
Glass Technology, “Optical Designing as an Art.” Taylor had been in retirement since 1920, and
in 1923, was returning publishing after an fourteen year hiatus. 494 In his address, Taylor argued
against the prevailing idea that science and engineering held the definitive solution for lens
production. Taylor stated:
I regard the work of optical designing to be much more analogous to the work of the
sculptor than to that of the mechanical engineer…I regard the best optical designing as
more of the nature of an art than the mere calculation and carrying out of a
mathematically prescribed specification. 495
In opposition to the prevailing professional tendency to align optical design with increasingly
scientific and mechanical forms of labor, Taylor argued strongly for a return to experimentation.
Taylor argued for the benefits of trial and error, rather than scientific analysis, as a way to
“sharpen” rather than “atrophy” intelligence, inventiveness, and artistic faculties. 496 By
reframing the future of optical design away from the standing tradition of Zeiss and towards the
seemingly neglected British school of optics established by Airy and Coddington, Taylor
mobilized national history for the support of science and industry. Taylor’s address, mired in
nationalism, redefined the postwar narrative of glass production in terms of quality and prestige
– language that was strongly drawn from the nationalist sentiments of the wartime years.
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Technological change never occurs in a vacuum, and the development of cinema lenses
was not solely the product of Cooke’s internal reputation with the cinema industry. Rather,
Cooke’s prestige was intertwined with its broader industrial reputation, which itself was
predicated on a nationalist desire to expand British glass production into broader markets. The
wartime development of the optical industry, which shored up both Britain’s infrastructural base
and its cultural belief in the quality of British lenses, encouraged the continued expansion of
precision optics. 497 The film industry’s use of Taylor-Hobson’s lenses was based on these
technical qualities, but these qualities were never inherently central to film practice. These
technical qualities became valuable because studios and theatres began to widely enact technical
standards – a horizontal synchronization that especially benefitted 1920s motion picture studios,
who were beginning to vertically integrate motion picture production and motion picture
exhibition.

Taylor-Hobson Moves into the Movies
The optical industry of the early 1920s was increasingly defined by scientific exchange,
the migration of wartime optical innovations into alternate markets, and a desire to re-energize
the glass industry on the basis of national prestige. As optics developed into a more international
and scientifically coordinated community of study, they sought to circulate, and sell, the product
of their research in new commercial markets.
One such market was the growing market of motion picture exhibition. The Berlin picture
palaces that Siegfried Kracauer analyzes in The Mass Ornament grew out of an industrial shift
towards opulent exhibition in the 1920s In the years following the war, “movie exhibition
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replaced big-time vaudeville as the mass entertainment form preferred by Americans.” 498 The
rise of cinema in the 1920s was by no means an immediate or evenly distributed process, but a
wide range of businesses concerned with the film production began to approach cinema as an
industry with its own distinct set of technical and professional needs. While elevating the quality
of the pictures themselves was part of this strategy, as Douglas Gomery writes in Shared
Pleasures: A History of Movie Presentation in the United States, the individual movie “typically
matters little to exhibition.” 499 Exhibitors didn’t sell movies; they sold escape, comfort, and
quality. By adopting the strategy of chain stores like Sears and S&P, the U.S. film industry used
theatre ownership to support its broader business of studio production. 500 The creation of an
integrated motion-picture production system involved more than the studio acquisition of
multiple chains; rather, as Marzola writes, “there was a whole other side of the industry that
made production possible and that needed to be incorporated for the system to function.” 501 As
motion picture exhibition became increasingly central to the studio profit model, standardization
across taking and projection was seen as a key criteria for quality, which was essential for profit.
Taylor-Hobson advertised itself in ways that the emerging ‘quality’ motion picture
industry sought to both promote and identify itself with. As much as story and stars were the
promoted cores of the motion picture industry, as the Players-Lasky wrote in a short 1919
corporate overview, The Story of the Famous Players-Lasky, “Every picture produced by this
organization is the fruit of the labor of a thousand experts, experts whose entire energies are bent
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to one task – the making of the best motion pictures.” 502 Optics’ language of scientific testing,
quality assurance, and engineering spoke strongly to studio and exhibitor efforts to increase both
public and industry-internal perceptions of cinema quality. While not exclusive to the optical
industry, optical catalogues and advertisements actively used narratives of scientific engineering
and design to translate technical quality into practical quality.
From 1919 to 1922, Taylor-Hobson began to aggressively mobilize their wartime lens
production into photography and cinema markets. They promoted the use of their lenses for
aerial photography in the war; they published a letter from Ernest Shackleton about the use of
their lenses on the Antarctic Expedition; they emphasized the use of their lenses to film royalty.
These international accomplishments helped Cooke advertise their growing distribution offices.
In 1921, after a period of displaying their wartime accomplishments, Taylor-Hobson released a
catalog with their new lenses. The catalog included lenses for astronomical photography and
cinema taking and projection lenses, including lenses with apertures as large as f/2.5, f/2, and
f/1.9. 503 Although manufacture was “not sufficiently advanced for these ultra-fast objectives to
be listed in detail,” consumers were notified that they could have further information directed to
them. In October of 1921, Taylor-Hobson also moved their primary sales department from
Leicester to London. 504 Although Taylor-Hobson had maintained an office at 1135 Broadway in
New York, at some point between 1915 and 1922, they discontinued operations at this location –
likely due to the war.
Taylor-Hobson distributed a new F/2 type of lens as early as 1920, which was introduced
to kinematograph studios as the “Kinic” lens. 505 According to R. Fawn Mitchell, Technical
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Service Manager for Bell & Howell, while
cinematographers had “preliminary hesitation”
about using lenses of such wide aperture, “the
superior definition and quality of these lenses
won acceptance under the most rigid tests and the
use of really fast lenses came into general use in
the studios for the first time.” 506 Mitchell’s
statement about the studios echoed similar claims
made by Bausch & Lomb and Taylor-Hobson
about the use of their lenses for military. The sale
of lenses, whether it was for war or cinema, was
frequently embedded in a demonstration of
scientifically-grounded quality (and often with a
Figure 21 1922 Burke & James Cooke Lens Catalog.

story or claim to rigid scientific testing). Faster

lenses did not inherently mean better pictures. As Kristin Thompson writes, we should dismiss
the notion that “the silent period used only a crude, unintentional deep focus resulting from
‘contrasty’ orthochromatic film or from crude, slow lenses.” 507 Rather, if faster lenses became
valuable over the course of the 1920s, it was because fast glass was connected to Hollywood’s
specific desire for quality and standardization.
The value of a lens was cultivated in more places that just the material lens itself: lenses
also became valuable through circulated trade articles that convinced technicians and business
operators of the value of more expensive lenses. In 1922, Taylor-Hobson began to distribute their
506
507
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lenses through Chicago-based camera accessories company, Burke & James. 508 In 1922 Burke &
James released a catalog dedicated to their new offering of Cooke lenses. Listed first in the
catalogue were the Series I lenses, F/3.1, designated “For Motion Picture Taking.” The catalogue
was, per its introduction, “not merely a catalog of the famous Taylor-Hobson Cooke
Anastigmats” but also “a treatise on applied photographic optics.” 509 With full page articles such
as “Which Lens to Choose,” “What is An Anastigmat?,” “How to Test Lenses,” “How to Focus,”
and “What Depth of Focus Really Means,” Burke & James sought to educate consumers on the
multiple reasons – and perceived value gained – from purchasing more expensive and higher
quality lenses.
Although Taylor-Hobson was beginning to sell camera lenses to the film industry, their
reputation for quality lenses grew the most in the field of cinema projection. In 1922, TaylorHobson also received a fête for their lens being chosen as the projector lens for the London
premiere of D.W. Griffith’s Orphans of the Storm (1921). The Taylor-Hobson lens apparently
won after a competitive test, and a note in the Exhibitors Trade Review remarked on how the
new lens gives “52% more light than others and saves 50% on current bills.” 510 A July 1922
advertisement for Taylor-Hobson projection lenses forthcoming from Burke & James similarly
promoted the lenses’ greater efficiency – rather than the lack of distortion that was classically
advertised in lens advertisements. 511
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Taylor-Hobson was not alone in the effort to sell the motion picture industry on improved
projection quality: in the field of motion picture projection, they faced stiff competition from
Bausch & Lomb. Bausch & Lomb, similarly mobilizing their wartime contributions to peacetime
markets, released the Cinephor projection lens in 1921. In an advertisement in Moving Picture
World, Bausch & Lomb proclaimed:
[B]etter illumination alone did not satisfy the Scientific Staff of the Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co. They were not content until they had devised a lens possessing as well all the
elements necessary to real projection improvement – a flatter field, sharper definition to
the very corners of the picture and stronger contrasts between light and shadow; a lens
that will give the quality pictures expected by patrons of a quality house. 512
Like Taylor-Hobson, Bausch & Lomb used advertisements to educate consumers on the criteria
of what constituted a quality lens. The advertisement claimed that a greater aperture in the lens
was not enough, and also emphasized that the lens quality was, on the judgment of “unbiased
experts,” “uniformly reliable in quality.” By 1925, advertisements shifted to promote a
“Cinephor Projection System” that promoted an increase in illumination with without additional
expense, and depending on the type of light and operating conditions, “Illumination can be
increased up to 25 percent.” 513 In comparison to the discourse surrounding anastigmats, which
emphasized the importance of faithfully reproducing an image, discussions of lens quality
became predicated on discussions of efficiency, percentages, and systems: language that spoke to
the manufacture, rather than capture, of visual reality.
It is unclear to what extent the Cinephor was used in theaters in comparison to TaylorHobson Cinema Projection Lenses. Both companies promoted their extensive use in the film
industries. Regardless, both Bausch & Lomb and Taylor-Hobson mobilized a desire for quality

“Announcing – Bausch & Lomb Cinephor,” Moving Picture World, August 27, 1921, 939.
“Bausch & Lomb Cinephor Projection System,” Better Theaters Section of Exhibitors Herald, November 7, 1925,
44.
512
513

175

Figure 22 Cinephor Ads 1921 and 1925.

in the motion picture industry that was based on the potential quality and profit values of a
systemic approach to film technologies. By 1924, Taylor-Hobson had begun to establish a
reputation as a lens company that could deliver not only technical standardization, but also the
technical quality that so many film technology companies sought to cultivate.
While Taylor-Hobson was frequently discussed in British trade press such as The Cinema
News and Property Gazette and Kinematograph Weekly, Taylor-Hobson was infrequently
discussed in regular Hollywood trade press prior to 1925. One way that Taylor-Hobson became
discussed and used by Hollywood was through professional trade societies, which were
significantly preoccupied with improving projection quality from 1920 to 1924. Much like the
Society of Glass, throughout the early 1920s, many SMPE papers became dedicated to
improving projection and screen illumination. In addition to articles such as “Reflection
Characteristics of Projection Screens” and “Absorption and Reflection Losses in Motion Picture
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Objectives,” in 1920 the Society convened committees to consider creating a correspondence
course for educating projectionists and to test the effect of color in projection. In these papers,
factors like interior illumination, the elimination of excessively bright surfaces, and proper
screen brightness were suggested for consideration by the motion picture engineer “in order that
the maximum of visual comfort may be obtained.” 514 In L.C. Porter’s 1922 President’s Address,
he identified projection lenses as a key problem for the SMPE:
Many of us know that there is a difference in definition, or sharpness of picture projected
with various lenses, yet no one knows how to measure it in exact terms, so that one lens
may be compared with any other lens in quantitative units…At present only about five
percent of the light generated for motion picture projection ultimately reaches the screen.
What an enormously inefficient thing a projector is! 515
These sentiments were echoed by a number of other papers discussed by the SMPE in the early
1920s. A 1922 article by F.H. Richardson, “Projection and Its Importance to the Industry,”
observed that while a number of exhibitors were making good business on the basis of proper
projection, “progressive exhibitors and theatre managers of this type are still very greatly in the
minority.” 516 Richardson connected the importance of projection not just to theatre managers, but
studio production more broadly. Poor projection, in this respect, affected the reputation and
quality of the director, the producer, and the actor. Richardson’s paper positioned engineering
and technology as a way to improve the quality and value of the motion picture industry not as a
series of discrete and separate professional practices, but as an integrated and efficient system.
The optical engineers’ embrace of cinema as an integrated system of production mirrored
a shift that was also occurring in the field of cinematography. In January of 1925, American
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Cinematographer announced that it would
be regularly including a section on
Projection in each of their issues. The
creation of the Projection department was
significant enough to merit a cover
announcement. The goal of this new regular
section was to bring about “the perfect
screen presentation” by virtue of creating
“the closest possible relationship” between
the projectionist and the cinematographer. 517
American Cinematographer was not the first
dedicated and regular publication about
Figure 23 Cover of the January 1925 American Cinematographer.

projection. Notable antecedents included

James R. Cameron’s Motion Picture Projection (1919), and F.H. Richardson’s extensive
columns in Moving Picture World. But, American Cinematographer’s Projection Department did
precede a number of other dedicated projection journals like The Motion Picture Projectionist
(1927), Projection Engineering (1929), and International Projectionist (1931). American
Cinematographer’s decision to establish a Projection section in what was classically a journal for
cinematographers placed motion picture production quality in an explicit conversation with
motion picture distribution quality – an alignment significantly motivated by the vertical
integration of the studios during this time. 518
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In this respect, the appointment of Earl J. Denison as Projection department section editor
– and the extensive biographic review of his professional qualifications in the January 1925
announcement – was a decisively political choice. Denison, in addition to being an active
member of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers, was also a longstanding motion picture
engineer for the Famous Players-Lasky. 519 The article commemorating his appointment
emphasized his long history in the testing and inspection of cinema projection technologies,
noting that in his six years of work for Players-Lasky he had “invented and perfected a number
of devices now in use by the Paramount organization in connection with inspection, splicing and
projection of film.” 520 The promotion of Denison and the Projection department highlighted the
extreme importance of bringing together cinematographers and projectionists in service of
establishing consistent quality for the studios.
As of 1925, aligning the quality of picture taking and picture projection had become
paramount for the Players-Lasky. The Famous Players-Lasky was formed in 1916 as a merger of
Adolph Zukor’s Famous Players Film Company, the Jesse L. Lasky Feature Play Company, and
the Paramount Pictures Corporation – which distributed Lasky and Famous Players films.
Players-Lasky’s investment in stars such as Mary Pickford, Rudolph Valentino, and Gloria
Swanson led to escalating productions costs, but high-investment pictures appeared to be one of
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the few reliable markers of financial success in the early 1920s. As Benjamin B. Hampton
writes:
Bigness–elaborateness–sumptuousness–lavishness–these seemed to constitute the elusive
“quality” the public wanted. “Bigger and better” seemed to be the infallible recipe for
success. These words were repeated so often in newspapers, trade journals, and fan
magazines in 1922, that “bigger and better pictures” became the slogan of the studios. 521
Illustrative of a broader tendency to sell “bigger and better pictures,” Players-Lasky’s
coordination of production and exhibition was carried out under the corporate goal of “better
motion pictures, better theaters, better business, and of continued growth and expansion of the
entire industry.” 522 To create higher quality pictures across production and distribution, in 1925,
Famous Players-Lasky engaged in an alliance with the Balaban & Katz theater chain. The
alliance meant that Balaban & Katz gained access to “the top Hollywood feature films” and the
Famous Players-Lasky had dramatically expanded the extent of their vertically integrated studio
model. 523 The alliance also spoke to the ever-increasing vertical integration that the Famous
Players-Lasky, soon to be named Paramount, was enacting in film production. The concentration
of theater control proceeded rapidly, and by 1924, “nearly all of the first-run houses in the United
States and Canada had been acquired by Paramount, Loew’s, Inc., the Stanley Company, and
large circuits affiliated with the Zukor, Loew, Mastbaum and First National groups.” 524 While
the Players-Lasky emphasized the centrality of quality storytelling, the quality narrative product
that it promoted was built on standardization, vertical integration, and the centralized creative
control of the motion picture production process from conception to distribution.
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The standardization of motion picture equipment, which included lenses, was an
important part of this industrial push for ‘quality’ cinema. Taylor-Hobson’s coordination of
optical quality across taking and projection lent itself well to the Players-Lasky’s efforts to
harmonize technical quality across multiple stages of production. Between 1924 and 1926,
Taylor-Hobson became very closely aligned with two of Hollywood’s most central players: the
Famous Players-Lasky and Bell & Howell. Frank E. Garbutt, a director of photography for
Players-Lasky, wrote to Taylor-Hobson in 1926 to confirm that “Over 100 Cooke lenses of
various focal lengths are used by the photographic department of Famous Players-Lasky
Studios.” 525 Garbutt was a special technical advisor to the Players-Lasky’s new west coast film
lab in 1922. 526 The use of Cooke lenses on a number of Bell & Howell professional cameras
positioned Cooke lenses at the intersection of ongoing efforts to promote technological
standardization in perhaps the largest vertically integrated studio of the time.
By 1925, Taylor-Hobson had firmly established itself as a lens maker that could cater
specifically to the technical and quality requirements of the film industry. As suggested by The
Cinema News and Property Gazette in the summer of 1925:
Whether it be in connection with their now famous wide aperture and other high-grade
cine-projector lenses, or with their equally fine cine-camera lenses, the name of TaylorHobson is becoming daily more closely associated with the picture-making and showing
industry of this country. 527
From their growing reputation in projection systems, Taylor-Hobson caught the eye of another
technology company: Bell & Howell. It is through Cooke’s industrial relationship to Bell &
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Howell that Cooke lenses became most explicitly linked to the cinema in both the professional
and the popular imagination.

Quality Lenses for Quality Cameras: Bell & Howell, Filmo, Eyemo, and Pioneer Cameras
Unsurprisingly, one reason that Cooke lenses became so closely associated with cinema
production was due to their use on a wide number of Hollywood films. Indeed, the use of Cooke
lenses in studio production was touted both by Cooke’s own advertisements and by popular
commentary around the company. As suggested in 1926 by “The Observation Window” of
Kinematograph Weekly:
It deserves to be better realized in the photographic world to what extent Taylor-Hobson
lenses have come into favour in the sound-film and silent-film studios in England and in
Hollywood. The Cooke lenses of very large aperture have been establishing themselves
increasingly in film production for several years past…Frequenters of the movies may
reckon therefore that most of the pictures which they see are both produced and projected
by means of lenses made in the Leicester factories of Messrs. Taylor, Taylor of Hobson,
Ltd., where so many photographic objectives have been originated and made. 528
How and why Cooke lenses came to be used so regularly in cinema productions, though, was
more complex than a simple question of objective technical quality. Rather, the reputation and
perceived prestige quality of Cooke lenses – a reputation based strongly on their work on
projection in the early 1920s – was a useful tool for camera manufacturers att empting to capture
and create professional and amateur markets for motion picture equipment.
One of the primary reasons that Cooke lenses became so closely branded as “cinema
lenses” was due to Bell & Howell’s investment in the amateur film and photography market. 529

“The Observation Window,” Supplement to Kinematograph Weekly, September 9, 1926, 71.
It’s difficult to know to what extent Bell & Howell and Cooke were affiliated – according to Patricia Zimmerman,
the warehouse of Bell & Howell archives disappeared from Skokie, Illinois, in the 1980s. However, given that Bell &
Howell took control of Taylor, Taylor & Hobson in 1930 until they sold TTH to Rank Organization – a British
entertainment conglomerate – in 1946, there is strong evidence to suggest that Cooke lenses were an important
part of Bell & Howell’s technological environment.
528
529

182

As the amateur market for lenses and cameras
grew extensively during the 1920s, Bell and
Howell mobilized the culture capital of Cooke
lenses to sell amateur and semi-professional
camera equipment. 530 As Marzola writes, “the
amateur would use Bell & Howell cameras with
Cooke lenses if the Hollywood cinematographer
did.” 531 Much like how the term “anastigmat”
was first used to describe Zeiss’ 1890 Anastigmat
lens but was later used to sell lenses of dubious
quality, the term cinema lens described a specific
series of lenses manufactured for studio practice
but also came to be used in a commercial effort to
sell more mid-range equipment. In branding
Cooke lenses as cinema lenses, Bell & Howell
both differentiated their own studio-specific
Figure 24 An advertisement featuring Bell & Howell’s three
flagship cameras, the Filmo, the Eyemo, and the
Professional Standard. McKay. Handbook of Motion Picture
Photography 1927.

offerings while simultaneously using Cooke’s
prestige to better leverage the sale of motion
picture equipment to amateur consumers.

In 1924, when Bell & Howell entered into a closer business arrangement with Cooke,
Bell & Howell had dire need for the kind of technical quality that Cooke was known for. Bell
and Howell had overtaken Pathé Professionals as the standard studio camera and, by 1920,
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studios were almost “100% Bell and Howell equipped.” 532 However, during the early 1920s, the
Mitchell camera company increasingly challenged Bell & Howell for control over the motion
picture camera supply. As Marzola writes, while Bell & Howell claimed that 95% of American
feature films were shot on their cameras in 1922, between 1922 and 1925, Bell & Howell had
begun to experience stiff competition from Mitchell. 533 Mitchells and Bell & Howell cameras
remained the two standard studio cameras through the late silent period. However, by 1925, Bell
& Howell were beginning to lose their prominent place in motion picture camera supply. Bell &
Howell sought to differentiate itself as a technologically progressive company by drawing on
Cooke’s reputation as a high-end optical manufacturer.

Cooke lenses were advertised in conjunction with Bell & Howell as early as 1924 as part
of a portable motion picture camera and companion projector. The portable camera, advertised
with the note that “Bell and Howell creations give attention to professional and amateur alike,”
came with a Cooke 25mm F/3.5 anastigmat. 534 In a 1927 advertisement for the Filmo, Bell &
Howell explained that the Cooke lens was the primary incentive for consumers to buy a more
expensive Filmo camera. The advertisement, beginning with the header “Why it pays to pay
more for this camera,” immediately extols that the Filmo is “regularly equipped with a highest
quality anastigmat, Taylor-Hobson Cooke, 25 m/m F 3.5 aperture lens. No lower-priced movie
camera affords such a lens.” 535 Inviting consumers to make edits, transitions, cartoons, and
effects “familiar to you on the theatre screen,” Bell & Howell sought to combine the allure of
high-quality motion pictures with the perceived “future years of satisfaction” provided by a more
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expensive lens. 536 The practice of connecting
expensive technology to consumer quality to
consumers would continue on throughout the
late 1920s. For example, in a February 1927
advertisement in Amateur Movie Makers, Bell
& Howell placed a two page advertisement with
the heading “All the tricks used in Professional
Movies Are made available to you through Bell
& Howell equipment and accessories.” 537 Bell
& Howell used the glamour of Cooke and
Hollywood to sell consumers on the value of a
higher priced camera.
Figure 25 “Why it pays to pay more for this Camera.”
Amateur Movie Makers. February 1927. 42.

Bell & Howell’s explicit emphasis on the
Filmo’s Cooke lenses was likely a commercial

response to one of the notable postwar entries into the amateur motion picture camera market,
the ICA Kinamo camera. ICA (Internationale Camera Aktiengesellschaft) was a subsidiary
division of Zeiss that was created in 1909 for the consolidation of its camera manufacturing
operations. 538 In 1921, ICA began marketing the Kinamo, a compact 35mm movie camera
designed for handheld filming. Emanuel Goldberg, the designer of the camera, had originally
been hired by Zeiss in the midst of World War I to develop military products. Following the war,
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Goldberg shifted from working on military applications to small cameras. 539 The Kinamo N25,
which was advertised from January 1924 to April 1924 in American Cinematographer, was
described as a “semi-professional motion picture or cine camera” and was advertised as
including “the Carl Zeiss Tessar f 3.5, the lens with which the best feature films have been
made.” 540 In an effort to increase Kinamo sales, short movies advertising the uses of the camera
were also packaged with the Zeiss Ikon logo around 1926. 541 The inclusion of a Zeiss lens, and
an emphasis on the connection between the lens and professional film productions, was a way for
ICA to increase the perceived prestige and quality of the amateur camera. As Bell & Howell
began to enter the amateur market, the Kinamo illustrated the potential that lens brands held for
selling the perceived quality of amateur cameras.
In addition to the Filmo, Bell & Howell’s diversified its camera options with the Eyemo
camera. The Eyemo was released in 1925, around the same time that Bell & Howell began to
advertise itself as the United States distributor of Cooke lenses. According to “A Cooke Look
Back,” “Every Eyemo camera was supplied with Cooke lenses made in Leicester, England. Bell
& Howell wanted high-end, quality lenses at a reasonable cost and Taylor-Hobson became Bell
& Howell’s main supplier.” 542 Similar to the Filmo, the Eyemo was marketed for semiprofessional use. Designed as a handheld camera, the Eyemo was used extensively for newsreel
footage, stunts, special effects shots, and rapid footage. Many Eyemo advertisements included
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images of or comparisons to the Pioneer Professional Standard, further linking the Eyemo to Bell
& Howell’s professional reputation in studio production. 543
Cooke’s prestige was also used by equipment vendors to sell higher quality lenses to still
photographers. On a commercial level, cinema’s aura was used to upsell photographers on higher
priced equipment. However, these lenses also served as a site of connection between
photographers and the cinema. After Joseph DuBray visited the 1928 meeting of the
Photographers Association of America as a representative of the ASC, he reflected that:
All of the photographers told me that they were following very closely the results that the
cinematographers are obtaining for the screen….I carried the investigation further, and
learned that the photographer is not selling any larger number of pictures by asking the
client to choose the style desired from an album; the client himself specifies this style
referring to some motion picture that has apparently struck his fancy. 544
Photographers were increasingly drawing on the cinema for aesthetic inspiration. As Karl Struss,
cinematographer for Murnau’s Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans (1927), similarly suggested in
“Photographic Modernism and the Cinematographer,” the tendency of 1920s photography to
suggest motion in static compositions “in truth had its inspiration in the achievements of the
silent cinema.” 545 Struss observed that there were few examples of modernist or surrealist
photography prior to the release of German or Russian silent films, notably The Cabinet of Dr.
Caligari (1920), Variety (1925), and the Soviet films of Eisenstein and Tisse. 546 Somewhat
cynically, Struss suggested that “More than a few of the modernists owe their success not so
much to the understanding or application of pure photographic artistry as to an unusual knack of
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‘freezing’ motion with a speed camera” – speed cameras that used the same kinds of high speed
lenses used for cinematography. 547 Cooke’s fast lenses helped create the rapid, handheld, and
accessible camerawork of the 1920s. But, the movement of equipment from studios to amateur
markets should be seen as more complex than a technologically-driven change imposed by
technology companies. The prestige associated with quality lenses, like Cooke, served as a site
of access and identification for amateur practitioners to connect their photographic practices to
those of the Hollywood studio.
Cooke’s reputation served the particular kind of consumer that Bell & Howell sought to
attract with the Filmo and Eyemo cameras: the semi-professional. As Bell & Howell engineer
Joseph DuBray suggested in 1929, motion picture use was not solely divided between amateur
and studio practice:
[C]an we really call amateurs the number of researchers who today have recourse to
motion picture photography as an aid to their investigation? The doctor who records in
motion pictures the action of living organisms or the performance of operations? The
industrialist who applies motion pictures to the precise recording of the functioning of the
machines or products he manufactures, the educator who, more and more, realizes the
great possibilities of motion pictures as a mighty collaborator? 548
Doctors, industrialists, educators: this set of modern motion picture practitioners, which DuBray
defined as the “semi-professional,” desired more than just the ability to make “simple pictures”
or to “rely solely on the interest they awaken just because they ‘move’ on the screen.” 549 DuBray
linked Bell & Howell’s cameras to an imagined desire on the part of consumers to add “beauty to
the picture, to express his artistic sentiments in them, to rival the cinematographic results that he
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daily sees on the thousands of theatre screens all over the country.” 550 Given that George
Eastman allegedly told William Taylor in the 1930s that “90% of the 16mm film used in
America passed behind lenses made in Leicester,” Cooke’s reputation helped foster a strong
imagined connection between semi-professional movie makers, quality, and studio practice. 551
While Cooke’s lenses may have begun as a way for
Bell & Howell to convince consumers to buy more
expensive cameras, the maintenance of this idea relied on
Cooke lenses being used by professionals. As early as 1925,
the same year that Bell & Howell was beginning to
distribute its Filmo and Eyemo cameras, Bell & Howell
succeeded Burke & James as the primary distributors for
Cooke lenses in the United States. 552 In an August 1925
issue of American Cinematographer, Bell and Howell
announced that it distributed “a complete line of Taylor
Hobson Cooke lenses, including the F 2 and the F 2.5” and
that Bell and Howell was the United States distributor for
the Taylor-Hobson Cooke lenses. 553 Bell & Howell began to
specifically advertise their sale of Cooke lenses with
Figure 26 Bell & Howell begins advertising
Cooke Lenses in 1925. American
Cinematographer. August 1925. 17.

dedicated advertisements about their fast F/2 and F/2.5
lenses, which were used by studios. Given that Bell &
Howell was increasingly branding its Pioneer Professional
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Standard cameras as the camera that “never grows obsolete no matter how old,” Bell & Howell’s
sale of Cooke lenses enabled them to maintain a commercial relationship with camera owners
long after they had purchased their camera. 554
Through their association with Bell & Howell in the late 1920s, Cooke lenses became
consistently associated with cinematic production, particularly in their use on PlayersLasky/Universal Pictures. In 1926, Kinematograph Weekly reported that over a hundred Cooke
lenses were in use by the photographic department of the Famous Players-Lasky studios. In
1928, The Kinematograph Year Book reported that Paramount had standardized the use of
Cooke’s F/2 lenses on all of their cinema cameras. 555 Cooke lenses may have been advertised for
their use on a number of motion picture cameras, but it is useful to remember that lenses were
also interchangeable. Simply because a camera came equipped with a Cooke did not necessarily
mean that cinematographers would use that lens, or use it for very long. Zeiss, Goerz,
Voigtlander, and Astro lenses were widely in use during the 1920s. However, regardless of
whether cinematographers used Cooke lenses, the clear attachment of Cooke lenses to PlayersLasky productions offered Taylor-Hobson a somewhat reliable business agreement with one of
the more prolific studios of the era.

Quality Control: Fast Glass and Studio Practice
Cinematographers increasingly used large aperture lenses, or fast glass, through the
1920s. The desire for faster lenses in and of itself was not new. Since the 19th century, lens
designers had been preoccupied with finding the optimal balance between high speed and low
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distortion. An effectively corrected lens often resulted in less light; greater light usually meant a
decrease in the sharpness and clarity of the lens. What was new, though, was that beginning in
the 1920s, there was a significant increase in what speeds were functional and viable in motion
picture practice. Lenses that could work at f/1.9 and f/2, approximately four times faster than the
typical speed of 3.5, enabled a significant increase in the amount of light available for motion
picture capture. The speed in and of itself was not significant; as early as 1913, C.C. Minor was
granted a patent for an f/.5 lens. 556 What was significant about the fast glass of the 1920s was
that these lens could let in those levels of light while also exposing a 35mm field at a level of
clarity and definition that was satisfactory and legible for studio production. Cinema lenses
needed to be more than just technically fast: lenses needed to be practically functional on set.
There were many fast lenses produced for motion picture work from 1920 to 1925, such
as the Minor f/1.7 (1920), the Dallmeyer F/1.9 (1920), the Gundlach-Manhattan f/1.9
Ultrastigmat (1922), the Bausch & Lomb Ultra f/2.7 Rapid Anastigmat (1922), the F/2 Kino
Plasmat (1924), and the Astro Berlin f/2.3 Pan Tachar (1925). Many of these lenses were
postwar refinements of existing lens designs. According to W.B. Rayton, optical designer at
Bausch & Lomb, simply increasing the diameter of a lens did not result in a faster lens. But,
some of the “old standard types of lenses” were found to “possess capabilities of expansion in
speed in the short focal lengths employed in motion picture work.” 557 Although fast lenses were
frequently discussed in terms of technical merit, lenses were not adopted solely by the film
industry on the basis of objective technical superiority or by virtue of the fastest lens. Rather,
lenses were adopted on a wide range of criteria ranging from personal preference to distributor
location to the latest wave of technical vogue. While Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson suggest
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that “We should not directly compare the aperture settings of the ultraspeed and soft-focus lenses
of the twenties with the regular lenses in use at the time,” the trade press often did. 558 As Karl
Brown proclaimed in his 1922 article, “Super-speed Lenses,” “The super-speed lenses are
certainly equal in every way to the slower lenses, and there seems to be no reason why they
should not become the standard, every-day utility lens.” 559 This did not mean that
cinematographers were necessarily using the lens at its widest aperture. Rather, these fast lenses
presented the cinematographer with more control over a wider range of available light.
In addition to meeting professional expectations of fidelity, fast lenses provided another
important affordance for practitioners working in the studio system: flexibility. Speed was
perhaps the greatest quality of a lens for cinematographic flexibility. As Joseph A. DuBray wrote
in 1930, “For Cinematographic Lenses, it may be stated that the ultimate goal of the optician is
to minimize the effects of the various aberrations which are inherent with the physical properties
of glass and at the same time reach the maximum possible luminosity or speed.” 560 Correction of
aberrations was a familiar expectation for lens design, but the emphasis on speed was driven by
how studios framed light as a resource that needed to be effectively managed. Although cinema
lenses were still often anastigmatic, the name shift from Zeiss Anastigmat to brand names like
the Kino Hypar and Cooke Speed Panchro increasingly described motion picture lenses that were
designed on the basis of cinema’s industrial requirements. To design a cinema lens in the 1920s
was to design a lens for increasingly manufactured and studio-specific lighting environments. In
these artificial environments, light was a resource to be efficiently managed rather than
objectively captured or recorded.
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The Taylor-Hobson f/2 lenses, in particular, gained significant popularity in
cinematography in the mid-1920s. 561 Motion Picture News reported on the use of Taylor-Hobson
Series IIa lenses for motion picture photography as early as 1916, but higher praise was reserved
for the lenses of Voigtlander, Goerz, Dallmeyer, Bausch & Lomb, and Zeiss. 562 The IIa was the
primary lens for cinema use that Cooke produced prior to the war. Although it’s less clear what
motion picture lenses Cooke sold in the early 1920s, in a 1919 patent notice for the Opic in The
British Journal of Photography, Taylor-Hobson described the optical glass construction for the
Opic with specific reference to the optical glass supplied from the catalogues of Parra-Mantois
and the Chance Brothers. 563 A 1935 article, “The Historical Background of the Speed Panchro
Lens,” suggests that Taylor-Hobson introduced an F/2 lens in 1920 as the “Kinic” lens. 564 A
1922 catalog explicitly lists a Series I f/3.1 lens “For Motion Picture Taking.” 565 An earlier note
in the 1921 British Journal of Photography suggests that Taylor-Hobson was manufacturing
lenses with apertures as large as f/2.5, f/2, and f/1.9, but that manufacturing was “not sufficiently
advanced for these ultra-fast objectives to be listed in detail.” 566 While the early 1920s are
murkier in regards to Cooke’s dedicated camera lenses – and the extent to which they were used
– the Cooke lens that gained a significant amount of use in the studios was the 1924 Series O F/2
lens.
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In 1924, H.W. Lee, from the Taylor-Hobson research department, gave a presentation to
The Optical Society of Britain on “The Taylor-Hobson F/2 Anastigmat.” In comparison to a
decade earlier, where information about lens craft was closely restricted to private firms, the
sharing and publication of this information made this information available to a much wider
community of practice. Professional societies also functioned as a site for Taylor-Hobson to
refine (and advertise) its investment in scientific design. Among Lee’s suggested uses for the F/2
Anastigmat – which included its existing applications for low-light theatrical photography and its
potential application in photographing meteors – was studio cinematography. As Lee wrote:
In kinematography, the lens should be valuable, especially in the studio, permitting of
photography with less intensely actinic light, which has been found so harmful to the
actors’ eyes. Fresh ground is being broken in other directions, though developments are
not so far advanced as to permit of further reference at present. 567
According to W. Taylor and H.W. Lee, while the large aperture lenses were initially rejected by
practitioners, one of the primary reasons for the adoption of these fast lenses was “the recent
development of fine-grain photographic emulsion for cinema film” that “stimulated a general
demand for small cameras and lenses of proportionately short focal length, greater consequent
depth of field, greater rapidity, and generally more critical definition.” 568 As Cooke was about to
enter into an agreement with Bell & Howell less than a year later, Lee’s 1924 presentation to The
Optical Society marked Taylor-Hobson’s emphatic shift from focusing on projection lenses to
focusing on camera lenses.
The industrial adoption of “fine-grain photographic emulsion” was one of the formative
industrial shifts that defined the design and adoption of Cooke’s flagship cinema lens, the Speed
Panchro. In 1926, changes in motion picture stock supply promised potential problems across
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exhibition and production. As Luci Marzola details in “Better Pictures Through Chemistry:
DuPont and the Fight for the Hollywood Film Stock Market,” Eastman Kodak’s control over the
supply of motion picture stock was challenged by the explosives company DuPont in the mid1920s. Dupont, like Taylor-Hobson, had entered the motion picture market through a need to
“create peacetime markets for its wartime facilities.” 569 Within a few short years – in no small
part due to its corporate research structure – DuPont had begun to manufacture and distribute
orthochromatic stock, and by the end of 1925, Dupont was manufacturing ortho negative in bulk.
Orthochromatic stock was standard in the film industry, but as of 1926, Kodak began to promote
and affordably supply panchromatic stock, which was faster and more sensitive to red light.
While Kodak had created panchromatic stock as early as 1913, the company only began to make
it functional and affordable in 1926 as a way to differentiate themselves from DuPont. 570
However, within a year, DuPont also began supplying panchromatic stock. Because
panchromatic stock was more sensitive to the red spectrum of light, the wide adoption of panchro
meant that studios needed to change their lighting systems from carbo arc lighting to
incandescent lighting to better function with panchromatic stock.
The competition between Kodak and DuPont peaked with the 1928 Mazda tests. Over
four months, tests comparing the use of Mazda incandescent lighting to carbon arc lighting were
carried out on the Warner Bros. lot. 571 As Marzola writes, the 1928 Mazda tests were the first
“great ‘scientific’ endeavor” of Hollywood. 572 While the Mazda tests were a benchmark
demonstration for ongoing changes to lighting and stock, these changes also created both
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technical and aesthetic challenges for lens designers. As DuBray wrote, “the use of panchromatic
film and corresponding use of light filters for the obtention of truer color renditions has proved a
crucial test of the chromatic correction of cinematographic objectives of large aperture.” 573 The
adoption of panchromatic stock did not just create a challenge for lighting systems: it also
generated a new set of problems for lens design.
The correction on existing lenses was slightly incompatible with the new studio stock and
lighting setups. To correct lenses for distortion, lens designers had historically compromised on
lens correction by focusing blue and yellow rays on a common point and getting the other rays,
notably red, “as close as possible.” 574 In studio standard arc lighting, the primary color was blue,
and so lenses used for motion picture production could be designed to focus on the best lighting
fit. Lenses could be imperfectly corrected for red light, but prior to incandescent lighting, this
was not a significant problem in studio practice. However, since incandescent lights gave off “a
preponderance of red and yellow light” and since panchromatic film was also very sensitive to
red light, the impending shift to panchromatic stock required lens designers to change the
chromatic correction in lenses to correct for the blue and red rays, rather than blue and yellow. 575
Cooke engineers Taylor and Lee, reflecting on the history of the photographic lens in
1935, would cautiously conclude that “No lens is perfect. When we say that aberrations are
corrected we mean not that they are reduced to zero but that they are confined within some
postulated circle of confusion, and that itself is imperfectly defined.” 576 The adoption of different
lights and standard film stock shifted the “imperfectly defined” circle of confusion of what
counted as reality in studio production. According to The International Photographer, many

DuBray, “Large Aperture Lenses in Cinematography,” 208.
Mitchell, “Historical Background of the Speed Panchro Lens,” 27.
575
Mitchell, “Historical Background of the Speed Panchro Lens,” 27.
576
Taylor and Lee. "The Development of the Photographic Lens," 518.
573
574

196

cinematographers had to “scrap a lot of their old lenses to use the new type lenses corrected for
the combination of panchromatic film and incandescent lighting.” 577 The shift from
orthochromatic stock to panchromatic stock revealed how situational optical correction was, and
cinema lenses were increasingly corrected against these artificial environments as studio lighting
departed from natural lighting.
Rather than thinking about the 1920s as motivated by one particular kind of technological
shift, the technological environment was characterized by precarity and flux. The change from
ortho to panchro stock was the first of a wave of changes to the film industry in the late 1920s.
Studio engineers were beginning to look towards sound, color, and wide formats.
Experimentations with sound recording techniques “reshuffled production practices several times
between 1926 and 1932, as studios and sound experts tested new technologies and filming
strategies.” 578 Any technological change, in this respect, needed to address both immediate needs
and potential future problems.
In a 1928 address to the SMPE, titled “Large Aperture Lenses in Cinematography,”
Joseph DuBray spoke strongly about how the long-term adoption of panchromatic stock would
present new challenges for lens production. DuBray spoke as an editor of American
Cinematographer, but he was also shortly to be hired as the director of Bell & Howell’s motion
picture camera division. 579 He began by noting that, between 1926 and 1928, designers and
manufacturers of photographic objectives had attempted to address the industry’s demand for
objectives possessing “the largest possible aperture compatible with the degree of sharpness and
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depth of focus which are requisite for the obtention of pleasing photographic results.” 580
According to DuBray, cinematographers desired fast glass for two reasons. First, these lenses
allowed for the “economic feature” of using “less light energy in photographing interior scenes”
and the possibility of working in “adverse outdoor conditions.” Second, these lenses offered
greater possibilities for “obtaining artistic photographic effects” through control over focus and
the lighting of the subject. 581 DuBray suggested that, in the face of the impending shift to
panchromatic stock, cinematographers would be faced with additional challenges to maintaining
control over the desired focus of their image.
Changes in stock and creative control posed a threat to the predominant aesthetic style of
the 1920s: soft-focus cinematography. While soft style had been used in a few films of the
1910s, such as The Marriage of Molly O (1916) and Broken Blossoms (1919), soft-focus
cinematography replaced deep focus as the pre-eminent style of the studio system in the
1920s. 582 Soft style was not just shallow focus, but also low-contrast developing, gauzes, filters,
soft-edged vignettes, smoke. Simply put, soft-style was not limited to lenses and was “Anything
that could reduce contrast and create diffusion.” 583 Because certain lenses were not wellcorrected for panchromatic stock, they created an out of focus image. The softness of these
images was not, however, intentional. Instead, the mis-match between older lenses and newer
stocks had the effect of over-softening the image, and this over-softening ran the risk of
diminishing the otherwise controlled use of soft focus cinematography during a period when
studios were especially interested in shoring up both creative control and public perceptions of
studio quality.
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For most of the silent period, the main cinematographic style emphasized sharp focus and
depth of field. 584 The film industry’s aesthetic emphasis on clarity and definition largely
paralleled the precision optical growth encouraged by the wartime boom. However, in the 1920s,
cinematography no longer emphasized sharp focus and depth of field as the criteria of effective
practice. As Karl Brown writes in his “Modern Lenses” series, the ideal of perfect definition held
force “until it dawned upon the photographic world that art was not necessarily a matter of
optical perfect definition…that it might be possible to make a good picture without this cherished
precision.” 585 The idea that cinematography was more than just an objective process of capturing
the world, and could be one of visual management, was the result of a number of different
influences – not, as Brown suggests, a dawning epiphany that struck cinematographers with the
light of inspiration. As Keating argues in Cinematography, three processes helped set the field of
cinematography as a professional practice in the 1920s: narrative integration, industrialization,
and aestheticization. 586 Through a combination of these processes, the professional role of
cinematographer began to become defined as one of artistry rather than as a technical role of the
cameraman. The electrification of lighting, in Keating’s history, is the most “large-scale
technical change impacting silent-period cinematography.” 587 The industrialization of motion
picture production affected both the responsibilities of the cinematographer, but also the
production process in which cinematographers came to participate. An increasingly industrial
practice required the technical coordination of camerawork with a number of other technical
practices.
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In his 1928 address to the SMPE, DuBray strongly advocated for the centrality of the lens
in soft-focus cinematography. While DuBray acknowledged that gauze and diffusing disks could
be used to soften an image, since film production took place over an extended period of time,
soft-focus lenses were more reliable and would produce a more consistent level of quality across
the picture. DuBray suggested that the softness ought to be “uniformly distributed over the field
of the picture [orig. emphasis]” and that “it should be of such a nature that it would be felt more
than actually seen [orig. emphasis].” 588 DuBray’s advocacy of large aperture lenses was, on the
surface, not based on aesthetic considerations. He repeatedly emphasized the importance of
efficiency, control, and the consistent value that large aperture lenses provided for studio
production over a period of time. However, DuBray’s emphasis on the subjective experience – of
spectators feeling rather than seeing the quality of the lens – was a fascinating departure from the
technical and scientific language that predominated his address to the SMPE.
“[F]elt more than actually seen” was a phrase that prefigured the combination of science
and artistry that Cooke used to characterize their creation of the Speed Panchro. According to
DuBray, “the exigencies of talking pictures and the definite adoption by the Motion Picture
Industry of Panchromatic Films” resulted in Arthur Warmisham, Optical Director of TaylorHobson, carrying out an extensive survey of production in Hollywood, New York, and
Europe. 589 From this research came the Speed Panchro lenses, which were designed for
“photographing with filtered or unfiltered daylight or with arc or incandescent lights as well.” 590
The extra light available with these lenses was also useful for sound filmmaking, which required
1) quieter but less powerful incandescent lights and 2) a faster frame rate when rates were
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standardized to twenty-four frames per second for sound recording. As studio production became
the dominant system of filmmaking during the 1920s, standardization – the correction of lenses
to the artificial, rather than the natural, world – became increasingly central to coordinating the
multiple technologies and technical roles involved in industrial film production. Lenses could
vary, but they needed to vary in relationship to the central object of the motion-picture industry:
celluloid film. This was clear on the November 1930 advertisement for the Speed Panchros,
which were advertised for their use on both orthochromatic and panchromatic film.
Bell & Howell’s 1930s lens advertisements illustrated that the relationship between craft,
mass production, and manufacturing had dramatically changed from the artisan days of lens
production. While craft practice connoted intuition and unreliability in the 19th century, the
optician-craftsman depicted by Bell & Howell combined scientific precision with the care
implied by artisanry. Furthermore, the advertisement of the Speed Panchro’s compatibility for
both standard and “wide” 65mm and 70mm film indicated that lenses were being considered in
relationship to the wide series of industrial changes that were not restricted to film form. Because
of changes to stock, sound, and color, Bell & Howell advertised their lenses as being adaptable
to a wide range of potential changes in the system. 591 Although wide formats did not become
standard in film production until the 1950s, experiments with wide format were increasing
throughout the late 1920s until the Great Depression ceased these initiatives. As Brian Winston
suggests, all technology often exists for years prior to its ‘invention,’ which generally marks
when a given technology takes shape as a result of its social necessity. 592 Rather than just
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Figure 27 Bell & Howell's advertisements in the October 1930 and November 1930 American Cinematographer emphasized
the value that scientifically crafted lenses offered film production.

progressive states of lens invention, the anticipation and uncertainty of what change would take
hold strongly influenced what lenses were, in fact, used.
The simultaneous specialization and flexibility of the Speed Panchro was ideally suited to
the context of a technologically shifting 1920s Hollywood. Cinematographers and studios
investing in equipment, particularly during a period of dramatic technological change, desired
lenses that could continue to work effectively with anticipated changes in the system. Lens
flexibility was not an explicit scientific criterion, but it was an implicit criterion for Hollywood
production. It was largely because of how lenses came to work with the rapidly changing
technological environment of the studios that the Speed Panchros came to be so closely
associated with the industrial infrastructure of studio production.
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Conclusion
In examining how and why Taylor-Hobson became entangled in Hollywood production,
we can see that the natural reputation of Cooke’s cinema lenses emerged from a constellation of
commercial changes that included both a postwar expansion of optical manufacturing and an
industrial consolidation of technological control in Hollywood studios. Although the Speed
Panchro secured a position as one of the central lenses of Hollywood, as this chapter has
suggested, it was the particular commercial endeavor of integrated optical, technical, and
commercial industry that shaped the conditions for the Panchro to emerge as such. As studios
replaced the natural world with a world built on artificial materials, a lens’ capacity to represent
natural reality was increasingly based on the embedded commercial relationship, rather than the
inherent technological properties, between the cinema lens and its artificial environment.
By examining lens development through its industrial infrastructure, we can see a close
entanglement between the development of classical Hollywood and the development of semiprofessional and amateur production of the 1920s. By the late 1920s, Bell & Howell had begun
to view Hollywood as a “small, ancillary market” rather than as its primary focus. 593 As Marzola
writes, while the financial interests of the company lay primarily in the amateur market, Bell &
Howell recognized the continued importance of Hollywood to the image of the company. 594
Rather than thinking of Hollywood as antithetical or necessarily distinct from photography or
semi-professional motion picture practice, in commercial optics, these communities of practice
also constructed Hollywood’s commercial and brand identity.
Following the use of Taylor-Hobson’s lenses in a range of newly formed technical
societies, Bell & Howell, and the Players-Lasky, Cooke lenses became a standard object in the
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studio system. The use of Cooke lenses for the Technicolor three strip process cameras – made
by the Mitchell camera company – only further cemented their alignment with Hollywood
production. As dramatically and sweepingly narrated by a 1938 Bell & Howell brochure:
In the United States, Paramount, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, and Warner Bros used Cooke
Speed Panchros almost exclusively. Fox, R.K.O., United Artists, Columbia, Universal,
and other studios were using them increasingly. In England, all film producers, including
British Gaumont, British & Dominion, London Films, and British International Pictures,
used these lenses. In other countries, Cooke Speed Panchros were used by the Russian
motion picture trust, in Australia by Cinesound and Australian Films, and by leading
studios in Austria, France, Italy, Germany, India, Japan, and South America. 595
The extent to which each of these companies did, in fact, use Cooke lenses, should at least
remain subject to skepticism. But this corporate mystification was an important part of Cooke’s
allure: that Cooke’s lenses could connect semi-professionals to the quality and precision of a
global film industry.
The connection between lenses and the cinema is the same idea that has sustained the
recent revival of Cooke lenses. For many years, Cooke lingered as a side division of TaylorHobson, which had gone on to focus more broadly on precision instrument design and
metrology. Les Zellan purchased the optical division of Taylor-Hobson in 1998, and in the years
since, “Cooke Optics Ltd.” has aggressively cultivated and commercialized its history in the film
industry. The historical revival of Cooke was aided, in no small part, by the Academy of Motion
Picture Arts and Sciences, which granted Cooke an Academy Award of Merit in 2013 for lenses
that “helped define the look of motion pictures over the last century.” 596 At the heart of these
accomplishments is the branded promise of the “Cooke Look,” a phrase that the Cooke website
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describes as “a sharp, subtle, smooth rendering that provides dimensionality and high contrast,
and pleases the eye.” 597
Formally trademarked in 2008 alongside the company’s split from its parent company,
Taylor-Hobson, the “Cooke Look” echoes DuBray’s 1928 remark about feeling, rather than
seeing, lens quality. The Cooke Look is often used in conjunction with the company’s newly
produced Speed Panchro. Cooke’s corporate website uses a number of quotes from directors of
photography and cinematographers to describe the Cooke Look. These quotes characterize the
aesthetic of the Look as natural, sharp yet soft, full of dimension, roundness, and full of subtlety.
For all that the language attempts to define the Cooke Look, the quotes only further mystify the
relationship between the lens and the image. The mystification of the Cooke Look and the Speed
Panchros draws on the historical aura of Cooke’s reputation in the film industry to lend warmth
and nature in the face of increasingly cold and sharp digital alternatives. In the context of a
pervasive melancholy surrounding the loss of film in cinema, cinema lenses have become a
powerful magnet for nostalgia and material fetishization.
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Conclusion | The Glass Age

When future history looks far backward to
the middle of the twentieth century, it may
well say: “At this period we have come to
another border-line. Mankind now having
passed through the unquiet turmoil of the
Machine Age was entering the Glass Age.”
5000 Years of Glass (1937)

In 5000 Years of Glass (1937), Frances Rogers and Alice Beard tell a sweeping tale of
the history, manufacture, and use of glass. The tome covers a long history of glassmakers, bottle
making, window panes, mirrors, gas and electric lighting casings, and lenses. From its earliest
invention myth to its use in modern safety, the book makes a compelling argument for glass’
impact not only on industry, but also on human consciousness. At the close of their work, Rogers
and Beard muse on how scientists, engineers, and artists were continuing to find more and more
applications for glass in the modern age. They declare: “When future history looks far backward
to the middle of the twentieth century, it may well say: ‘At this period we have come to another
border-line. Mankind now having passed through the unquiet turmoil of the Machine Age was
entering the Glass Age.’” 598
Film history has often thought of cinema as the art of the machine age. Formed at the
intersection of industrialization, mass transit, urbanization, and the rise a mass consumer culture,
cinema became “the single most expansive discursive horizon in which the effects of modernity
were reflected, rejected or denied, transmuted or negotiated.” 599 The machine age had a much
longer history than the 19th century industrial modernity from which cinema emerged. As Lewis
Mumford writes in Technics and Civilization (1934), the machine age was defined by more than
the factory and the steam engine. Before industrial modernity could take place on a mass scale,
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“a reorientation of wishes, habits, ideas, [and] goals was necessary.” 600 In order to understand the
role that technologies have played in modernity, Mumford writes, “one must explain the culture
that was ready to use them and profit by them so extensively.” 601 5000 Years of Glass ends its
foreword with a quote from Mumford; Rogers and Beard were likely familiar with Mumford’s
understanding of the Machine Age as a longer tradition of ideological and social transformation.
In proclaiming the advent of the Glass Age as a way out from the “unquiet turmoil” of the
Machine Age, 5000 Years of Glass foregrounds the material poetics of glass and its potential to
bring about utopian change through vision.
The multiple communities of practice that that emerged around lenses in the late 19th and
early 20th century – lens culture – believed in the strong utopian promise of lens-based vision.
Zeiss’ creation of new kinds of optical glass came about because Abbe believed that
improvements in the glass-making industry would benefit not only microscopy, but “all sciences
and arts that need optical appliances.” 602 The promise of lens technology was the promise of
seeing and understanding a world that existed beyond human eyes. As Dziga Vertov wrote in his
1926 instructions to the Kino-Eye Groups:
Our eyes see very little and very badly — so people dreamed up the microscope to let
them see invisible phenomena; they invented the telescope…Now they have perfected the
cinecamera to penetrate more deeply into the visible world, to explore and record visual
phenomena so that what is happening now, which will have to be taken account of in the
future, is not forgotten. 603
At the same time that lenses were being industrially defined as cinema lenses par excellance,
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lenses were at the heart of a wide range of visual experiments in the 1920s that sought to
radically reconfigure the social relationship between vision and technology. As Michel Frizot
writes in “The Poetics of Eye and Lens,” the notion that the eye’s optical role could be
transferred to the lens “reappeared in the context of the 1920s avant-garde in a more theoretical
and technological form, as an eye-lens analogy and a new eye-photography combination.” 604
Collectively, Vertov’s Kino-Glaz (Cine Eye), the French Avant-Garde, and the Neues Sehen
(New Vision) photography movements suggested that the “frenzy of the visible” of the mid-19th
century had returned with a vengeance.
Among these experiments were a set of short films titled the “Looney Lens” series.
Filmed by Fox News and Fox Movietone cameraman Al Brick between 1924 and 1927, the three
short films use optical distortions to playfully rearrange the visual forms of people, city streets,
and skyscrapers. Echoing the split images of skyscrapers and manic cityscapes that would later
appear in Dziga Vertov’s Man With a Movie Camera (1929), the “Looney Lens” series plays
with the lens’ ability to disfigure and distort the space of lived experience. These distortions were
from more than just the lens, though. A title card for “Split Skyscrapers / Tenth Avenue, NYC”
(1924) declares that “New Year Festivities Make New York Dizzy,” and “Crazy cameraman,
with looney lens, finds the city all in a whirl.” While the lens may be looney, what it sees is the
whirlwind of modern experience: dizziness, motion, rushing traffic, and an unstable yet exciting
experience of vision unmoored from the human eye.
The wide interest in exploring the relationship between technology and vision was aided,
in no small part, by the industrialization of lens production described in this project. In
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Figure 28 Stills from Anamorphic People (1927), Pas De Deux (1924), and Split Skyscrapers / Tenth Avenue, NYC (1924).

expanding precision lens production to markets outside of professional scientific practice, optical
manufacturers brought lenses into intersection with a wider and wider range of commercial,
political, and professional communities. The history of the lens is not simply a series of everimproving technical designs that move towards the complete correction of optical distortion or
the perpetual acceleration of functional apertures. Rather, a lens was constituted by a gradual
reconfiguration of ideas about the relationship between vision and technology, and what role
lenses could play in society more broadly. Lenses were also constituted by national communities
who imagined lens production in relationship to national identity and labor, and the production
of lenses was influenced by the ways in which industries navigated and constituted their
respective national and international identities. Cinema lenses were defined on the basis of
specialized studio practice, but they were also defined by instrument sellers who sought to sell
lenses to a growing community of semi-professional practitioners. If cinema was an art of the
209

lens as much as it was an art of celluloid film, through the industrialization of lenses, the
cinematic character of modernity expanded to places that were less and less restricted by access
to lens technology.
The Glass Age never came to pass, but we may nonetheless find ourselves in the Age of
Windows. As Anne Friedberg writes in The Virtual Window, the architectural function of
windows – an opening for light and ventilation – gradually transformed alongside film,
television, and computers to function more primarily as a frame for viewing. Glass materialized
the exchange between frame and view, and allows spectators to “inhabit, in a virtual sense, two
or more spaces at one, and equally, two or more times.” 605 While these virtual windows are
rarely made of glass, they still retain the same imaginative potential of the lens: to see a world in
ways that exceed the limitations of single human perspective. Interspersed between The Virtual
Window’s primary chapters on the history of the screen are a variety of philosophers and critical
theorists whose theories serve as ‘lenses’ through which Friedberg refracts contemporary terms
used to describe technology ̶ window, frame, virtual, screen ̶ through a historical perspective.
In Friedberg’s book, lenses are a way to adjust contemporary views of media to “vanishing
points deeper than the last century.” 606 Philosophers become ways of seeing that make visible the
ways we think about historical relationships between subjects, environments, and the perception
of both.
The phrase “to look through a lens” has become a popular cultural shorthand for
perspective. We look through feminist lenses, critical lenses, black lenses, historical lenses, and
wide lenses; we zoom in and out, we frame, we change our lenses, we focus. As metaphors,
lenses frame the act of perceiving and are useful in negotiating the contractions that emerge
605
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between individual perception and increasingly multiple views. As objects, lenses shape the way
we see and understand the world. Through the industrialization of lens production, lenses
circulated more and more widely and became a powerful metaphor for the apprehension of the
increasingly heterogeneous visual culture that constituted modernity.
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